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JURISDICTION OF COURT 
Defendants, Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union 
Pacific") and Paul Kleinman, hereinafter sometimes referred to 
jointly as "Union Pacific" agree with plaintiffs' jurisdictional 
statement. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Union Pacific accepts plaintiffs' statement of the 
issues. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Section 54-4-14, et seg., U.C.A. (1990). 
23 U.S.C. § 101, et seg. (Highway Safety Act.) 
23 U.S.C. § 409. 
45 U.S.C. § 421, et seg. (Rail Safety Act). 
23 C.F-R. Parts 646, 655(f), 924 
23 C.F.R. § 1204.4 
Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD). 
For the sake of brevity portions of the above statutes 
and regulations and relevant provisions from the MUTCD are set 
forth in full in the Addendum, as provided for in Rules 24(a)(6) 
and (f), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
STATEMENT OF TEE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Union Pacific accepts plaintiffs' statement of the 
nature of the case. 
Course of Proceedings Below 
Union Pacific takes exception to and/or supplements 
plaintiffs' statement of the course of the proceedings below as 
follows: 
1. Discovery - By their statements at p. 3 of their 
brief, plaintiffs would have the court believe that they were 
actively engaged in conducting discovery. To the contrary, it is 
important to note that after filing the Complaint in May 1984, 
plaintiffs conducted no discovery until they filed a set of 
Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents in 
February 1986, nearly two years later. It was not until the 
State and Union Pacific filed their motions for summary judgment 
in December 1986 and February 1987, respectively, that plaintiffs 
made any further efforts at discovery by filing another set of 
Interrogatories in March 1987. Such was the full extent of 
plaintiffs' efforts at discovery (no depositions were taken) by 
the time defendants filed their Motions for Summary Judgment. 
2. Substance Abuse Issue - Defendants produced 
evidence (police reports, toxicology reports and affidavit of Dr. 
Michael A. Peat) (R. 436, 426, 423, 421, 372, 324-321) of 
ingestion of marijuana and impairment of driving capacity by the 
driver, Patrick Duncan, prior to and/or at the time of the 
accident, and intended to rely on such evidence, in part, to 
argue that Duncan's negligence was the sole cause of the 
accident. Prior to the hearing on defendants' motions, 
plaintiffs filed affidavits from a medical doctor, Charles 
Becker, which, while not denying the ingestion of marijuana by 
Duncan and some resulting degree of impairment, raised an issue 
of fact as to whether Duncan was "impaired in any substantial 
manner" (emphasis added) at the time of the accident. 
Accordingly, defendants did not argue Duncan's alleged driving 
impairment as the cause of the accident at the hearing on the 
motions, and it was not so considered by the District Court. (R. 
485. ) 
3. Extra Hazardous Crossing Issue - In the courts 
below Union Pacific relied primarily upon photographs (R. 370, 
364, 339-337), to argue that the crossing was not more than 
ordinarily hazardous as a matter of law. Except in rebuttal to 
plaintiffs' misstatements of the evidence, Union Pacific did not 
rely on the affidavits of the Utah Department of Transportation 
("UDOT") surveillance team submitted by the State, largely 
because much of the information contained therein and the 
exhibits attached thereto are inadmissible pursuant to 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409. 
4. The Crommelin Affidavit - Plaintiffs' only 
evidence to counter what the physical facts showed concerning the 
wide-open nature of the crossing, was a single affidavit from an 
expert witness named Robert Crommelin (R. 00191); however, the 
District Court considered and then disregarded the Crommelin 
Affidavit on the grounds that it was premised upon erroneous and 
inadmissible facts. (R. 481-479). 
5, District Court Decision - The Court not only held 
that Union Pacific had no duty to improve the warning devices 
because of state law preemption, it also specifically and 
separately ruled that as a matter of law Union Pacific had no 
duty because the crossing was not more than ordinarily hazardous 
at the time of the accident. (R. 479-478.) 
6. Court of Appeals Decision - The Court of Appeals 
did not agree, as against Union Pacific, that "plaintiffs had 
stated a prima facie case of negligence, . . . ." To the 
contrary, the court specifically found "that plaintiffs failed to 
show negligence in operating the train or in entrusting its 
operation to Kleinman." The court also fully understood that the 
Crommelin Affidavit was plaintiffs' only evidence of negligence 
on the extra hazardous crossing issue, that the District Court 
had concluded that the affidavit should be disregarded on 
foundational grounds, and that the Court had additionally ruled 
that even if the affidavit were considered, the case should still 
be dismissed on its merits. It was because of this 
understanding, and in order to address the merits of the issue, 
that the Court of Appeals opted to take "Crommelin's opinion at 
face value." By doing so, the Court was hardly agreeing that 
plaintiffs had stated a prima facie case of negligence against 
Union Pacific. The court was just finding a way to address the 
merits of the issue by agreeing, arguendo, that the affidavit had 
created a question of material fact. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Union Pacific makes the following corrections and 
additions to plaintiff's Statement of Facts which Union Pacific 
believes to be incomplete and/or inaccurate in several material 
respects. 
The Accident 
1. The investigating Utah Highway Patrol Trooper, 
Terry C. Smith, reported that the weather was "clear or cloudy," 
rather than "raining" or "foggy." (R. 373, 431.) Plaintiffs' 
statement at page 5 of their brief, that the "weather was cloudy 
with a light rain falling," is incorrect. Neither should it be 
taken to imply that visibility, or the lack thereof (other than 
that which is incident to nighttime hours) was a factor in 
causing the accident. The only evidence (other than Trooper 
Smith's testimony) concerning visibility, is from Engineer 
Kleinman who testified that he had no difficulty in observing 
automobile traffic, including the plaintiffs' car, approach the 
crossing. (R. 450-449.) There is no support in the record for 
plaintiffs' contention that it was raining or that weather 
created visibility problems. 
2. Neither is there any evidentiary support for the 
contention that Patrick Duncan was unfamiliar with the crossing. 
There is nothing in the record to indicate how long Duncan had 
been living in Utah, nor whether he had ever driven over the 
crossing before. 
3. The only eyewitnesses to the collision were the 
train crew members. Engineer Kleinman's unchallenged testimony 
is that the train was travelling 40 m.p.h., 20 m.p.h. under the 
maximum speed allowed for the track and 10 m.p.h. under the 
maximum speed allowed for the train; the train's whistle and bell 
were sounding; and the train's double-sealed beam headlights (two 
headlights) and a flashing yellow strobe light on top of the 
leading engine were operating. Kleinman observed the automobile 
for approximately one-quarter mile prior to reaching the 
crossing. He believed that the automobile could stop for the 
crossing. At the point where he first realized that the 
automobile was not going to stop, the train was so close to the 
crossing that it was not possible to avoid the accident. (R. 
451-448.) 
4. The train's signal devices (whistle, bell, 
headlights, strobe light) were manufactured and installed to 
perform at levels which substantially exceeded the standard set 
by the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA") in 49 C.F.R. § 
229.125, et sea. Significantly, the candle power of the engine's 
headlight was three times more powerful than that which is 
required by the FRA standard (600,000 candle power versus 200,000 
candle power). (R. 447-446.) 
5. There is evidence that the automobile's AM/FM 
stereo and tape deck was turned up to a high decibel level. 
According to Trooper Smith's incident report, the volume knob was 
"adjusted to approximately three-quarters of the way to full 
volume" at the time he inspected the car following the accident. 
(R. 434, 429.) 
6. Neither Trooper Smith nor Tooele County Deputy 
Sheriff Dennis Andrews, an expert accident reconstruction!st who 
also investigated the accident, could find evidence that the 
automobile left skid marks. (R. 373, 335.) Based upon such 
evidence, the evidence indicating the tremendous force with which 
the automobile and train collided (Incident Report, beginning at 
R. 429), and Engineer Kleinman's testimony concerning his 
observation of the automobile's approach to the crossing (R. 
451), the conclusion seems inescapable that plaintiffs made 
little if any effort to stop for the train. 
The Railroad Crossing 
1. The uncomplicated, unobstructed, and rural nature 
of the crossing is best exemplified by the photographs taken 
following the accident (R. 370, 337-339), and the aerial 
photograph attached to the Affidavit of Joseph F. Varoz. (R. 
365.) These photographs clearly show a total absence of any 
obstructions to view as well as any other factors which might 
have confused or distracted plaintiffs and prevented them from 
perceiving the existence and location of the crossing and the 
train's hazardous proximity thereto. 
2. The open, greater than 90° nature of the crossing 
angle (approximately 136°) (R. 367) should have made it easier 
for plaintiffs to observe the train. Plaintiffs should have been 
able to view the train's approach in their peripheral vision with 
little or no need to turn their heads. 
3. Reflectorized railroad crossbuck signs were in 
place at the crossing. A reflectorized railroad crossing advance 
warning sign was also located on Droubay Road, approximately 305 
feet south of the crossing (R. 410.), in accordance with the 
distance standards set forth at §§ 8B-3 and 2C-3 of the Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices. (R. 250-249, 480, Appendix.) 
4. The investigation of Trooper Smith and Deputy 
Sheriff Andrews shows how plainly visible the warning signs, the 
crossing location and the approaching train were from a 
substantial distance away. (R. 373, 335). As stated in Trooper 
Smith's incident report (R. 435): 
Testing was conducted on 13 and 14 day of April, 1983. 
Testing was done with and without trains present. 
Driving at dark with no moon and stars partially 
covered by clouds. At 3/4's mile the yellow crossing 
sign is plainly visible. The two white crossing signs 
are visible but appear to be round. At 1/2 mile all 
signs are clearly visible. These tests were done with 
vehicle lights on low beam. Time was approximately 
20:30 hours. With headlights on, high beam, signs are 
clearly visible from a mile back from the intersection. 
Test No. 2: Terrain 
I drove up and down Droubay Bay Road to see if there 
was any place in the road that would obstruct the view 
of the train. There is one mound of dirt at 400 feet 
from the intersection to the east of the roadway. I 
drove slowly toward the intersection as the train 
approached from the east. At no point in time was the 
train out of view. Even at the highest portion of the 
mound of dirt. Test 14 April 1983, 1:00 a.m. 
5. As acknowledged by plaintiffs at pp. 6-7 of 
their brief, Union Pacific brought to the attention of 
Tooele County authorities in September 1979 the possibility 
that warning devices at the crossing may need to be improved 
at sometime in the future if and when the county widened 
Droubay Road and generated an increase in traffic over the 
crossing. Union Pacific suggested that the County share 
this concern with the State. (R. 232.) However, as pointed 
out at p. 9 of plaintiffs' brief, the road was not widened 
by Tooele County until sometime after the accident occurred. 
6. As shown by the affidavits and exhibits submitted 
by the State and plaintiffs (R. 363-351, 313-309, 307-296, 176), 
the crossing was inspected by UDOT in November 1981. The 
inspection revealed no hazards then existing which indicated 
improvement of the crossing warning devices was in order. The 
inspection report dated November 10, 1981, specifically states 
"No sight dist. restrictions." (R. 302.) The inspection team did 
recommend, based upon a predicted future significant increase in 
vehicular traffic, that upgrading take place "at such time as 
federal funding became available." (R. 305, 312.) Specifically, 
only 100 cars per day were using the crossing as of the November 
1981 inspection (R. 176); however, based upon information 
received from Tooele County, the inspection team projected that 
1,500 vehicles per day were "expected" to use the crossing in the 
future. (R. 176, 305, 312, 359.) This projection had not, 
however, come to fruition by the time the accident occurred. 
UDOT reviewed the issue again in June 1982 and consciously 
decided against making the crossing a "high priority." (R. 352, 
351, 358.) According to UDOT and Federal Highway Administration 
("FHWA") officials, the crossing was not ranked high enough on 
the State's "Hazard Index," which was the priority ranking system 
being used then, to warrant making any improvements at that time 
(R. 356-357, 317-315). UDOT made another inspection on June 3, 
1983, some seven weeks after the accident. This inspection 
determined that daily usage (at least on the day of the count) 
was up to only 580 vehicles per day, far short of the 1500 
vehicles per day projected in 1981. (R. 301.) 
7. In early 1983, just prior to the accident, 
federal authorities approved a new formula for prioritizing 
crossings for crossing warning improvements. This new formula 
gave greater weight to the actual accident experience at a given 
crossing. Following the June 1983 inspection, using the new 
formula and including the statistics from the accident in 
question, UDOT determined the Droubay Road crossing was qualified 
- 10 -
for federal funding, and the improvements were recommended and 
eventually installed. (R. 318-315, 358-359.) 
8, Review of reports for the three prior accidents 
at the crossing show that none of them have "similar" 
circumstances. In the first accident, on November 11, 1980 (R. 
221, 220), the automobile was travelling in the opposite 
direction creating a much more difficult angle for observation of 
the approaching train; however, the driver was able to see the 
train in time to "stop just short of the train tracks." The 
train apparently nicked the bumper of the vehicle and no injuries 
resulted. In the second accident, on March 29, 1981 (R. 219, 
218), the automobile was also travelling in the opposite 
direction and, additionally, the police officer reported the 
accident was caused "due to poor visibility because of a heavy 
snow storm." (R. 218.) In the third accident, on October 24, 
1981, (R. 217, 216), the automobile stalled and stopped on the 
track directly in front of the train. 
9. Plaintiffs incorrectly imply, without reference 
to any support in the record, that Union Pacific paid for the 
costs of the subsequently installed warning device improvements. 
To the contrary, consistent with federal guidelines [see, e.g. » 
23 C.F.R. § 646.210(b)(1)] (Addendum), governmental authorities 
paid the complete cost with Union Pacific assuming the continuing 
maintenance expenses, which traditionally far exceed installation 
costs. The portion of the record to which plaintiffs refer (R. 
303, 298-299) merely indicates the fact that Union Pacific 
forces, under UDOT's direction, did the actual construction work. 
The costs of such installation, both for materials and labor, 
were either paid for up front or reimbursed later by or through 
UDOT. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I: 
It is the public policy of federal and state governments 
that responsibility for regulating the installation and 
modification of warning devices at public railroad crossings be 
lodged exclusively with the state. Thus, both federal and state 
laws preempt negligence lawsuits against railroads for failing to 
install or modify such devices. Such a holding does not alter 
the railroads' common law duty of reasonable care with respect to 
matters under their control. The Court of Appeals decision in 
this respect is in harmony with Utah statutory and case law, and 
is supported by the majority of recent decisions from other 
jurisdictions. 
POINT II: 
The crossing in question is located in a rural area, is 
totally unobstructed and has none of the confusing or 
complicating features normally found in extrahazardous crossings. 
It was appropriate, therefore, for the District Court, based upon 
its examination of the nature of the crossing itself, to rule as 
a matter of law that it was not more than ordinarily hazardous. 
Union Pacific had no duty, therefore, to take additional 
precautions to reduce the risks at the crossing with respect to 
approaching motorists. 
Furthermore, the Crommelin Affidavit was fundamentally 
flawed in that it relied for its conclusion on misinformation and 
inadmissible evidence. The affidavit, therefore, was not 
persuasive in raising a general issue of material fact concerning 
the extrahazardous crossing issue. 
POINT III: 
It would be inappropriate to burden Union Pacific with a 
duty for which it has no corresponding right to control and 
implement, and where it has no expertise in prioritizing 
crossings and obtains no benefit from projects which install or 
improve crossing warning devices. Public policy considerations 
support the dispositions of plaintiffs' claim thus far. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT OF APPEALS DID NOT ERROR IN ASSESSING UNION 
PACIFIC'S DUTIES TO IMPROVE WARNING DEVICES AT PUBLIC 
RAILROAD CROSSINGS. 
A. Utah Law Vests Exclusive Jurisdiction In State 
Agencies For Regulating the Travel of Motorists at 
Public Railroad Crossings. 
Union Pacific could not have been negligent in failing 
to improve the warning devices at the crossing because it had no 
authority or duty to install or modify such devices. 
Governmental agencies have the exclusive authority over public 
roads and over the signs and warning devices placed on those 
roads. 
1. The Statutory Framework, 
The Utah Legislature (and the Courts) has divided 
responsibility for safety at public railroad crossings among 
involved parties. Railroads are statutorily required to provide 
crossing surfaces that are in a proper state of repair so that 
they can be safely driven over [§ 10-7-26, «et seq. ; § 56-1-11; 
Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 P. 999 (1918); 
Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R., 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293 
(1947)]; have their trains sound bells or whistles when 
approaching public crossings (§ 56-1-14); and cooperate with 
governmental agencies in investigating the safety of crossings 
and in the installation and maintenance of whatever crossing 
warning systems UDOT deems necessary and approves for 
construction. (§ 54-4-14, et, seq. ) (Addendum. ) Additionally, as 
explained by the Court of Appeals in this case (790 P.2d at 599) 
(Addendum), railroads have the common law duty to take such 
reasonable steps as would be within their authority to alleviate 
hazards at crossings, such as by removing obstructions to view on 
their right of way or reducing train speed. Gleave v. Denver & 
Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah App. 1988). 
Adjacent property owners are required to remove vegetation or 
other obstructions to view or which otherwise constitute a 
"traffic hazard," (§ 41-6-19); motorists are responsible to 
recognize the train's right of way, and take special precautions 
when approaching and stopping at railroad crossings. (§§ 
41-6-46, 41-6-93, 41-6-95, and 41-6-97.) UDOT has been delegated 
the responsibility for regulating the safe travel of motorists on 
roads and highways, including those which pass over and across 
railroad tracks. § 54-4-14, est seg. ; Gleave v. Denver & Rio 
Grande W. R.R. Co., supra, at 664. 
A series of Utah statutes has established the exclusive 
authority of UDOT to decide on and install traffic control 
devices at public railroad crossings, subject only to review by 
the Public Service Commission of Utah ("PSCU"). Under § 54-4-14, 
state authorities are specifically charged with the overall, 
exclusive responsibility to regulate the installation of warning 
devices at public grade crossings. Under § 54-4-15(1), a 
crossing cannot be built "without the permission of the 
Department of Transportation having first been secured," and UDOT 
"shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant it 
upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe." 
Furthermore, § 54-4-15(2) provides that UDOT "shall have the 
power to determine and prescribe the manner . of . 
protection of each crossing . . . and to alter or abolish any 
such crossing . . . ." Under § 54-4-15(4), the PSCU "shall 
retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of any dispute 
upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of [UDOT]" 
taken pursuant to § 54-4-15. Moreover, Section 54-4-15.3 
provides that UDOT "shall apportion the cost of the installation, 
maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of any signals or 
devices described in § 54-4-15.1 between the railroad or street 
railroad and the public agency involved." Section 54-4-15 
separately requires UDOT to provide in its annual budget for the 
cost of installing signals or other safety devices at railroad 
crossings. 
2. The Legislative History. 
In 1917, the Utah Legislature enacted the forerunner of 
the current § 54-4-14, et seq., under which the predecessor of 
the PSCU was granted "the exclusive power to determine and 
prescribe the manner . . . and the terms of installation, 
operation, maintenance, use and protection . . . of each crossing 
of a public road or a highway." Laws of Utah, 1917, § 47-4-14. 
This court has held that this language means just what it says in 
The Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R. v. Public Utilities 
Commission of Utah, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479 (1918); and Provo 
City v. Department of Business Regulation, et al., 118 Utah 1, 
218 P.2d 675 (1950). On both of these occasions, the court held 
that the power of the designated state agency to "determine and 
prescribe" railroad crossings was exclusive. 
Section 54-4-14, .et seq. , was amended in 1975 in 
conjunction with the creation of UDOT, which assumed most of the 
PSCU's duties regarding railroad crossing safety. The amendment 
substituted references to UDOT for the prior references in the 
statutes to the PSCU. Subsection (4) in § 54-4-15 was added to 
retain ultimate supervisory jurisdiction in the PSCU to review 
the actions of UDOT. As a result, a single state agency no 
longer had "exclusive" power over crossing safety -- two agencies 
now shared that power. Therefore, Legislature had to delete the 
word "exclusive" as it referred to UDOT's authority. However, 
the State (UDOT and the PSCU together) still retains exclusive 
jurisdiction over the installation of traffic signs and control 
devices on public roads at railroad crossings, and a private 
party, such as a railroad, has no more right to change the 
traffic warning devices on such roads than it would to change any 
other regulatory signs on any other public highways. 
3. Interpretation by Utah Courts. 
Although the Utah Supreme Court has not interpreted 
these statutes since the 1975 Amendment, there has been a 
considerable amount of Utah litigation on this issue. State and 
federal trial court judges and now the Utah Court of Appeals, 
have uniformly interpreted Utah law to preclude railroads and 
local governments from having any authority or duty to install 
initially or modify traffic warning devices at public railroad 
crossings. In addition to Judge Hansen's decision in this case, 
see, e.g., the Order of Judge Dennis Frederick in Anderson v. 
Whittle v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., Civ. No. C 81-3189 
(3rd Dist. Ct., March 1987)(R. 161); the Order of Judge David K. 
Winder in Harsin v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., Civ. No. 
C 83-0993W (D. Utah, January 1985)(R.157); the Order of Judge 
Aldin J. Anderson in Bellon v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R,, 
Civ. No. C 83-088A (D. Utah, Sept. 1984) (R. 152); and the Order 
of Chief Judge Bruce S. Jenkins in Denver & Rio Grande Western 
R.R. v. West Jordan Municipal Court, Civ. No. C 81-0344J (D, Utah, 
May 1982). (R. 150.) As stated in Gleave: 
UDOT is statutorily empowered to 'provide for the 
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving 
of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or 
devices at grade crossings,' and to apportion 
costs of such projects among public and private 
entities. . . . the government alone must consistently 
regulate safety devices at railroad crossings, 
determine which devices at which crossings should be 
recommended for federal funding, rank crossings in 
order of need for upgrading in light of limited funds 
for that purpose, and apportion signal installation 
costs between public and private entities. As a 
practical matter, the private sector cannot perform 
these functions. Accordingly, we hold that the 
regulation of public safety needs and the evaluation, 
installation, maintenance and improvement of safety 
signals or devices at railroad crossings is a 
governmental function. . . . 
(Citations omitted), 749 P.2d at 667-68. 
4. The Vesting of Exclusive Authority in State 
Agencies Serves the Important Purpose of 
Establishing Uniformity Throughout the State. 
Presumably, in the early days of railroading when only 
horse drawn vehicles and early "horseless carriages" crossed over 
railroad tracks, the railroads themselves installed whatever 
signs they chose at crossings. One can safely assume the 
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crossing protection signs of that era offered little consistency 
to the highway traveler but, of course, the speed and range of 
highway travel was substantially different from what it is today. 
In Utah, as elsewhere, government has become 
increasingly involved in the regulation of highway traffic as the 
number and speed of vehicles increased. The legislature's 
decision to reserve to state agencies the exclusive authority 
over railroad crossing protection establishes efficiency as well 
as uniformity in safety regulation. The purpose of any traffic 
control system is to promote safety while preserving efficiency 
of traffic flow. The goals of safety and efficiency are, to some 
extent, inherently conflicting. For example, if the speed limit 
on interstate highways were reduced from 55 to 25 m.p.h., there 
would no doubt be a reduction in accidents, but the reduction in 
traffic flow efficiency would be drastic. The balance between 
safety and efficiency would be upset. 
In order to strike an acceptable balance between safety 
and efficiency at railroad crossings, an entity with traffic 
regulation expertise and decision making authority must have an 
overview of the safety requirements and traffic flow needs of 
both the communities and the railroad companies involved. If 
railroad companies had decision making authority, they would 
undoubtedly close as many railroad-highway grade crossings as 
possible so as to prevent potential hazards. This would not, of 
course, serve the interest of the community residents who want to 
avoid detours and other impediments to their free travel. The 
Utah state agencies that have been given exclusive authority over 
railroad crossing protection are uniquely qualified to make the 
necessary traffic control decisions. 
Railroad companies also lack the engineering expertise 
and overview of community traffic flow needs required to make 
decisions about what traffic control devices should be installed 
at railroad crossings. The UDOT has the necessary expertise to 
make those decisions. In doing so, UDOT considers a variety of 
factual data not even available to railroad companies, including 
highway speed limits, the density of vehicular traffic, the 
density of pedestrian traffic, and the desired traffic flow 
patterns. (See, Affidavit of Ross D. Wilson with attachments, R. 
362-353.) For these reasons, as well as for the purposes of 
safety and efficiency, the exclusive authority for determining 
what traffic control devices will be installed at railroad 
crossings has been vested in UDOT, subject to PSCU review. 
Since state agencies have exclusive authority over the 
installation of railroad crossing protection devices, it 
necessarily follows that Union Pacific had neither the authority 
nor the duty to install any such devices at the crossing in 
question. 
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B. Plaintiffs Misinterpret the Court of Appeals' 
Decisions in the Gleave and Duncan Cases. 
A close reading of the Court of Appeals decisions in 
the Gleave and Duncan cases clearly shows that the decisions are 
in harmony on the issue of the respective responsibilities of 
state agencies and railroads with respect to crossing safety. 
Both cases specifically reaffirmed the long standing 
common law duty that railroads are required to take the actions 
of a reasonable man in alleviating such hazards at railroad 
crossings as are within their power and authority to remove. 
Gleave specifically identified the wild vegetation which the 
railroad allowed to grow on its right of way to the point where 
it obstructed the motorist's view, and reducing train speed, as 
the type of hazards the railroad could alleviate. (Gleave, 749 
P.2d at 664.) The court acknowledged the existence of this duty 
in Duncan, but pointed out that "there is nothing to indicate 
what could have made Union Pacific's right of way any safer to 
motorists crossing Droubay Road." (Duncan, 790 P.2d at 599.) 
Indeed, plaintiffs make no such suggestions in this regard 
anywhere in their brief. In fact, there were no railroad created 
or controlled obstructions either on or off the right of way, and 
the train was travelling 20 miles per hour under the speed limit. 
Accordingly, it is incorrect for plaintiffs to assert that Duncan 
insulates railroads "from any concerns of negligence for unsafe 
conditions at crossings . . . ," or that the Court of Appeals has 
in any way changed Utah law in this respect. Railroads have 
always been and continue to be subject to the reasonable man 
standard with respect to those hazards over which they have 
control or responsibility. 
C. Plaintiffs Misinterpret the Meaning and 
Application § 56-1-11. 
Plaintiffs apparently interpret § 56-1-11 as imposing 
on railroads a duty to install and improve warning devices at 
crossings, and in doing so argue that the statute is, therefore, 
inconsistent with the statutory scheme set forth at § 54-4-14 et 
seq., as interpreted by the Court of Appeals. 
Plaintiffs misunderstand the meaning and application of 
§ 56-1-11. This Court has discussed the application of this 
statute to a railroad's duty in crossing accident cases in 
Denkers v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 18, 171 p. 999 (1918), 
and Van Wagoner v. Union Pacific R.R.. 112 Utah 189, 186 P.2d 293 
(1947). In both cases the statute was discussed and applied in 
terms of the railroad's responsibilities to maintain the crossing 
surface in a "good and sufficient" state of repair so that 
travellers can pass safely thereover. There were no discussions 
that it imposed a duty to signalize crossings. 
Indeed, there are no Utah decisions which interpret the 
statute as placing a duty upon railroads to install or improve 
warning devices at railroad crossings. That responsibility was 
specifically addressed and delegated to the State in § 54-4-14, 
et seq. Section 56-1-11, as part of the statutory scheme enacted 
by the legislature to delegate safety responsibilities at 
railroad crossings, gives to railroads the responsibility to 
maintain a "good and sufficient" crossing surface. It does not 
impose a duty to construct warning devices. Consequently, there 
is no "potential inconsistency" between this statute and 
§ 54-4-14, et seq. 
D. Federal Enactments are Supportive of the Court of 
Appeals Decision. 
The federal Rail Safety Act of 1970 ("FRSA"), 45 U.S.C. 
§ 421, et seq., covers all areas of railroad safety. Of the 
numerous areas of railroad safety addressed by the Act, only one 
area is afforded specific treatment and that is the area relating 
to the problem of railroad grade crossing safety, to which a 
specific section of the Act is devoted. In 45 U.S.C. § 433(a), 
the Secretary was required to study and report to Congress on the 
problem of protecting railroad grade crossings, and at the same 
time, he was required (under § 433(b)) to undertake a coordinated 
study towards solving the grade crossing problem, not only under 
his FRSA authority, but also under his authority pursuant to 
other federal laws dealing with highway traffic, safety, and 
construction, thus bringing into play the provisions of the 
federal Highway Safety Act (23 U.S.C. § 101, et seq.), various 
sections of which directly require the states (not the railroads) 
to survey and identify those crossings which require automatic 
warning devices. 
When the Secretary filed his mandated report to 
Congress on the solution of the grade crossing problem, Congress 
then amended (in 1973) the federal Highway Safety Act so as to 
require the states (not the railroads) to conduct and maintain a 
survey of all grade crossings to identify those in need of 
protective devices and to implement a schedule of projects to 
accomplish the same. (See, e.g.. 23 U.S.C. §§ 130 and 152.) 
Conditioning the distribution of federal highway 
funding on the state's compliance therewith, the Secretary then 
issued appropriate orders, standards and regulations requiring 
the states to adopt various plans for implementation of projects 
to increase grade crossing safety. This federal regulatory 
scheme incorporated the requirement that any determination of 
need for grade crossing warning^ devices be made on the basis of 
an engineering judgment by the public authorities having 
jurisdiction over the roadway at the crossing. 
Pursuant to his statutory authority to condition the 
grant of federal highway funding for the states (23 U.S.C. § 402; 
23 C.F.R. § 1251.2), the Secretary issued regulations (23 C.F.R. 
§ 655.601[a])(Addendum) which adopted the "Manual on Uniform 
Traffic Control Devices for Streets and Highways" as the 
"national standard for all traffic control devices installed on 
any street, highway . . . open to public travel . . . " (23 C.F.R. 
§ 655.603[a])(Addendum). More specifically, it is the standard 
for rail-highway grade crossing improvements pursuant to 23 
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C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(Addendum). Part VIII of the MUTCD is devoted 
to "traffic control systems for railroad-highway crossings," and 
is specific in its requirement that the state authorities (not 
railroads) are responsible for surveying and making the 
determination of need for upgrading protection at all 
rail-highway grade crossings. (See, e.g., §§ 8A-1 and 8D-1 
(Addendum), which specifically state that the determination of 
need and selection of warning devices at a grade crossing is to 
be "made by the public agency having jurisdictional authority.") 
The national MUTCD (or a state's version, which must be 
in substantial conformity therewith)(See, e.g., § 41-6-20 UCA) is 
required under 23 C.F.R. § 655.603 (Addendum). The same section 
also requires [in Subsection (d)] the states to adopt the program 
provided for in Highway Safety Program Standard No. 13 (as 
contained in 23 C.F.R. § 1204.4) which in turn requires that the 
states "analyze potentially hazardous locations, such as . . . 
railroad grade crossings and develop appropriate 
countermeasures." Similarly, 23 C.F.R. § 924.9 (Addendum) 
details multiple requirements and standards involved in state 
planning for the identification of hazardous grade crossings, as 
well as state programs for improvement projects for their 
elimination. Other subsections of Part 924 detail the 
requirements for the implementation and evaluation components of 
the safety program, as well as the requirements for annual 
reporting to the Federal Department of Transportation. Moreover, 
under 23 C.F.R. § 646.210 (Addendum), the Secretary has 
specifically determined that "[pjrojects for grade crossing 
improvements are deemed to be of no ascertainable net benefit to 
the railroads and there shall be no required share of the costs." 
Finally, any doubts as to the preemptive shifting of 
duty and responsibility to public agencies for improving grade 
crossing safety were removed in 1987, when Congress exercised its 
preemptive authority so as to protect the grade crossing data and 
other information gathered by the states, by amending the Highway 
Safety Act with the addition of 23 U.S.C. § 409 (Addendum), which 
precludes the use, in both federal and state courts, of such data 
compiled for use by the states in complying with the requirements 
of the various highway safety acts. Its enactment demonstrates 
that Congress fully appreciated the fact that the federal laws 
and regulations required the states to gather such data in order 
to determine whether and to what extent grade crossings were in 
need of additional warnings. To ensure that responsibility was 
carried out fully, and without fear of lawsuits, Congress enacted 
that statutory prohibition in order to protect the reports and 
data upon which the states make their required determinations. 
E. Recent Case Law Supports the Public Agency 
Preemption Argument. 
Virtually all recent cases which address the issue of 
the duty to regulate grade crossing warning devices hold that 
public agencies, and not railroads, are responsible to determine 
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the need for and direct the installation of such devices. For 
instance, in Sisk v. The National R.R. Passenger Corp., 657 F. 
Supp. 861 (D. Kan. 1986), the court stated as follows: 
Then, in the 1970s, Congress, recognizing a need for 
uniform safety standards, enacted the Railroad Safety 
Act which imposed nationwide standards, reserving 
authority to the states for further regulation only 
under special circumstances. In conjunction with 
railroad safety, Congress determined that grade 
crossing improvements were a governmental 
responsibility rather than the responsibility of the 
railroads and increased funding to the federal aid 
program. 
647 F. Supp. at 863. See, also, Easterwood v. CSX, 742 F. Supp. 
676 (N.D. Ga. 1990); Tiley v. B. & 0. R. Co. (Miami County Court 
of Common Pleas 1990)(copy attached in Addendum); Nixon v. 
Burlington Northern Ry. (D. Mont. 1988) (copy attached in 
Addendum); Singer v. Southern Railway Co. (N.C. Sup. Ct. 1989) 
(copy attached in Addendum); Flynn v. Howard (D.C.N.D. 1989) 
(copy attached in Addendum); Armijo v. ATSF (D. N. Mex. 1990) 
(copy attached in Addendum); Carpenter v. Conrail (Ohio Ct. of 
Common Pleas 1990)(copy attached in Addendum); Case v. Norfolk & 
Western (Ohio Court of Common Pleas 1990) (copy attached in 
Addendum); Mahoney v. CSX (N.D. Ga. 1990) (copy attached in 
Addendum); Kalthoff v. Burlington Northern (D. Minn. 1990) 
(copy attached in Addendum); Bauqhman v. Conrail (Mich. App. 
1990) (copy attached in Addendum). 
The only two federal appellate cases which have 
considered the question whether the federal grade crossing 
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regulations preempt state law claims against railroads which are 
predicated upon negligence in selecting or providing additional 
highway warning devices have reached opposite conclusions. The 
decision of now-Justice Kennedy in Marshall v. Burlington 
Northern, 720 F.2d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 1983) held that 
preemption occurred when the state authorities approved the level 
of protection at the crossing, whereas in Karl v. Burlington 
Northern, 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989), the court ruled there 
was no such preemption under such circumstances. 
An analysis of the Karl decision clearly shows it to be 
aberrational, as it ignores not only the preemption under the 
express terms of the FRSA (when the Secretary issues regulations 
covering the subject matter), but also the express intent of 
Congress in enacting the FRSA. A careful analysis of Karl 
clearly demonstrates that: 
(a) It is the only federal circuit decision which 
holds that where the Secretary has issued regulations, 
they are not preemptive under the FRSA; 
(b) Its citation of Marshall as authority for the 
proposition that the FRSA "did not occupy the field of 
railroad safety governance" demonstrates its basic 
misunderstanding of the Marshall holding. The cited 
portion of Marshall merely held that the FRSA did not 
affect existing preemptive federal railroad laws (e.g., 
the Boiler Inspection Act). In point of fact, Marshall 
held the FRSA was preemptive as to grade crossing 
warning devices when the state agency makes the 
determination as to what level of protection is 
required for the crossing. (720 F.2d at 1154.) Since 
the Karl crossing warnings had been improved by the 
local agency (as Karl noted at 880 F.2d at 76), Karl 
stands in direct conflict with Marshall* s holding as to 
grade crossing preemption under the FRSA. 
(c) Karl* s comment on the absence of any "case 
law or legislative history to support the theory that 
Congress intended to completely occupy the field of 
railroad safety governance," is surprising, as it 
demonstrates that the court completely overlooked the 
express provisions of the FRSA, whether considered in 
general, or considered with specific reference to grade 
crossing safety. Moreover, its statement that "Neither 
circumstance [expressed or implied preemption] is 
present in this case" ignores the express preemption 
provision of the FRSA, as well as the several 
expressions of Congressional intent contained in the 
legislative history of the FRSA. 
Accordingly, with the exception of Karl (which we 
submit is an aberration in the case law), recent decisions 
uniformly hold that damage suits under state law which seek 
recovery on the theory of railroad negligence in failing to 
install adequate grade crossing warning devices are preempted by 
federal and/or state law. 
Therefore, Union Pacific submits that because the prior 
state law basis for plaintiffs' claim that Union Pacific was 
negligent in failing to provide additional warning devices has 
been preempted by federal and state laws, which by statute and 
regulation vest that duty in the state, plaintiffs' claim is not 
actionable against the Railroad. 
F. The State of Utah, In Conformity With the Federal 
Requirements, Has Effectuated a Shift of the Duty 
to Provide Grade Crossing Warnings From the 
Railroad to the Public Authorities. 
As shown above, the State of Utah, in conformity with 
federal requirements, has enacted laws concerning the 
determination of need for warning devices at railroad grade 
crossings, requiring the public authorities with jurisdiction of 
the roadway (and not the railroad) to make such determination. 
Not only do these laws conform with and complement the federal 
requirements, they constitute a statutory confirmation by the 
legislative branch, binding upon the courts, that such legal duty 
has been allocated to the appropriate public authorities. 
Moreover, UDOT has acknowledged its duty, as evidenced 
by the affidavits of the UDOT officials submitted by the State in 
the District Court proceedings. Such officials confirm that the 
state receives federal highway funding provided to the states 
pursuant to the Highway Safety Act. They acknowledge that UDOT 
performs the duties required of the state to survey railroad 
crossings, identify those crossings which require protective 
devices and implement a schedule for the installation of such 
devices, as required under federal law. Such affidavits likewise 
show that the State of Utah, in accordance with § 41-6-20, has 
adopted the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices to 
determine the type of warning devices to be used at railroad 
grade crossings, and the MUTCD expressly delegates to the public 
agencies having jurisdiction over the roadway the duty to make 
the determination as to the adequacy of warning devices at any 
railroad grade crossing. 
In this situation, numerous courts, recognizing the 
shift or assumption of duty pursuant to similar state statutes 
enacted in response to the federal requirements, have held that 
railroads cannot be liable for failing to upgrade or add 
additional warning devices at railroad crossings. Callis v. Long 
Island R. Co. , 372 F.2d 422 (2nd Cir. 1967), cert, denied, 389 
U.S. 827 (1967); Herold v. Burlington Northern R. Co., 761 F.2d 
1241 (8th Cir. 1985); McNiff v. Missouri Pacific R. Co., 560 
S.W.2d 46 (Mo. App. 1977); South v. National R.R. Passenger 
Corp., 290 N.W.2d 819 (N.D. 1980); Harrison v. Grand Trunk W. R. 
Co., 413 N.W.2d 429 (Mich. App. 1987); Edington v. Grand Trunk W. 
R Co., 418 N.E.2d 415 (Mich. App. 1987). 
In McNiff, a wrongful death action arising from a 
railroad crossing collision, the court approved as a correct 
statement of law, the following instruction which was given to 
the jury: 
The court further instructs the jury . . . that only 
the Missouri Public Service Commission has the 
exclusive authority to indicate when and where crossing 
gates should be installed and erected and it is the 
exclusive responsibility and exclusive authority of the 
Missouri Public Service Commission to make that 
determination. 
560 S.W.2d at 48. 
A similar issue faced the North Dakota Supreme Court in 
South v. National R.R. Corp., supra., in which the court approved 
the following instruction regarding the railroad's duty to 
install additional crossing protection: 
You are instructed that the court finds as a matter of 
law that the mere fact that Barrett Street intersects 
the railroad does not raise any duty whatsoever on the 
part of the railroad or any of the defendants to take 
upon themselves the responsibility for installing 
flagmen, gates, electric or automatic crossing signals, 
stop signs, advanced railroad warning signs, 
modification of the crossing in any manner, or a 
closure thereof. You are instructed that the court 
finds as a matter of law that, with the exception of 
the obligation upon the railroad to install and 
maintain crossbucks, only the Public Service Commission 
of the State of North Dakota can find a crossing extra 
hazardous or unusually dangerous to life and property 
requiring additional protection beyond the crossbuck. 
290 N.W.2d at 826-827. 
In a more recent case, Herold v. Burlington Northern, 
Inc., supra., the 8th Circuit implicitly upheld the South 
decision. In Herold, one of the contentions on appeal was that 
the U.S. District Court erred in allowing certain expert 
testimony regarding automatic crossing signals. The railroad 
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argued that from the testimony, the jury might have been given 
the impression that the defendant railroad had a duty to employ 
automatic signals. The court rejected the argument by noting the 
jury instructions expressly declared that the railroad had no 
obligation to install any safety devices other than a crossbuck; 
that only the state authorities could authorize additional safety 
devices, and thus the jury could not hold the railroad liable for 
negligence in failing to modify or close the crossing. 
Other courts have similarly interpreted various state 
statutes which provide that the state, and not the railroad, 
shall determine the need for warning devices at railroad grade 
crossings. In Harrison v. Grand Trunk W. R.R. Co., supra. , the 
court, relying upon state statute, held that the railroad could 
not be liable for its failure to install additional warning 
devices where there were no outstanding orders by a public 
authority to do so. The court further noted that the railroad 
could not erect additional warning devices without permission by 
the state. 
The U.S. District Court, Northern District of Ohio, 
reached the same conclusion in Nice v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 
168 F. Supp. 641 (1959) and held that the railroad had no duty to 
install automatic signal crossing devices or flagmen at a 
crossing in the absence of an order from the Public Utilities 
Commission. 
Thus, it is clear that the statutory scheme set forth 
at § 54-4-14, et seq. , vesting in UDOT the decision as to the 
need for warning devices at railroad crossings, like those of the 
various other states in the cases discussed above, confirms that 
which is required under federal law and places the legal duty in 
the state to make such decision so as to preempt actions against 
railroads for failure to select and install such devices. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT TO UNION PACIFIC ON THE ISSUE OF WHETHER THE 
CROSSING WAS MORE THAN ORDINARILY HAZARDOUS. 
A. The District Court was Correct in Ruling as a 
Matter of Law that the Crossing was not 
Extrahazardous. 
If the crossing was not more than ordinarily hazardous 
as of the date the accident happened, no duty existed to take 
added precautions such as by installing automatic flashing lights 
and/or gates. 
This Court has provided guidance for determining 
whether a crossing is extrahazardous. In Bridges v. Union 
Pacific R.R., 488 P.2d 738 (1971), followed in Hobbs v. Denver & 
Rio Grande Western R.R., 677 P.2d 1128 (1984), the court stated 
that if there are: (1) obstructions to view; (2) heavy vehicular 
traffic; and (3) "other conditions" which make the existing 
protection devices "inadequate to warn the public of the danger," 
then a more than ordinarily hazardous crossing may be present 
which may require the taking of additional precautionary 
measures. 
The kinds of obstructions, traffic problems and "other 
conditions" which might render a crossing extrahazardous are 
described in earlier cases decided by this Court. For example, 
in Pippy v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 11 P.2d 305 (1932), and 
Toomer^s Estate v. Union Pacific R.R., 239 P.2d 163 (1951), the 
crossings were found to be more than ordinarily hazardous because 
(1) the railroads had created obstructions to view of the 
oncoming trains on an adjacent track right up next to the 
crossing; (2) there were electrical signals present at the 
crossings which the drivers relied upon and which failed to work; 
(3) the trains were speeding greatly in excess of a city-imposed 
speed limit; (4) there was excessive noise being emitted by 
adjacent railroad operations which tended to drown out any 
warning signals being emitted by the oncoming train; and (5) 
there were other circumstances which the courts held tended to 
confuse the motorist into thinking it was safe to cross when it 
was not, or made it impossible for the drivers to safely make 
such a determination. 
Obviously none of these factors or confusing 
circumstances are present in this case. It is undisputed that 
the crossing was located in wide open country rather than in a 
city or a populated area; that there were no obstructions to view 
of any kind; that the train was not speeding and there were no 
speed ordinances or restrictions violated; that the location of 
the trackage and the approach of the train were readily 
observable from a substantial distance away from the crossing; 
and that the projected increase in vehicular traffic never 
occurred. In short, there was absolutely nothing 
"in the configuration of the land, or in the structures 
in the vicinity, or in the nature or amount of travel 
on the highway, or in other conditions, which 
render[ed] the warning devices employed at the 
[crossing] inadequate to warn [the occupants of the 
accident vehicle] of the danger." 
Bridges, 488 P.2d at 739. 
The determination of whether a crossing is 
extrahazardous is, in the appropriate case, initially for the 
Court to make as a matter of law. As state in Bridges, at p. 
739, the Court may "authorize" a jury to consider the 
extrahazardous crossing issue only after it first determines that 
there is probative, admissible evidence showing the existence of 
such a crossing. If the Court concludes that there is no such 
evidence, it may rule that the crossing is not more than 
ordinarily hazardous as a matter of law. This appears to be the 
accepted rule which is followed in a number of jurisdictions, 
e.g., Lerner v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 594 F. Supp. 963 
(S.D.N.Y. 1984); Sargent v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co., 
504 P.2d 729 (Ore. 1972); Walker v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 
674 F.2d 1130, 1133 (5th Cir. 1982; Richards v. Southern Pacific 
Transportation Co., 666 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1982); Missouri Pacific 
R.R. v. Cooper, 563 S.W.2d 233 (Texas 1978); Seaboard Coastline 
R.R. v. Sheffield, 194 S.E.2d 484 (Ga. 1972); Still v. Hampton & 
Branchville R.R., 189 S.E.2d 15 (S.C. 1972); Chicago, Rock Island 
& Pacific R.R. V. Gray, 453 S.W.2d 54 (Ark. 1970); Poole v. 
Southern Ry. Co., 150 S.E.2d 175 (S.C. 1967); Hammarmeister v. 
Illinois Central R.R., 117 N.W.2d 463 (Iowa 1962); Carlson v. 
Southern Pacific Co., 346 P.2d 381 (Ore. 1959); and Union Pacific 
R.R. v. Snyder, 220 F.2d 388, 390-1 (10th Cir. 1955) (applying 
Colorado law). 
Accordingly, it was proper for the District Court, 
after reviewing the evidence and based upon its own evaluation of 
the crossing itself, to rule as a matter of law that reasonable 
minds could not differ that the crossing was not more than 
ordinarily hazardous. As stated by the Court at pp. 10-11 of its 
Memorandum Decision (R. 479-478). 
"While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is 
hard to imagine a crossing that presents a smaller 
hazard than the one in question before the Court. 
B, The Crommelin Affidavit Does Not Raise Any Genuine 
Issue of Material Fact. 
The Crommelin Affidavit cannot be considered as 
probative evidence because it relies upon misstated and 
inadmissible facts in reaching the conclusion that the crossing 
was extrahazardous, to wit: 
1. Volume of Vehicular Traffic. 
The first and apparently most critical fact relied upon 
by Crommelin is that "field study reports" (the UDOT surveillance 
reports) show that "as many as 1,500 vehicles traversed the 
railroad crossing per day" (R. 189). This is a serious 
distortion of the facts. As explained in detail under 
defendants' Statement of Facts, the UDOT records clearly show 
that the 1,500 vehicles per day number was only an "expected" or 
anticipated increase which never materialized. The actual count 
that Crommelin should have relied upon was closer to 580 vehicles 
per day, or nearly two-thirds less than the figure used in 
arriving at this conclusion. 
2. Placement of the Advance Warning Sign. 
As explained in Union Pacific's Statement of Facts, 
Crommelin's interpretation of the MUTCD erroneously represents 
the Manual as mandating that the advance warning sign should have 
been placed 750 feet away from the crossing instead of the 305 
feet where it was actually located. A simple reading of the 
MUTCD's applicable sections (§§ 8B-3 and 2C-3)(Addendum) clearly 
shows that 750 feet is only a suggested distance and that the 
actual distance may appropriately be less as long as such lesser 
distance allows the driver enough time and distance to react and, 
if necessary, maneuver. The stopping tests performed by Trooper 
Smith and Newell Knight clearly show that the lesser distance of 
305 feet was more than adequate for such purposes. Accordingly, 
the sign was not misplaced or placed in violation of any federal 
standard, and it was incorrect for Crommelin to so state and to 
rely upon such an incorrect assumption as a basis for his 
conclusion. 
In any event, as noted by the District Court at p. 9 of 
its Memorandum Decision (R. 450), placement of the sign at 305 
feet as opposed to 750 feet could not possibly have been a 
proximate cause of the accident, since the undisputed facts show 
that plaintiffs totally ignored the warning signs which were 
clearly and readily noticeable at a distance of up to one mile 
away from the crossing. Plaintiffs offer no explanation of how 
placement of the sign an additional 445 feet away from the 
crossing would have made any difference with respect to how the 
accident vehicle was operated as it approached the crossing. 
3. Other Accidents at the Crossing, 
As also explained above, and as can be readily 
concluded from even a cursory review of the accident reports, the 
prior "similar" accidents at the crossing are, in fact, totally 
dissimilar in their material aspects. Accordingly, if 
Crommelin's conclusion was based in any material degree on such 
an erroneous assumption, the conclusion is without proper 
foundation and, therefore, inadmissible. 
4. Inadmissibility of UDOT Surveillance Report 
Pursuant to 23 U.S.C. § 409. 
In addition to the above-mentioned misstatement of 
foundational facts, the affidavit also improperly relies upon 
evidence which is statutorily inadmissible pursuant to 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409 (Addendum). 
The obvious public policy intent of 23 U.S.C. § 409 is 
to promote candor between governmental officials and railroads 
regarding applications submitted by state and local governments 
for federal funds to enhance safety at railroad grade crossings. 
If state and local highway officials and railroads must be 
concerned that statements which they make and which can be used 
in making applications for federal funds to upgrade crossings, or 
in supporting data, will be used against them, either as direct 
evidence or by way of an expert's opinion, as admissions in civil 
damage suits based upon accidents at such crossings, such 
officials will be inhibited in making any such statements or 
applications or in preparing the underlying data used by the 
federal officials in passing upon such applications. 
Obviously, the rationale underlying 23 U.S.C. § 409 is 
the same as that behind other evidentiary "privileges," such as 
the privilege set forth in Rule 407, Utah Rules of Evidence, 
which precludes the admission of evidence of post-accident 
remedial measures in personal injury cases, lest the remedial 
measure be deemed an admission that the pre-accident, conduct, 
product or condition was negligent or unsafe. 
Plaintiff may argue that § 409 does not exclude use of 
the evidence by an expert witness. For the above same reasons, 
Union Pacific submits that use of the phrase "for any purpose" in 
23 U.S.C. § 409 ought to be held to refer to use of such reports 
by an expert in formulating his opinion as well as to use of the 
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reports as direct evidence. In view of the clear remedial 
purpose for which the 23 U.S.C. § 409 was enacted, it doesn't 
make sense to allow a party to get into evidence through the 
"back door" of an expert's opinion what the statute prohibits 
from coming in as direct, factual evidence. The public policy 
arguments against admissibility are just as valid in the former 
case as in the latter. 
The Crommelin Affidavit relies, albeit erroneously, 
upon the UDOT reports in concluding that the crossing is 
extrahazardous. There is no question that the UDOT reports 
reflect the results of an investigation which was undertaken to 
determine the appropriateness and feasibility of installing 
additional crossing warning devices through use of available 
federal funding. Accordingly, neither the reports nor any of the 
data contained therein can be relied upon either by way of 
evidence or argument, by plaintiffs in support of their 
contention, that the crossing was extrahazardous and/or that 
Union Pacific was negligence in not upgrading the crossing 
warning devices. 
POINT III. PLAINTIFFS MISUNDERSTAND THE PUBLIC POLICY AND 
LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS INVOLVED IN THIS CASE. 
A. It is axiomatic "public policy" that not all 
damages caused by the act of another have, or even should have, a 
remedy, and that "accidents frequently occur, the consequences of 
which the sufferer must bear alone." 74 Am.Jur.2d Torts, § 13. 
Accordingly, for instance, the law recognizes unavoidable 
accidents; a claimant is required to prove the elements of his 
cause of action — the mere showing of damages is not enough to 
warrant recovery; and the State of Utah may not be sued without 
its consent. 
The fact that this tragic accident occurred and that 
plaintiffs have undeniably suffered damages obviously does not by 
itself make them legally "worthy" to recover. In fact, the 
passengers' heirs have not been denied recovery for their loss, 
since they earlier pursued their remedy against Patrick Duncan's 
Estate, obtaining a substantial six figure settlement. Union 
Pacific submits that "public policy" considerations support 
completely the disposition of this case thus far. 
B. Plaintiffs argue that the Legislature did not 
intend § 54-4-14, et seg., to "abrogate the common law duties 
imposed upon railroads to make and maintain safe crossings" 
(plaintiffs' brief, p. 10). To the contrary, § 68-3-2 U.C.A. 
(1986), specifically states otherwise: 
The rule of the common law that statutes in derogation 
thereof are to be strictly construed has no application 
to the statutes of the state. The statutes establish 
the laws of this state respecting the subjects to which 
they relate, and their provisions and all proceedings 
under them are to be liberally construed with a view to 
effect the objects of the statutes and to promote 
justice. . . . 
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C. Plaintiffs ignore the practicalities which a 
policy in defining the railroad's duty must take into 
consideration: Can you give a party a duty without the 
corresponding right to control and implement? That is precisely 
the dilemma the railroads would be placed in should the court 
adopt the argument that Union Pacific had a duty to signalize the 
crossing but no authority to implement that responsibility. 
D. On the other hand, if plaintiffs are arguing that 
Union Pacific has the power to actually make changes in crossing 
warning devices, regardless of the State's position, they are 
also at the same time arguing for defeat of the very system of 
uniform traffic regulation by UDOT which they admit is the 
declared policy of this State. 
E. Union Pacific submits it would be bad public 
policy to burden railroads with the duty of accurately predicting 
accidents at crossings (the primary basis for prioritizing 
crossings for upgrading), and/or the duty of subsidizing the cost 
of constructing warning device improvements at such crossings. 
If the state is unable to always prioritize accurately, why 
should the railroads, with less expertise and knowledge in the 
area, be held to a higher standard? Additionally, plaintiffs 
overlook the official findings of the Secretary of Transportation 
(23 C.F.R. § 696.210) that railroads do not benefit from such 
upgrading projects, thus they should not have to bear the burden 
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of paying for them, especially since they already bear the 
greater expense of paying for the ongoing maintenance costs. 
F. It is good public policy to impose a duty upon 
railroads to operate trains and maintain rights of way safely, 
and upon UDOT a duty to protect and regulate traffic at railroad 
crossings. This is so because railroads have expertise in train 
operations and UDOT in traffic control, not visa versa; because 
uniformity of traffic regulation is fostered thereby; and because 
the limited funding that is available is thereby prioritized to 
offer the greatest benefit to the public by being assigned to the 
crossings which need the most attention. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated above, the decision of the Court 
of Appeals should be affirmed on the grounds that: 
1. The Droubay Road crossing was not extrahazardous, 
as a matter of law; therefore, Union Pacific had no duty to 
install additional or different warning devices at the crossing; 
and 
2. Union Pacific had no duty to install additional or 
different warning devices because such responsibility is lodged 
exclusively with the State of Utah pursuant to § 54-4-14, et 
seq., and plaintiffs' claims of negligence against Union Pacific 
for failing to make such installations or changes are thereby 
preempted by both state and federal laws. 
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STATUTES 
(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and neces-
sity demand the establishment, creation or construction of a crossing of a 
street or highway over, under or upon the tracks or lines of any public utility, 
the department may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establish-
ment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such crossing shall there-
upon become a public highway and crossing. 
(4) The commission shall retain exclusive jurisdiction for the resolution of 
any dispute upon petition by any person aggrieved by any action of the de-
partment pursuant to this section. 
History- L. 1917, ch. 47, art. 4, § 14; C.L. Cities, power to regulate tracks, $ 10-8-33. 
1917, § 4811; R.S. 1933, 76-4-15; L. 1939, ch. Fences, cattle guards and street crossings, 
$4, $ 1; C. 1943,76-4-15; L. 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. § 10-8-35. 
9, § 17. Flagmen, grade crossings and drains, 
Cross-References. — Change of grades and § 10-8-36 
crossings. § 10-8-34. 
54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty of 
transportation department to provide. 
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the public safety shall 
as prescribed in this act provide for the installing, maintaining, reconstruct-
ing, and improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or de-
vices at grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of any 
railroad or street railroad corporation in the state. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 118, S 1; 1975 (lit act," referred to in this section, means L. 1973, 
S.S.), ch. 9, i 18. ch. 118, §§ 1 through 4, which appear at §§ 
Meaning of Nthis act*'. — The term "this 54*4-15.1 through 54-4-15.4. 
54-4-15.2. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Funds 
for payment of costs. 
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall be used in 
conjunction with other available moneys, including those received from fed-
eral sources, to pay all or part of the cost of the installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in 
§ 54-4-15.1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any road over the 
tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 118, { 2. 
Meaning of "this act". — See note under 
this catchline following § 54-4-15.1. 
54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Appor-
tionment of costs by transportation department 
— Liability of cities, towns and counties — 
Claims for payment of costs. 
STATUTES 
54*4*14. Safety regulation. 
The commission shall have power, by general or special orders, rules or 
regulations, or otherwise, to require every public utility to construct, main-
tain and operate its line, plant, system, equipment, apparatus, tracks and 
premises in such manner as to promote and safeguard the health and safety of 
its employees, passengers, customers and the public, and to this end to pre-
scribe, among other things, the installation, use, maintenance and operation 
of appropriate safety or other devices or appliances including interlocking and 
other protective devices at grade crossings or junctions, and block or other 
system of signaling, and to establish uniform or other standards of construc-
tion and equipment, and to require the performance of any other acts which 
the health or safety of its employees, passengers, customers or the public may 
demand, provided, however, that the department of transportation shall have 
jurisdiction over those safety functions transferred to it by the Department of 
Transportation Act. 
History: L. 1917, ch. 47, art 4, $ 13; C.L. Department of Transportation Act. — 
1917, ( 4S10;R.S. 1933 AC. 1943. 76-4-14; L. The Department of Transportation Act, re-
1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, i 16. ferred to in this section, is located mainly at 
Cross-References. — Transportation de- §$ 63-49-1 through 63-49-15 
partment, § 63-49-1 et seq 
54-4-15. Grade crossings — Transportation department — 
Commission — Regulation. 
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a public road, high-
way or street at grade, nor shall the track of any railroad corporation be 
constructed across the track of any other railroad or street railroad corpora-
tion at grade, nor shall the track of a street railroad corporation be con-
structed across the track of a railroad corporation at grade, without the per-
mission of the Department of Transportation having first been secured; pro-
vided, that this subsection shall not apply to the replacement of lawfully 
existing tracks. The department shall have the right to refuse its permission 
or to grant it upon such terms and conditions as it may prescribe. 
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and prescribe the 
manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installa-
tion, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each crossing of one rail-
road by another railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a 
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a railroad or 
street railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice versa, and to alter or 
abolish any such crossing, to restrict the use of such crossings to certain types 
of traffic in the interest of public safety and is vested with power and it shall 
be its duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by school buses 
and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire, and to require, where in its 
judgment it would be practicable, a separation of grades at any such crossing 
heretofore or hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which 
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which the expense of the 
alteration or abolition of such crossings or the separation of such grades shall 
be divided between the railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or 
between such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other public 
authority in interest. 
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the provisions of 
§ 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the installation, maintenance, recon-
struction or improvement of any signals or devices described in § 54-4-15.1 
between the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved. Unless 
otherwise ordered by the department, the liability of cities, towns and coun-
ties to pay the share of maintenance cost assigned to the local agencies by the 
department shall be limited to the funds provided under this act. Payment of 
any moneys from the funds provided shall be made on the basis of verified 
claims filed with the Department of Transportation by the railroad or street 
railroad corporation responsible for the physical installation, maintenance, 
reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 118. f 3; 1975 (1st Meaning of "this act". — See note under 
S.S.), fch. 9, i 19. this catchline following I 54-4-15.1. 
54-4-15.4. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Trans-
portation department to provide costs in annual 
budget. 
The Department of Transportation shall provide in its annual budget for 
the costs to be incurred under this act. 
History: L. 1973, ch. 118. t 4; 1975 (1st Meaning of "this mcT. — See note under 
S.S.), ch. 9, I 20. tame catchhne following § 54-4-15.1. 
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NOTES OF DECISIONS 
Costs of construction 1 R2d 424, certiorari denied 109 S.Ct 790, 
Ferries 2 102 LEd.2d 782. 
2. Ferries 
1. Costs of construction The establishment of ferries across 
Insurance proceeds and interest to streams and on navigable waters, for 
which state had title and which state normal transportation purposes as dis-
transferred to Federal Highway Admin- tinguished from sightseeing, amusement 
istration to obtain federal emergency re- and the like, is not a matter of purely 
lief funds to reconstruct bridge were private right and function, but is a pub-
"cost of construction" within meaning of lie function permitted only by the con-
statute allowing state to collect tolls up sent, express or implied, of sovereign 
to amount necessary to recoup state's authority. U.S. v. Washington Toll 
contribution toward cost of construction Bridge Authority, D.CWash.1960, 190 
of federally funded bridge. Clallam FiSupp. 95, reversed on other grounds 
County v. Department of Transp., of 307 F.2d 330, certiorari denied 83 S.Ct 
State of Wash., C.A.9 (Wash.) 1988, 849 724, 372 VS. 911, 9 LEd^d 71. 
§ 130. Railway-highway crossings 
(a) Except as provided in subsection (d) of section 120 of this title 
and subsection (b) of this section, the entire cost of construction of 
projects for the elimination of hazards of railway-highway cross-
ings, including the separation or protection of grades at crossings, 
the reconstruction of existing railroad grade crossing structures, 
and the relocation of highways to eliminate grade crossings, may be 
paid from sums apportioned in accordance with section 104 of this 
title. In any case when the elimination of the hazards of a railway-
highway crossing can be effected by the relocation of a portion of a 
railway at a cost estimated by the Secretary to be less than the cost 
of such elimination by one of the methods mentioned in the first 
sentence of this section, then the entire cost of such relocation 
project, exceot as provided in subsection (d) of section 120 of this 
title and subsection (b) of this section, may be paid from sums 
apportioned in accordance with section 104 of this title. 
(b) The Secretary may classify the various types of projects in-
volved in the elimination of hazards of railway-highway crossings, 
and may set for each such classification a percentage of the costs of 
construction which shall be deemed to represent the net benefit to 
the railroad or railroads for the purpose of determining the rail-
road's share of the cost of construction. The percentage so deter-
mined shall in no case exceed 10 per centum. The Secretary shall 
determine the appropriate classification of each project. 
(c) Any railroad involved in a project for the elimination of 
hazards of railway-highway crossings paid for in whole or in part 
from sums made available for expenditure under this title, or prior 
Acts, shall be liable to the United States for the net benefit to the 
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railroad determined under the classification of such project made 
pursuant to subsection (b) of this section. Such liability to the 
United States may be discharged by direct payment to the State 
highway department of the State in which the project is located, in 
which case such payment shall be credited to the cost of the project. 
Such payment may consist in whole or in part of materials and 
labor furnished by the railroad in connection with the construction 
of such project. If any such railroad fails to discharge such liability 
within a six-month period after completion of the project, it shall be 
liable to the United States for its share of the cost, and the Secretary 
shall request the Attorney General to institute proceedings against 
such railroad for the recovery of the amount for which it is liable 
under this subsection. The Attorney General is authorized to bring 
such proceedings on behalf of the United States, in the appropriate 
district court of the United States, and the United States shall be 
entitled in such proceedings to recover such sums as it is considered 
and adjudged by the court that such railroad is liable for in the 
premises. Any amounts recovered by the United States under this 
subsection shall be credited to miscellaneous receipts. 
(d) Survey and schedule of projects.—Each State shall conduct 
and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify 
those railroad crossings which may require separation, relocation, 
or protective devices, and establish and implement a schedule of 
projects for this purpose. At a minimum, such a schedule shall 
provide signs for all railway-highway crossings. 
(e) Funds for protective devices.—At least Vi of the funds autho-
rized for and expended under this section shall be available for the 
installation of protective devices at railway-highway crossings. 
Sums authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section shall 
be available for obligation in the same manner as funds appor-
tioned under section 104(b)(1) of this title. 
(f) Apportionment.—Twenty-five percent of the funds authorized 
to be appropriated to carry out this section shall be apportioned to 
the States in the same manner as sums are apportioned under 
section 104(b)(2) of this title, 25 percent of such funds shall be 
apportioned to the States in the same manner as sums are appor-
tioned under section 104(b)(6) of this title, and 50 percent of such 
funds shall be apportioned to the States in the ratio that total 
railway-highway crossings in each State bears to the total of such 
crossings in all States. The Federal share payable on account of 
any project financed with funds authorized to be appropriated to 
carry out this section shall be 90 percent of the cost thereof. 
(g) Annual report.—Each State shall report to the Secretary not 
later than December 30 of each year on the progress being made to 
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implement the railway-highway crossings program authorized by 
this section and the effectiveness of such improvements. Each 
State report shall contain an assessment of the costs of the various 
treatments employed and subsequent accident experience at im-
proved locations. The Secretary shall submit a report to the Com-
mittee on Environment and Public Works of the Senate and the 
Committee on Public Works and Transportation of the House of 
Representatives not later than April 1 of each year, on the progress 
being made by the State in implementing projects to improve 
railway-highway crossings. The report shall include, but not be 
limited to, the number of projects undertaken, their distribution by 
cost range, road system, nature of treatment, and subsequent acci-
dent experience at improved locations. In addition, the Secretary's 
report shall analyze and evaluate each State program, identify any 
State found not to be in compliance with the schedule of improve-
ments required by subsection (d) and include recommendations for 
future implementation of the railroad highwayl crossings program. 
(h) Use of funds for matching.—Funds authorized to be appro-
priated to carry out this section may be used to provide a local 
government with funds to be used on a matching basis when State 
funds are available which may only be spent when the local govern-
ment produces matching funds for the improvement of railway-
highway crossings. 
(Pub. L. 85-767, Aug. 27,1958, 72 Stat. 903; Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 121(a), 
Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 159.) 
1
 So in original. Probably should be "railroad-highway". 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports Demonstration Project, Railroad-High* 
1958 Act. Senate Report No. 1928, see way Crossings; Reports to President 
1958 U .^Code Cong, and Adm.News, p. and Congress; Appropriations Autho-
3942. rization; Highway Safety Study; Re-
1987 Act Senate Report No. 100-4 K^T^o^SfTtu T S I*I A,., II 
i S £ w J T « l S g* 93-643' § 1 0 4 - J a n - 4> l975'88 Stat 
Adm.News, p. 66.
 2 2 8 2 ; p ^ ^ 9Ar2ZQ T i U c ^ 
Amendments § HOfcMe). Ma* 5, 1976, 90 Stat 444; 
1987 Amendment Subsecs. (d) to (h). f l * i ; . 9 " 9 2r TltlcJJ ll4^}m(c)' N2X' 
Pub.L. 100-17 added subsecs. (d) to (h). £ }97*> MSttL 2709;; PubJL 96^70, 
Title II, § 209(b). Oct 19, 1980, 94 Stat 
Demonstration Project Railroad-High- 2245; Pub.L 97-424, Title I, § 151, Jan. 
way Crossings; Inclusion of Projects 6, 1983, 96 Stat 2132; Pub.L 100-17, 
at Terre Haute, Indiana Title I, §§ 133(c)(3), 148, Apr. 2, 1987, 
Pub.L 94-387, Tide I, § 101, Aug. 14, 101 Stat. 172, 181; Pub.L 100-202, 
1976, 90 Stat. 1176, provided in part: § 101(0 [Tide III, § 346], Dec 22, 1987, 
That section 163 of Public Law 93-87 101 Stat 1329-358, 1329-388, provided 
[set out as a note under this section] is that 
hereby amended to include projects at "(a) (1) The Secretary of Transporta-
Terre Haute, Indiana". tion shall enter into such arrangements 
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by Pub.L 100-17. Tide I, § 125(a). Apr. 
2. 1987. 101 Stat 166. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Highway funds, see Highways **99XA. 
Power and duty to maintain and repair, see Bridges *»21(1). 
Encyclopedias 
Federal aid for highways, see CJ.S. Highways § 176. 
Power and duty to maintain and repair, see CJS. Bridges §§ 35 to 42. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Highways cases: 200k[add key number]. 
See. also. WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
§ 152 . Hazard elimination program 
(a) Each State shall conduct and systematically maintain an engi-
neering survey of all public roads to identify hazardous locations, 
sections, and elements, including roadside obstacles and unmarked 
or poorly marked roads, which may constitute a danger to motor-
ists and pedestrians, assign priorities for the correction of such 
locations, sections, and elements, and establish and implement a 
schedule of projects for their improvement. 
(b) The Secretary may approve as a project under this section any 
highway safety improvement project. 
(c) Funds authorized to carry out this section shall be available 
for expenditure on any public road (other than a highway on the 
Interstate System). 
(d) The Federal share payable on account of any project under 
this section shall be 90 percent of the cost thereof. 
(e) Funds authorized to be appropriated to carry out this section 
shall be apportioned to the States as provided in section 402(c) of 
this title. Such funds shall be available for obligation in the same 
manner and to the same extent as if such funds were apportioned 
under section 104(b)(1), except that the Secretary is authorized to 
waive provisions he deems inconsistent with the purposes of this 
section. 
(f) Each State shall establish an evaluation process approved by 
the Secretary, to analyze and assess results achieved by highway 
safety improvement projects carried out in accordance with proce-
dures and criteria established by this section. Such evaluation 
process shall develop cost-benefit data for various types of correc-
tions and treatments which shall be used in setting priorities for 
highway safety improvement projects. 
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(g) Each State shall report to the Secretary of Transportation not 
later than December 30 of each year, on the progress being made to 
implement highway safety improvement projects for hazard elimi-
nation and the effectiveness of such improvements. Each State 
report shall contain an assessment of the cost of, and safety benefits 
derived from, the various means and methods used to mitigate or 
eliminate hazards and the previous and subsequent accident experi-
ence at these locations. The Secretary of Transportation shall 
submit a report to the Committee on Environment and Public 
Works of the Senate and the Committee on Public Works and 
Transportation of the House of Representatives not later than April 
1 of each year on the progress being made by the States in 
implementing the hazard elimination program (including but not 
limited to any projects for pavement marking). The report shall 
include, but not be limited to, the number of projects undertaken, 
their distribution by cost range, road system, means and methods 
used, and the previous and subsequent accident experience at im-
proved locations. In addition, the Secretary's report shall analyze 
and evaluate each State program, identify any State found not to be 
in compliance with the schedule of improvements required by 
subsection (a) and include recommendations for future implemen-
tation of the hazard elimination program. 
(h) For the purposes of this section the term "State" shall have 
the meaning given it in section 401 of this title. 
(Added Pub. L. 93-87, Title II, § 209(a), Aug. 13, 1973, 87 Stat. 286, and 
amended Pub. L. 94-280, Title I, § 131, May 5, 1976, 90 Stat 441; Pub. L. 
95-599, Title I, § 168(a), Nov. 6, 1978, 92 Stat. 2722; Pub. L. 96-106, 
§ 10(b), Nov. 9, 1979, 93 Stat. 798; Pub. L. 97-375, Title II, § 210(b), Dec. 
21, 1982, 96 Stat. 1826; Pub. L. 97-424, Title I, § 125, Jan. 6, 1983, 96 Stat. 
2113; Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 133(b)(12), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 172.) 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 1982 Act House Report No. 97-804, 
1973 Act. House Report No. 93-118 see 1982 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, 
and Senate Conference Report No. p. 3435. 
93-355 see 1973 ILS.Code Cong, and
 1 9 g 3 AeL H o u s c R c p o r t N o 97-555 
Adm.News, p. 1859.
 a n d H o u s c Conference Report 97-987, 
1976 Act. House Report No. 94-716 see 1982 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, 
and House Conference Report No. p. 3639. 
94-1017, see 1976 U^.Code Cong, and i 9 8 7 Act. Senate Report No. 10CM 
Adm.News, p. 798. ^ d House Conference Report No. 
1978 Act. House Report No. 95-1485 1W-27, see 1987 U.S.Code Cong, and 
and House Conference Report No. Adm.News, p. 66. 
! ^ 7 ' S e e l « , 8 e U - S - C ° d e C 0 n g a n d Amendment, 
Adm-News.p.6575. 1987 Amendment. Subsec (g). 
1979 Act Senate Report No. 96-333, Pub.L. 100-17 substituted "the Commit-
see 1979 U.S.Code Cong, and Adm.News, tee on Environment and Public Works of 
p. 1813. the Senate and the Committee on Public 
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§ 409* Admission as evidence of certain reports and surveys 
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, reports, surveys, 
schedules, lists, or data compiled for the purpose of identifyingl 
evaluating, or planning the safety enhancement of potential acci-
dent sites, hazardous roadway conditions, or railway-highway cross-
ings, pursuant to sections 130, 144, and 152 of this title or for the 
purpose of developing any highway safety construction improve-
ment project which may be implemented utilizing Federal-aid high-
way funds shall not be admitted into evidence in Federal or State 
court or considered for other purposes in any action for damages 
arising from any occurrence at a location mentioned or addressed 
in such reports, surveys, schedules, lists, or data. 
(Added Pub.L. 100-17, Title I, § 132(a), Apr. 2, 1987, 101 Stat. 170.) 
1
 Probably should have a comma inserted. 
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES 
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports 100-27, see 1987 U.S.Code Cong, and 
1987 Act. Senate Report No. 100-4 Adm.News, p. 66. 
and House Conference Report No. 
LIBRARY REFERENCES 
American Digest System 
Power to regulate or prohibit, see Automobiles ^5(1) to 6. 
Encyclopedias 
Power to regulate or prohibit, see CJS. Motor Vehicles §§ 14 to 25. 
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH 
Automobiles cases: 48ak [add key number] 
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume. 
§ 4 1 0 . Drunk driving prevention programs 
(a) General authority.—Subject to the provisions of this section 
and to the extent provided in advance in appropriation Acts, the 
Secretary shall make basic and supplemental grants to those States 
which adopt and implement drunk driving prevention programs 
which include measures described in this section to improve the 
effectiveness of the enforcement of laws the purpose of which are to 
discourage individuals from operating motor vehicles while under 
the influence of alcohol. Such grants may only be used by recipi-
ent States to implement and enforce such programs. 
(b) Maintenance of effort—No grant may be made to a State 
under this section in any fiscal year unless such State enters into 
such agreements with the Secretary as the Secretary may require to 
ensure that such State will maintain its aggregate expenditures from 
all other sources for drunk driving prevention programs at or above 
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which the employer has its principal executive office, or for the District of 
Columbia, to compel the Secretary to issue an order under this section. 
The failure of the Secretary to seek relief under subsection (a) of this 
section shall be reviewed solely under the standards of section 706 of Title 
5. 
(Pub.L. 91-458, Tide II, § 203, Oct 16,1970, 84 Stat 972; PubX. 96-423, § 3, Oct 10, 
1980, 94 Stat 1811.) 
Historical Note 
1980 Amendment. Pub.L. 96-423 designat-
ed existing provisions as subsecs. (a) and (b), 
substituted references to unsafe conditions or 
practices or combinations of unsafe conditions 
or practices or both for former references to 
facilities or pieces of equipment in unsafe con-
dition in subsec. (a) as so designated, and 
added subsecs. (c), (d), and (e). 
Effective Date of 1980 Amendment 
Amendment by PubX. 96-423 effective Oct. 
10, 1980, see section 17(a) of PubX. 96-423, 
set out as a note under section 431 of this title. 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of PubX. 91-458, see 1970 VS. 
Code Cong, and AdmJfcws, p. 4104. See, also, 
PubX. 96-423, 1980 U^.Codc Cong, and Adm. 
News, p. 3830. 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Rules of practice—Federal Railroad Administration, see 49 CFR 211.1 et seq. 
Special notice and emergency order procedures—Railroad track, locomotive and equipment see 
49 CFR 216.1 et seq. 
Notes of Decisions 
Construction with other laws 1 
Standards and procedures for relief 
1. Construction with other laws 
In light of the legislative history of the 1980 
amendments to this section, practical interpre-
tation of the broad phrase "conditions or prac-
tices," the need for flexibility in response to 
life-threatening emergency situations, and the 
lack of conflict between the exercise of the 
Secretary of Transportation's emergency pow-
ers under this section and the United States 
attorney's enforcement of the Hours of Service 
Act, section 62 of this title, the Secretary's 
emergency powers under this section to abate 
unsafe conditions or practices extend to emer-
gency situations involving a hazard of death or 
injury to persons with respect to sleeping quar-
ters for employees, even though the prescrip-
tions of the Service Act, section 62 of this tide, 
with respect to crew sleeping accommodations 
are enforceable only by the United States at-
torney. United Transp. Union v. Lewis, CA. 
Ala.1983, 699 F2d 1109. 
2. Standards and procedures for relief 
Order of Administrator of the Federal Rail-
road Administration placing 30-mile-per-hour 
speed limit on all trams carrying hazardous 
materials over railroad's tracks, requiring that 
railroad double the frequency of track inspec-
tions, and directing that railroad inspect on 
foot all of track over which it transported 
hazardous material violated due process 
clause of U.S.CA.Const. Amend. 5 because of 
its failure to specify the precise corrective 
steps which railroad had to take to eliminate 
unsafe condiuon in its trackage and thus ob-
tain relief from order, and violated provision 
of this section requiring that such an order 
relate solely to a facility or piece of equipment 
in unsafe condiuon. Louisville ii NJL Co. v. 
Sullivan, D.C.D.C.1979, 471 F.Supp. 469. 
§ 4 3 3 . Grade crossings and railroad rights-of-way; compre-
hensive study and recommendations of means of elimi-
nation and protection 
(a) The Secretary shall submit to the President for transmittal to the 
Congress, within one year after October 16, 1970, a comprehensive study of 
the problem of eliminating and protecting railroad grade crossings, includ-
ing a study of measures to protect pedestrians in densely populated areas 
along railroad rights-of-way, together with his recommendations for appro-
priate action including, if relevant, a recommendation for equitable alloca-
tion of the economic costs of any program proposed as a result of such 
study. 
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(b) In addition the Secretary shall, insofar as practicable, under the 
authority provided by this subchapter and pursuant to his authority over 
highway, traffic, and motor vehicle safety, and highway construction, 
undertake a coordinated effort toward the objective of developing and 
implementing solutions to the grade crossing problem, as well as measures 
to protect pedestrians in densely populated areas along railroad rights-of-
way. 
(PubX. 91^*58, Tide II, § 204, Oct 16, 1970, 84 Stat 972.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of PubX. 91-458, see 1970 VS. 
Code Cong, and AdnLNews, p. 4104. 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Special notice and emergency order procedures—Railroad track, locomotive and equipment, see 
49 CFR 216.1 et seq. 
Library References 
Railroads «=»239 et seq. 
CJS. Railroads § 432. 
§ 4 3 4 . National uniformity of laws, rules, regulations, orders, 
and standards relating to railroad safety; State regula-
tion 
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, orders, and standards 
relating to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practica-
ble. A State may adopt or continue in force any law, rule, regulation, 
order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such time as the Secre-
tary has adopted a rule, regulation, order, or standard covering the subject 
matter of such State requirement A State may adopt or continue in force 
an additional or more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard, and when not incompatible with any Feder-
al law, rule, regulation, order, or standard, and when not creating an undue 
burden on interstate commerce. 
(PubX. 91-458, Title II, § 205, Oct 16, 1970, 84 Stat 972.) 
Historical Note 
Legislative History. For legislative history 
and purpose of PubX. 91-458, see 1970 U.S. 
Code Cong, and AdnLNews, p. 4104. 
Cross References 
Promulgation of rules, regulations, orders, and standards, see section 431 of this title. 
Code of Federal Regulations 
Special notice and emergency order procedures—Railroad track, locomotive and equipment, see 
49 CFR 216.1 et seq. 
State safety participation regulations, see 49 CFR 212.1 et seq. 
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(2) Reconstruction of existing grade 
separations; and 
(3) Grade crossing improvements, (b) Other railroad-highway projects 
are those which use railroad proper-
ties or involve adjustments to railroad 
facilities required by highway con-
struction but do not involve the elimi-
nation of hazards of railroad-highway 
crossings. Also included are adjust-
ments to facilities that are jointly 
owned or used by railroad and utility 
companies. 
§646.208 Funding. 
(a) Federal-aid funding for projects 
which involve the elimination of haz-
ards of railroad-highway crossings 
may, at the option of the State, be 
provided through one of the following 
alternative methods, within the quali-
fications prescribed for each: 
(1) "G" funding, as provided by 23 
TLS.C. 120(d) and 130; 
(2) Regular pro rata sharing as pro-
vided by 23 UJS.C. 120(a) and 120(c); 
and 
(3) Funding authorized by 23 U.S.C. 
405 and section 203 of the Highway 
Safety Act of 1973. 
(b) The adjustment of railroad facili-
ties which does not involve the elimi-
nation of hazards of railroad-highway 
crossings may be funded through reg-
ular pro rata sharing, as provided by 
23 UJS.C. 120 (a) and (c). 
§646^10 Classification of projects and 
railroad share of the cost 
(a) State laws requiring railroads to 
share in the cost of work for the elimi-
nation of hazards at railroad-highway 
crossings shall not apply to Federal-
aid projects. (b) Pursuant to 23 UJS.C. 130(b), and 
49 CFR 1.48: (1) Projects for grade crossing im-
provements are deemed to be of no as-
certainable net benefit to the railroads 
and there shall be no required railroad 
share of the costs. (2) Projects for the reconstruction of 
existing grade separations are deemed 
to generally be of no ascertainable net 
benefit to the railroad and there shall 
be no required railroad share of the 
costs, unless the railroad has a specific 
contractual obligation with the State 
or its political subdivision to share in 
the costs. 
(3) On projects for the elimination 
of existing grade crossings at which 
active warning devices are in place or 
ordered to be installed by a State regu-
latory agency, the railroad share of 
the project costs shall be 5 percent. 
(4) On projects for the elimination 
of existing grade crossings at which 
active warning devices are not in place 
and have not been ordered installed by 
a State regulatory agency, or on 
projects which do not eliminate an ex-
isting crossing, there shall be no re-
quired railroad share of the project 
cost. 
(c) The required railroad share of 
the cost under § 646.210(b) (3) shall be 
based on the costs for preliminary en-
gineering, right-of-way and construc-
tion within the limits described below: 
(1) Where a grade crossing is elimi-
nated by grade separation, the struc-
ture and approaches required to tran-
sition to a theoretical highway profile 
which would have been constructed if 
there were no railroad present, for the 
number of lanes on the existing high-
way and in accordance with the cur-
rent design standards of the State 
highway agency. 
(2) Where another facility, such as a 
highway or waterway, requiring a 
bridge structure is located within the 
limits of a grade separation project, 
the estimated cost of a theoretical 
structure and approaches as described 
in § 646.210(c) (1) to eliminate the rail-
road-highway grade crossing without 
considering the presence of the water-
way or other highway. 
(3) Where a grade crossing is elimi-
nated by railroad or highway reloca-
tion, the actual cost of the relocation 
project, the estimated cost of the relo-
cation project, or the estimated cost of 
a structure and approaches as de-
scribed in § 646.210(c)(1). whichever is 
less. 
(d) Railroads may voluntarily con-
tribute a greater share of project costs 
than is required. Also, other parties 
may voluntarily assume the railroad's 
share. 
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964&212 Federal share. 
(a) General. (1) Federal funds are 
not eligible to participate in costs in-
curred solely for the benefit of the 
railroad. 
(2) At grade separations Federal 
funds are eligible to participate in 
costs to provide space for more tracks 
than are in place when the railroad es-
tablishes to the satisfaction of the 
State highway agency and FHWA that 
it has a definite demand and plans for 
installation of the additional tracks 
within a reasonable time. (3) The Federal share of the cost of 
a grade separation project shall be 
based on the cost to provide horizontal 
and/or vertical clearances used by the 
railroad in its normal practice subject 
to limitations as shown in the Appen-
dix or as required by a State regula-
tory agency. 
(b) "G" Funds. (1) The Federal 
sfoax*. ot t\\fc cask oi *. "G" fcuuted 
project may be up to 100 percent of 
the cost of preliminary engineering 
and construction and 75 percent of the 
cost of right-of-way and property 
damage, except that the Federal share 
shall be reduced by the amount of any 
required railroad share of the cost. 
(2) Projects for the elimination of 
hazards of railroad-highway crossings, 
either by crossing elimination, im-
provement, or the reconstruction of 
existing grade separations, as de-
scribed in § 646.206(a) are eligible for 
"G" funding subject to the following 
limitations: 
(i) For a new or reconstructed grade 
separation, the entire structure or 
structures and necessary highway and 
railroad approaches to accommodate 
both vehicular and pedestrian traffic. (11) Where another facility, such as a 
highway or waterway requiring a 
bridge structure, is located within the 
limits of a grade separation project, 
the estimated cost and limits of work 
IOT & \,YteOT€ttoa\ starvrctottfe an& neces-
sary approaches as in §646.212 (b) (2) (i) without considering the pres-
ence of the waterway or other high-
way. 
(ill) For railroad or highway reloca-
tion the actual cost of the relocation 
project or the estimated cost of a theo-
retical structure and necessary ap-
proaches to eliminate the grade 
crossings) as in } 646.212(b) (2) (1), 
whichever is less. 
(iv) Grade crossing improvements in (he vicinity of the crossing and related 
work, including construction or recon-
struction of the approaches as neces-
sary to provide an acceptable transi-
tion to existing or improved highway 
gradients and alignments, and advance 
yarning devices. 
(40 FR 16059, Apr. 9.1975, as amended at 47 
fR 33955, Aug. 5, 1982; 53 FR 32218, Aug. 
24,19881 
$ 646*214 Design. 
(a) General (1) Facilities that are 
the responsibility of the railroad for 
maintenance and operation shall con-
form to the specifications and design 
standards used by the railroad in its 
normal practice, subject to approval 
py the State highway agency and 
(2) Facilities that are the responsi-
bility of the highway agency for main-
tenance and operation shall conform 
to the specifications and design stand-
ards and guides used by the highway 
agency in its normal practice, subject 
to approval by FHWA. 
(b) Grade crossing improvements. (1) All traffic control devices proposed 
shall comply with the latest edition of 
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Con-
trol Devices for Streets and Highways 
supplemented to the extent applicable 
W State standards. 
(2) Pursuant to 23 UJS.C. 109(e), 
^ here a railroad-highway grade cross-
ing is located within the limits of or 
near the terminus of a Federal-aid 
highway project for construction of a 
Dew highway or improvement of the 
existing roadway, the crossing shall 
not be opened for unrestricted use by 
traffic or the project accepted by 
fHWA until adequate warning devices 
for the crossing are installed and func-
(3)(i) "Adequate warning devices", 
under § 646.214(b) (2) or on any proj-
ect where Federal-aid funds partici-
pate in the installation of the devices 
*re to include automatic gates with 
flashing light signals when one or 
inore of the following conditions exist: 
(A) Multiple main line railroad 
tracks. 
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(B) Multiple tracks at or in the vicin-
ity of the crossing which may be occu-
pied by a train or locomotive so as to 
obscure the movement of another 
train approaching the crossing. 
(C) High Speed train operation com-
bined with limited sight distance at 
either single or multiple track cross-
ings. 
(D) A combination of high speeds 
and moderately high volumes of high-
way and railroad traffic. 
(E) Either a high volume of vehicu-
lar traffic, high number of train move-
ments, substantial numbers of school-
buses or trucks carrying hazardous 
materials, unusually restricted sight 
distance, continuing accident occur-
rences, or any combination of these 
conditions. 
(F) A diagnostic team recommends 
them. 
(ii) In individual cases where a diag-
nostic team justifies that gates are not 
appropriate, PHWA may find that the 
above requirements are not applicable. 
(4) For crossings where the require-
ments of § 646.214(b) (3) are not appli-
cable, the type of warning device to be 
installed, whether the determination 
is made by a State regulatory agency, 
State highway agency, and/or the rail-
road, is subject to the approval of 
FHWA. (c) Grade crossing elimination. All 
crossings of railroads and highways at 
grade shall be eliminated where there 
is full control of access on the high-
way (a freeway) regardless of the 
volume of railroad or highway traffic. 
[40 FR 16059, Apr. 9.1975. as amended at 47 
FR 33955. Aug. 5.1982] 
§ 646.216 General procedures. 
(a) General Unless specifically modi-
fied herein, applicable Federal-aid pro-
cedures govern projects undertaken 
pursuant to this subpart. (b) Preliminary engineering and en-
gineering services. (1) As mutually 
agreed to by the State highway agency 
and railroad, and subject to the provi-
sions of § 646.216(b) (2), preliminary 
engineering work on railroad-highway 
projects may be accomplished by one 
of the following methods: 
(i) The State or railroad's engineer-
ing forces; 
(ii) An engineering consultant select-
ed by the State after consultation with 
the railroad, and with the State ad-
ministering the contract; or 
(ill) An engineering consultant se-
lected by the railroad, with the ap-
proval of the State and with the rail-
road administering the contract. 
(2) Where a railroad is not adequate-
ly staffed. Federal-aid funds may par-
ticipate in the amounts paid to engi-
neering consultants and others for re-
quired services, provided such 
amounts are not based on a percent-
age of the cost of construction, either 
under contracts for individual projects 
or under existing written continuing 
contracts where such work is regularly 
performed for the railroad in its own 
work under such contracts at reasona-
ble costs. 
(c) Rights-of-way. (1) Acquisition of 
right-of-way by a State highway 
agency on behalf of a railroad or ac-
quisition of nonoperating real proper-
ty from a railroad shall be in accord-
ance with the Uniform Relocation As-
sistance and Real Property Acquisition 
Policies Act of 1970 (42XLS.C. 4601 et 
seq.) and applicable rnwA right-of-
way procedures in 23 CFR, Chapter I, 
Subchapter H. On projects for the 
elimination of hazards of railroad-
highway crossings by the relocation of 
railroads, acquisition or replacement 
right-of-way by a railroad shall be in 
accordance with 42 UJS.C. 4601 et seq. 
(2) Where buildings and other depre-
ciable structures of the railroad (such 
as signal towers, passenger stations, 
depots, and other buildings, and equip-
ment housings) which are integral to 
operation of railroad traffic are wholly 
or partly affected by a highway 
project, the costs of work necessary to 
functionally restore such facilities are 
eligible for participation. However, 
when replacement of such facilities is 
necessary, credits shall be made to the 
cost of the project fon 
(i) Accrued depreciation, which is 
that amount based on the ratio be-
tween the period of actual length of 
service and total life expectancy ap-
plied to the original cost. 
(ii) Additions or improvements 
which provide higher quality or in-
creased service capability of the f acili-
219 
§655*601 23 CFR Ch. I (4-1-90 Edition) 
Subpart E—[Rasorvod] 
Subpart F—Traffic Control Dovicas on 
Fodarol-Aid and Othor Stroots 
and Highways 
80UBCC 48 FR 46776, Oct. 14,1983, unless 
otherwise noted. 
§655.601 Purpose. 
To prescribe the policies and proce-
dures of the Federal Highway Admin-
istration (FHWA) to obtain basic uni-
formity of traffic control devices on all 
streets and highways in accordance 
with the following references that are 
approved by the FHWA for applica-
tion on Federal-aid projects: 
(a) Manual on Uniform Traffic Con-
trol Devices for Streets and Highways, 
FHWA, 1988, as of March 1989. (This 
publication is incorporated by refer-
ence and is on file at the Office o! the 
Federal Register in Washington, DC. 
It may be purchased from the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office (GPO), Washing-
ton, DC 20402 and has Stock No. 050-
001-81001-8. It is available for inspec-
tion and copying as prescribed in 49 
CFR Paii; 7, Appendix D). 
(b) Standard Alphabets for Highway 
Signs, FHWA, 1966 Edition, Reprinted 
May 1972. (This publication is incorpo-
rated by reference and is on file at the 
Office of the Federal Register in 
Washington, DC. This document is 
available for inspection and copying as 
provided in 49 CFR Part 7, Appendix 
D). 
(c) Traffic Surveillance and Control, 
FHWA, 23 CFR Part 655, Subpart D. 
(d) Motorist Aid Systems, FHWA, 23 
CFR Part 655, Subpart G. 
(e) Pavement Marking Demonstra-
tion Program, FHWA, 23 CFR Part 
920. 
[51 FR 16834. May 7,1986, as amended at 53 
FR 8626. Mar. 16, 1988: 54 FR 3004. Jan. 23, 
1989:55 FR 2374. Jan. 24,1990] 
§655.602 Definitions. 
The terms used herein are defined in 
accordance with definitions and usages 
contained in the MUTCD and 23 
U.S.C. 101(a). 
§655.603 Standards. 
(a) National MUTCD. The MUTCD 
approved by the Federal Highway Ad-
ministrator is the national standard 
for all traffic control devices installed 
on any street, highway, or bicycle trail 
open to public travel in accordance 
with 23 UJS.C 109(d) and 402(a). The 
national MUTCDis specifically ap-
proved by the FHWA for application 
on any highway project in which Fed-
eral highway funds participate and on 
projects in federally administered 
areas where a Federal department or 
agency controls the highway or super-
vises the traffic operations. 
(b) State or other Federal MUTCD. 
(1) Where State or other Federal 
agency MUTCDs or supplements are 
required, they shall be in substantial 
conformance with the national 
MUTCD. Changes to the national 
MUTCD Issued by the FHWA shall be 
adopted by the States or other Federal 
agencies within 2 years of issuance. 
The FHWA Regional Administrator 
has been delegated the authority to 
approve State MUTCDs and supple-
ments. 
(2) The Direct Federal Program Ad-
ministrator has been delegated the au-
thority to approve other Federal 
agency MUTCDs with the concurrence 
of the Office of Traffic Operations. 
States and other Federal agencies are 
encouraged to adopt the national 
MUTCD as their official Manual on 
Uniform Traffic Control Devices. 
(c) Color specifications. Color deter-
minations and specifications of sign 
and pavement marking materials shall 
conform to requirements of the 
FHWA Color Tolerance Charts.2 An al-
ternate method of determining the 
color of retroreflective sign material is 
provided in the Appendix. 
(d) Compliance—<1) Existing high-
ways. Each State, in cooperation with 
agencies shall have a program as re-
quired by Highway Safety Program 
Standard Number 13, Traffic Engi-
neering Services (23 CFR 1204.4) 
'Available for inspection from the Office 
of Traffic Operations, Federal Highway Ad-
ministration. 400 Seventh Street. SW., 
Washington, D.C. 20590. 
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which shall include provisions for the jvstematic upgrading of substandard 
traffic control devices and for the in-
stallation of needed devices to achieve 
conformity with the MUTCD. (2) New or reconstructed highways. 
Federal-aid projects for the construc-
tion* reconstruction, resurfacing, res-
toration, or rehabilitation of streets 
and highways shall not be opened to 
the public for unrestricted use until 
all appropriate traffic control devices, 
either temporary or permanent, are 
Installed and functioning properly. 
Both temporary and permanent de-
vices shall conform to the MUTCD. (3) Construction area activities. All 
traffic control devices installed in con-
struction areas using Federal-aid 
funds shall conform to the MUTCD. 
Traffic control plans for handling 
traffic and pedestrians in construction 
zones and for protection of workers 
shall conform to the requirements of 
23 CPR Part 630, Subpart J, Traffic 
Safety in Highway and Street Work 
Zones. (4) MUTCD changes. The FHWA 
may establish target dates for achiev-
ing compliance with changes to specif-
ic devices in the MUTCD. (e) Specific information signs. 
Standards for specific information 
signs are contained in the MUTCD. 
[48 FR 46776, Oct. 14, 1983, as amended at 
51 FR 16834. May 7,1986] 
§ 655.604 Achieving basic uniformity. 
(a) Programs. Programs for the or-
derly and systematic upgrading of ex-
isting traffic control devices or the in-
stallation of needed traffic control de-
vices on or off the Federal-aid system 
should be based on inventories made 
in accordance with 23 CFR 1204.4, 
Highway Safety Program Standards. 
These inventories provide the infor-
mation necessary for programming 
traffic control device upgrading 
projects. (b) Inventory. An inventory of all 
traffic control devices is required by 
Highway Safety Program Standard 
Number 13, Traffic Engineering Serv-
ices (23 CFR 1204.4). Highway plan-
ning and research funds and highway 
related safety grant program funds 
may be used in statewide or system-
wide studies or inventories. Also, met-
ropolitan planning (PL) funds may be 
used in urbanized areas provided the 
activity is included in an approved uni-
fied work program. 
§ 655.605 Project procedures. 
(a) Federal-aid highways. Federal-
aid projects involving the installation 
of traffic control devices shall follow 
procedures as established in 23 CFR 
Part 630, Subpart A, Federal-Aid Pro-
grams Approval and Project Authori-
zation. Simplified and timesaving pro-
cedures are to be used to the extent 
permitted by existing policy. 
(b) Off-system highways. Certain fed-
erally funded programs are available 
for installation of traffic control de-
vices on streets and highways that are 
not on the Federal-aid system. The 
procedures used in these programs 
may vary from project to project but, 
essentially, the guidelines set forth 
herein should be used. 
§ 655.606 Higher cost materials. 
The use of signing, pavement mark-
ing, and signal materials (or equip-
ment) having distinctive performance 
characteristics, but costing more than 
other materials (or equipment) com-
monly used may be approved by the 
FHWA Division Administrator when 
the specific use proposed is considered 
to be in the public interest. 
§655.607 Funding. 
(a) Federal-aid highways. (1) Funds 
apportioned or allocated under 23 
U.S.C. 104(b) are eligible to participate 
in projects to install traffic control de-
vices in accordance with the MUTCD 
on newly constructed, reconstructed, 
resurfaced, restored, or rehabilitated 
highways, or on existing highways 
when this work is classified as con-
struction in accordance with 23 UJS.C. 
101(a). Federal-aid highway funds for 
eligible pavement markings and traffic 
control signalization may amount to 
100 percent of the construction cost. 
Federal-aid highway funds appor-
tioned or allocated under other sec-
tions of 23 UJS.C. are eligible for par-
ticipation in improvements conform-
ing to the MUTCD in accordance with 
the provisions of applicable program 
regulations and directives. 
40-077 O—90 9 
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jU4^ Planning. 
(g) The planning component of the 
lilghway safety improvement program 
Itudl incorporate: 
(X) A process for collecting and 
maintaining a record of accident, traf-
gc and highway data, including, for 
railroad-highway grade crossings, the 
characteristics of both highway and 
train traffic; 
(2) A process for analyzing available 
data to identify highway locations, 
lections and elements determined to 
be hazardous on the basis of accident 
experience or accident potential; 
(3) A process for conducting engi-
neering studies of hazardous locations, 
sections, and elements to develop 
highway safety improvement projects 
is defined in 23 UJS.C. 101(a); and 
(4) A process for establishing prior-
ities for implementing highway safety 
improvement, projects, considering: 
(i) The potential reduction in the 
number and/or severity of accidents, 
(ii) The cost of the projects and the 
resources available, 
(iii) The relative hazard of public 
railroad-highway grade crossings 
based on a hazard index formula, 
(iv) Onsite inspection of public grade 
crossings, 
(v) The potential danger to large 
numbers of people at public grade 
crossings used on a regular basis by 
passenger trains, school buses, transit 
buses, pedestrians, bicyclists, or by 
trains and/or motor vehicles carrying 
hazardous materials, and 
(vi) Other criteria as appropriate in 
each State. 
(b) In planning a program of safety 
improvement projects at railroad-
highway grade crossings, special em-
phasis shall be given to the legislative 
requirement that all public crossings 
be provided with standard signing. 
(c) The planning component of the 
highway safety improvement program 
may be financed with funds made 
available through 23 U.S.C. 402, 
307(c), and, where applicable, 104(f). 
§924.11 Implementation. 
(a) The implementation component 
of the highway safety improvement 
program in each State shall include a 
§924.11 
process for scheduling and implement-
ing safety improvement projects in ac-
cordance with (1) the procedures set 
forth in 23 CFR Part 630, Subpart A 
(Federal-Aid Program Approval and 
Project Authorization) and (2) the pri-
orities developed in accordance with 
§ 924.9. The States are encouraged to 
utilize the timesaving procedures in-
corporated in FHWA directives for the 
minor type of work normal to highway 
safety improvement projects. 
(b) Funds apportioned under 23 
U.S.C. 152, Hazard Elimination Pro-
gram, are to be used to implement 
highway safety improvement projects 
on any public road other than Inter-
state. 
(c) Funds apportioned under section 
203(b) of the Highway Safety Act of 
1973, as amended, Rail-Highway Cross-
ings, are to be used to implement rail-
road-highway grade crossing safety 
projects on amy public road. At least 
50 percent of the funds apportioned 
under section 203(b) must be made 
available for the installation of grade 
crossing protective devices. The rail-
road share, if any, of the cost of grade 
crossing improvements shall be deter-
mined in accordance with 23 CFR Part 
646, Subpart B (Railroad-Highway 
Projects). 
(d) Highway safety improvement 
projects may be implemented on the 
Federal-aid system with funds appor-
tioned under 23 U.S.C. 104(b), and 
with funds apportioned under section 
104(b)(1) of the Federal-Aid Highway 
Act of 1978 and section 103(a) of the 
Highway Improvement Act of 1982, if 
excess to Interstate System needs. 
(e) Funds apportioned under 23 
U.S.C. 219, Safer Off-System Roads, 
may be used to implement highway 
safety improvement projects on public 
roads which are not on a Federal-aid 
system. 
(f) Major safety defects on bridges, 
including related approach improve-
ments, may be corrected as part of a 
bridge rehabilitation project on any 
public road with funds apportioned 
under 23 U.S.C. 144, if such project is 
considered eligible under 23 CFR Part 
650, Subpart D (Special Bridge Re-
placement Program). 
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yellow background. There are specific exceptions to this rule, some of 
which are noted in the following sections. The allowance of these 
exceptions shall not be construed as permitting deviations from the 
standard messages where standard messages are applicable. 
All warning signs having significance during the hours of darkness shall 
have a fully reflectorized background or be illuminated. 
The standard size for each warning sign prescribed herein is shown with 
the illustration accompanying the specification. Where conditions of 
speed, volume, or special hazard require greater visibility or emphasis, 
larger signs should be used, with symbol or legend enlarged approximately 
in proportion to outside dimensions. Sign sizes for various type facilities 
can be found in Standard Highway Signs.* 
To carry proper emphasis among large signs for other purposes, all 
warning signs on expressways should be not less than 36 x 36 inches. 
To permit the use of standard dies and templates the outside dimens.ons 
of warning sign should ordinarily be in multiples of 6 inches. Letter 
heights should be rounded to the nearest inch that will best fit the plate 
used for legibility and appearance. 
For use of educational plaques with symbol signs see section 2A-13. 
2C-3 Placement of Warning Signs 
Warning signs shall be erected in accordance with the general 
requirements for sign position as described in Section 2A-21 to 29. 
Since warning signs are primarily for the benefit of the driver who is 
unacquainted with the road, it is very important that care be given to the 
placement of such signs. Warning signs should provide adequate time for 
the driver to perceive, identify, decide, and perform any necessary 
maneuver. This total time to perceive and complete a reaction to a sign is 
the sum of the times necessary for Perception, Identification/under-
standing, Emotion/ decisionmaking, and Volition/ execution of decision, 
and is here referred to as the PIEV time. The PIEV time can vary from 
about 3 seconds for general warning signs to 10 seconds for high driver 
judgment condition warning signs. Table II-1 lists suggested minimum 
sign placement distances that may be used for three conditions: 
* Available from GPO. see page u. 
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TABLE II—1— A Guide For Advance Warning Sign Placement Distance1 
20. 
25. 
K). 
35. 
40 
45. 
50. 
55. 
60. 
Posted or 
85 percentile 
speed MPH 
Condition 
A high 
judg-
ment 
needed* (10 sees. 
PIEV) 
%
 175 
250 
325 
400 
475 
550 
625 
700 
775 
Condition 
B—Stop 
condition 
0 
(4) 
(4) 5
 100 
150 
225 
300 
375 
450 
550 
General warning signs1 
Condition C—Deceleration condition to listed 
advisory speed—MPH for desired speed at condition) 
10 
(4) 
MOO 
150 
200 
275 
350 
425 
500 
575 
20 
5
 100 . 
175 . 
250 
300 
400 
475 
550 
30 
1
 175 
250 .. 
325 
400 
500 
40 50 
'225 
300 
400 5300 
Typical Signs for the Laued Conditions in Table 11-1, Condition A—Merge. Right Lane Ends, etc; Condition B—Cross 
Road, Stop Ahead. Signal Ahead, Ped-Xing, etc.. Condition C—Turn, Curve, Divided Road. Hill, Dip, etc. 
1 Distances shown are for level roadways. Corrections should be made for grades. If 48-«nch signs are used, the legibility 
distance may be increased to 200 feet. This would allow reducing the above distance by 75 feet. 
2 In urban areas, a supplementary plate underneath the warning sign should be used specifying the distance to the 
condition if there is an in-between intersection which might confuse the motorist. 
3 Distance provides for 3-second PIEV, 123 feet Sign Legibility Distance. Bra km g Distance for Condition B and 
Comfortable Braking Distance for condition C as indicated m A Policy on Geometric Design of Highways and Streets, 1984, 
AASHTO. Figure 11-13. 
4 No suggested mmmum distance provided. At these speeds, sign location depends on physical conditions at sue. 
5 Feet 
Condition A—a higher driver judgment condition which requires the 
driver to use extra time in making and executing a decision because of a 
complex driving situation; i.e., lane changing, passing, or merging. 
Condition B—a condition in which the driver will likely be required to 
stop; and Condition C—a condition in which the driver will likely be 
required to decelerate to a specific speed. The table is provided as an aid 
for determining warning sign location. The values contained in the table 
are for guidance purposes and should be applied with engineering 
judgment. The placement of temporary warning signs used at highway 
construction and maintenance sites is covered in Part VI of this Manual 
and the suggested minimum sign placement distances given in Table II-1 
may not apply to that group of signs. 
Other miscellaneous warning signs that advise of potential hazards not 
related to a specific location may be installed in the most appropriate 
locations since they are not covered in Table II-1. These include DEER 
CROSSING and SOFT SHOULDER signs. Minimum spacing between 
warning signs with different messages normally should be based on the 
PIEV times for driver comprehension and reaction. 
The effectiveness of the placement of any warning sign should be tested 
periodically under both day and night conditions. Figure 2-5 (page 2A-17) 
shows typical installations of standard warning signs. 
2C-4 Turn Sign (Wl-1) 
The Turn sign (W1-1R or 1L) is intended for use where engineering 
investigations of roadway, geometric, and operating conditions show the 
2C-2a Rev. 3/86 
Part VIII. TRAFFIC CONTROL SYSTEMS FOR 
RAILROAD — HIGHWAY GRADE CROSSINGS 
A. GENERAL 
8A-1 Functions 
Traffic control systems for railroad-highway grade crossings include 
all signs, signals, markings, and illumination devices and their supports 
along highways approaching and at railroad crossings at grade. The 
function of these systems is to permit safe and efficient operation of rail 
and highway traffic over crossings. Traffic control devices shall be con-
sistent with the design and application of the standards contained 
herein. For the purpose of installation, operation, and mainu iance of 
devices constituting traffic control systems at railroad-high vay grade 
crossings, it is recognized that any crossing of a public road and a rail-
road is situated on right-of-way available for the use of both highway 
traffic and railroad traffic on their respective roadways and tracks. 
With due regard for safety and for the integrity of operations by 
highway and railroad users, the highway agency and the railroad com-
pany are entitled to jointly occupy the right-of-way in the conduct of 
their assigned duties. This requires joint responsibility in the traffic 
control function between the public agency and the railroad. The deter-
mination of need and selection of devices at a grade crossing is made by 
the public agency with jurisdictional authority. Subject to such determi-
nation and selection, the design, installation and operation shall be in 
accordance with the national standards contained herein. 
8A-2 Use of Standard Devices 
The grade crossing traffic control devices, systems, and practices 
described herein are intended for use both in new installations and at 
locations where general replacement of present apparatus is made, con-
sistent with Federal and State laws and regulations. To stimulate effec-
tive reaction of vehicle operators and pedestrians, these devices, sys-
tems, and practices utilize the five basic considerations: design, 
placement, operation, maintenance, and uniformity employed generally 
for traffic control devices and described fully in section 1A-2. 
8A-3 Uniform Provisions 
All signs used in grade crossing traffic control systems shall be reflec-
torized to show the same shape and color to an approaching motorist 
8A-1 
both by day and by night. Reflectorization may be by one of the methods 
described in section 2A-18. 
Normally, where the distance between tracks, measured along thfc 
highway^exceedsf 100 feet, additional signs or other appropriate traffic 
confrof devices*8hould be used. 
No sign or signal shall be located in the center of an undivided road-
way except in an island with barrier curbs installed in accordance with 
the general requirements of Part V with minimum clearance of 2 feet 
from the face of each curb. 
Where it is practical, equipment housing should provide a lateral 
clearance of 30 feet from the roadway. Adequate clearance should also 
be provided from tracks in order to reduce the obstruction to motorists 
sight distance and to reduce the possibility of damage to the housed 
equipment. 
8A-4 Crossing Closure 
Any highway grade crossing for which there is not a demonstrated 
need should be closed. 
8A-5 Traffic Controls During Construction and Maintenance 
Traffic controls for street and highway construction and maintenance 
operations are discussed in Part VI of this manuaL Similar traffic con-
trol methods should be used where highway traffic is affected by con-
struction and maintenance at grade crossings. 
Public and private agencies should meet to plan appropriate detours 
and necessary signing, marking, and flagging requirements for success-
ful operations during the closing. Pertinent considerations include 
length of time for crossing to be closed, type of traffic affected, time of 
day, materials and techniques of repair. Inconvenience, delay, and acci-
dent potential to affected traffic should be minimized to the extent 
practical Prior notice should be extended to affected public or private 
agencies before blockage or infringement on the free movement of ve-
hicles or trains. 
Construction or maintenance techniques should not extensively pro-
long the closing of the crossing. The width and riding quality of the 
roadway surface at a grade crossing should, as a minimum, be restored 
to correspond with the approaches to the crossing. 
8A-2 
8B-3 Railroad Advance Warning Signs (W10-1, 2, 3, 4) 
A Railroad Advance Warning (W10-1) sign shall be used on each road-
way in advance of every grade crossing except: 
1. On low-volume, low-speed roadways crossing minor spurs or other 
tracks that are infrequently used and which are flagged by train crews. 
2. In the business districts of urban areas where active grade crossing 
traffic control devices are in use. 
3. Where physical conditions do not permit even a partially effective 
display of the sign. 
Placement of the sign shall generally be in accordance with Section 2C-3 
and Seaions 2A-21 to 2A-27, normally 750 feet or more in advance of the 
crossing in rural areas and 250 feet in advance of the crossing in urban 
areas, except that in a residential or business district where low speeds are 
prevalent, the signs may be placed a minimum distance of 100 feet from 
the crossing. On divided highways and one-way roads, it is desirable to 
erect an additional sign on the left side of the roadway. 
The W10-2,3, and 4 signs may be installed on highways that are parallel 
to railroads. The purpose of these signs is to warn a motorist making a 
turn that a railroad crossing is ahead. Where there is 100 feet or more 
between the railroad and the parallel highway, a W10-1 sign should be in-
stalled in advance of the railroad crossing and the W10-2,3, or 4 signs on 
the parallel highway would not be necessary. 
VIII-2 (c) 
W10-1 
36* Diamtter 
W10-2 
30" X 30" 
W10-3 
30" x 30" 
W10-4 
30" x 30" 
VIII-2 (e) 
8B-3 R«v. 12/83 
D. SYSTEMS AND DEVICES 
8D-1 Selection of Systems and Devices 
The selection of traffic control devices at a grade crossing is deter-
mined by public agencies having jurisdictional responsibility at specific 
locations. 
Active grade crossing traffic control systems range from 
1. post mounted flashing light signals to 
2. automatic gates combined with 
(a) post mounted flashing light signals, 
(b) cantilever flashing light signals, or 
(c) combination of the above 
Any of the foregoing may or may not incorporate a bell. 
Due to the large number of significant variables which must be con-
sidered there is no single standard system of active traffic control de-
vices universally applicable for grade crossings. Based on an engineer-
ing and traffic investigation, a determination is made whether any 
active traffic control system is required at a crossing and, if so, what 
type is appropriate. Before a new or modified grade crossing traffic 
control system is installed, approval is required from the appropriate 
agency within a given State. 
8D-1 
CASES 
DUNCAN v. UNION PACIFIC R. CO. 
Cite at 790 P2d 593 (UuhApp. 1990) 
Utah 595 
tiornia court, where it found it was "dealing 
with a litigant who not only has previously 
failed to appear as ordered, but who up to 
this very time remains a fugitive from jus-
tice. Apparently, he is unwilling to re-
spond to a court order with which he dis-
agrees, but seeks to obtain on appeal" a 
more favorable result Tobin v. Casans, 
128 CaLApp.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792, 795 
(1954). 
We therefore hold that appellant has 30 
days from the date of the issuance of this 
opinion to bring herself within the process 
of the trial court If appellant submits 
herself to the trial court she should be 
allowed an opportunity to offer alternatives 
to the trial court to protect the judgment 
Appellant may persuade the court it should 
hold the disputed judgment amount in trust 
until a resolution of this appeal on the 
merits. However, if appellant persists in 
secreting herself in violation of the trial 
court's orders, her appeal will be dismissed 
at the expiration of the 30-day period. 
GARFF and ORME, JJ„ concur. 
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Shelly Bowers; Sherry Bowers; Monica 
Henwood, individually and as personal 
representative of the Estate of Ramon 
Henwood, deceased; Phyllis Henwood; 
and Owen Henwood, Plaintiffs and Ap-
pellants, 
v. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPA-
NY, a corporation; The State of Utah; 
Paul Kleinman; and Does 1 through 
100, inclusive, Defendants and Respon-
dents. 
No. 890291-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
April 12, 1990. 
Heirs of victims of train-automobile ac-
cident brought action against railroad, De-
partment of Transportation and railroad 
engineer. The Third District Court, Tooele 
County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., entered 
summary judgment dismissing wrongful 
death action. Heirs appealed. The Court 
of Appeals, J. Robert Bullock, Senior Dis-
trict Judge, held that (1) heirs failed to 
establish that either engineer or railroad 
were negligent, and (2) Department, having 
given at least some warning or control at 
railroad crossing, was governmentally im-
mune in deciding whether to improve 
means of warning or control at crossing 
because of fiscal effects of decision. 
Affirmed. 
Jackson, J., filed a concurring opinion. 
Lewis DUNCAN, individually and as per-
sonal representative of the Estate of 
Patrick Duncan, deceased; Jason E. 
Duncan, a minor by and through his 
Guardian ad Litem; Alice Duncan: No-
reen Duncan; Michael Duncan; Tim 
Duncan; Kevin Duncan; Brian Dun-
can; Michelle Bowers, individually and 
as personal representative of the Estate 
of Jefrey and Nicole Bowers, deceased; 
Judson Bowers; Florence Hanson; 
1. Railroads <£=>348(1) 
Evidence failed to support claim of 
heirs of accident victims that there was 
negligence in operation of train or entrust-
ing its operation to engineer who was in 
charge at time of automobile-train collision. 
2. Railroads <3=>348(2) 
Evidence did not support claim of heirs 
of accident victims that railroad negligently 
maintained railroad right-of-way at cross-
ing with street where train-automobile colli-
sion occurred; there was nothing to indi-
cate what could have made railroad's right-
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of-way safer to motorist crossing since 
path of train was clearly visible to oncom-
ing motorists. 
3. Railroads e=>303(l) 
Railroad has tort duty to maintain its 
rights-of-way in condition safe to motorists 
who traverse them at established cross-
ings. 
4. Railroads e»303(l) 
Railroad is required to take precau-
tions to prevent injury to motorists cross-
ing railroad right-of-way if reasonable per-
son in railroad's position would take such 
precautions. 
5. Railroads <s=*303(l) 
In determining what is reasonable un-
der the circumstances for railroad crossing, 
every railroad crossing is hazardous but, 
since it is not practicable to eliminate all 
railroad crossings, simple existence of rail-
road crossing is not in itself a breach of 
duty of care. 
6. Railroads e»303(l) 
For railroad to be liable for crossing 
mishap, there must be something about 
railroad's right-of-way that creates hazard 
to motorist greater than hazard presented 
by simple fact that railroad and street in-
tersect 
7. Railroads <3=>303(1) 
Railroad is required to take every rea-
sonable action to assure safety of motorist 
who can reasonably be expected to cross 
right-of-way and in determining what is 
reasonable under circumstances of specific 
case, trier of fact must ultimately weigh 
burden on railroad, and indirectly on public, 
of requiring added precautions, against 
benefits that would be derived by public at 
large from precautions. 
8. Railroads e»307(2, 3) 
It was not responsibility of railroad to 
place signs and devices on public road 
warning motorists of railroad crossing. 
9. States e»U2(l) 
Governmental immunity shields sover-
eign policy making and discretion from 
state law damage claims by generally pre-
cluding damage liability for performance of 
governmental function subject to certain 
statutorily enumerated waivers. 
10. Automobiles e=»277 
Department of Transportation enjoyed 
governmental immunity from liability in ac-
tion brought by heirs of train-automobile 
accident victims alleging that safety im-
provements at railroad crossing were inad-
equate. U.C.A.1953, 63-30-10. 
11. Municipal Corporations <8=>724 
Test for determining governmental im-
munity is whether activity under considera-
tion is of such unique nature that it can 
only be performed by governmental agency 
or that it is essential to core of governmen-
tal activity, and under that test, court ex-
amines nature of activity itself, not identity 
of person performing activity. 
12. Automobiles <3=>279 
Government may be held liable in tort 
for failure to provide some effective warn-
ing or control for traffic at city intersec-
tion; however, duty to provide some effec-
tive warning or control must be distin-
guished from more than minimal mainte-
nance and from enhancement of means of 
providing warning and control. 
13. Automobiles e»279 
Highways e=»194 
As long as warning or control signage 
of clear hazard is in existence and main-
tained enough to give it minimal effective-
ness, government is not liable in tort for 
failure to better maintain or to enhance 
signage. 
Michael A. Katz (argued), Burbidge & 
Mitchell, Salt Lake City, for appellants. 
J. Clare Williams (argued), Larry A. Gan-
tenbein, Salt Lake City, for respondents 
Union Pacific R. Co. and Paul Kleinman. 
Allan L. Larson (argued), Craig Barlow, 
Anne Swenson, Snow, Christensen & Marti-
neau, Salt Lake City, R. Paul Van Dam, 
State Atty. Gen., Stephen J. Sorenson, 
Asst Atty. Gen., Salt Lake City, for re-
spondent State of Utah;**"*. mwo; ' 
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Before BENCH and JACKSON, JJ., UDOT's prioritization of the State's rail-
and BULLOCK,1 Senior District Judge. road crossings to receive additional safety 
improvements, such as electrified lights 
OPINION and crossbars. 
J. ROBERT BULLOCK, Senior District 
Judge. 
Plaintiffs appeal from a summary judg-
ment dismissing their wrongful death ac-
tion arising out of a train-automobile colli-
sion. We affirm. 
Droubay Road is a two-lane thorough-
fare running north and south in rural 
Tooele County. At one point, it intersects 
the Union Pacific Railroad tracks at ap-
proximately a 43-degree angle on the north 
and a 136-degree angle on the south. 
Three roadside signs warn oncoming mo-
torists of the crossing, one sign located 
about 300 feet from the crossing, and two 
on either side of the road 19 feet from the 
crossing. There are no flashing lights or 
mechanical devices at the crossing to warn 
of an approaching train, but nothing ob-
structs a motorist's view of the tracks for 
several thousand feet. 
On the evening of April 9, 1983, at about 
8:50 p.m., a Union Pacific train operated by 
Paul Kleinman struck an automobile and 
killed all four occupants of the vehicle at 
the Droubay Road crossing. There is no 
evidence to indicate that the train was neg-
ligently or improperly operated, and its 
headlight, warning bells, and whistles were 
activated well in advance of the crossing. 
The engineer, Kleinman, averred that he 
saw the car approach the crossing but be-
lieved that it would stop. When it became 
apparent that the car was not going to 
stop, it was too late for him to stop the 
train. 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) periodically evaluated the Droubay 
Road crossing in planning the allocation of 
its resources, including federal funding, for 
state-wide highway improvements. Under 
the methods used at the time, the Droubay 
Road crossing did not rank high enough in 
1* J. Robert Bullock, Senior District Judge, sit-
ting by special appointment pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-3-24(10) (Supp.1989). 
The heirs of the accident victims sued 
Union Pacific and engineer Kleinman for 
negligent operation of the train, negligent 
maintenance of the railroad right of way at 
the Droubay Road crossing, and for en-
trusting operation of the train to an alleg-
edly unfit employee. The heirs also sued 
the State, claiming that the safety improve-
ments at the crossing were inadequate. 
All of the defendants moved for summary 
judgment, and the district court granted 
their motions and dismissed the complaint 
Plaintiffs appealed. 
CLAIMS AGAINST UNION PACIFIC 
In defense against the motions for sum-
mary judgment, the plaintiffs filed an affi-
davit of one Robert Crommelin, a traffic 
safety engineer. In Crommelin's opinion, 
"the warning signs present at the crossing 
were clearly inadequate" and "the intersec-
tion [was] clearly 'extra hazardous/ " The 
district court, however, struck Crommelin's 
affidavit on the grounds that 23 U.S.C. 
§ 409 (Supp.1989) forbade admission into 
evidence of the factual basis for Cromme-
lin's conclusions, and Utah Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56(e) permits only affidavits 
which state "such facts as would be admis-
sible in evidencef.]" Crommelin's opinion 
was based partly on information gained 
from UDOT's records of the Droubay Road 
crossing. To facilitate candor in adminis-
trative evaluations of highway safety haz-
ards, 23 U.S.C. § 409 prevents a court from 
receiving records of such evaluations into 
evidence.2 Therefore, under this federal 
statute, the documents from which 
Crommelin obtained a large part of the 
data used in reaching his conclusions were 
inadmissible. 
On that basis, the district court struck 
Crommelin's affidavit However, the dis-
2. The legislative purpose of section 409 can be 
gleaned from H.Conf.Rep. No. 100-27, 104th 
Cong. 1st Sess. 172-173, reprinted in 1987 U.S. 
Code Cong. & AdmiruNews 66, 156-57. 
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trict court also ruled that, even if the affi-
davit were considered, the case should be 
dismissed on its merits. Faced with these 
alternative grounds for the same result, we 
choose on appeal in this case to rest our 
decision on the merits. We will thus take 
Crommelin's opinion at face value. 
[1] Even if Crommelin's affidavit is con-
sidered, plaintiffs did not show that Union 
Pacific breached any duty of care in the 
collision at the Droubay Road crossing. 
Plaintiffs alleged negligence in the opera-
tion of the train by Kleinman and, through 
respondeat superior, by Union Pacific, as 
well as negligence by Union Pacific in em-
ploying an unfit train operator and in main-
taining its right of way. Plaintiffs also 
sought punitive damages from Union Pacif-
ic for willful and reckless conduct. Plain-
tiffs introduced no evidence to show that 
the train was negligently operated, much 
less that the collision was willfully and 
recklessly caused, and no evidence to show 
that Kleinman was unfit to operate the 
train. Kleinman avers that he operated the 
train properly. Of course, Kleinman's tes-
timony is biased, and there are no known 
witnesses surviving the crash other than 
Union Pacific employees. Nevertheless, 
lacking any evidence to the contrary, we 
conclude that plaintiffs failed to show neg-
ligence in operating the train or in entrust-
ing its operation to Kleinman.3 
[2] The only claim against Union Pacif-
ic on which evidence was introduced was 
the claim for negligent maintenance of the 
railroad right of way, which is supported, 
from plaintiffs' point of view, by Cromme-
lin's affidavit We therefore proceed to 
consider this claim. 
[3] It is settled that a railroad has a 
tort duty to maintain its rights of way in a 
3. See Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt Paving Co. v. 
Blomquist, 773 P.2d 1382, 1385 (Utah 1989); 
Creekview Apartments v. State Farm Ins. Co., 
771 P.2d 693, 695 (Utah Ct.App.1989). 
4. Cleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 
749 ?2d 660, 662-64 (Utah Ct.App.1988). 
5. Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande W.R.R. Co., No. 
C-83-149J, slip op. at 16, 1985 WL17370 (D.Ut. 
April 3, 1985). 
condition safe to motorists who traverse 
them at established crossings.4 However 
there seems to be a \ack oi ciarity about 
the standard of care required of the rail-
road in the observance of this duty, and 
this apparent lack of clarity has led to 
some criticism of the Utah standard of care 
as it was understood.5 Since we must ap-
ply a standard of care in determining 
whether Union Pacific breached its duty, 
we attempt to state clearly the extent to 
which a railroad must make its right of 
way safe for motorists to cross. 
[4] The confusion concerning the stan-
dard of care centers in the meaning of the 
words "more than ordinarily hazardous," 
which were used in applying the standard 
of care in two Utah cases, Bridges v. Un-
ion Pacific R.R. Co., 26 Utah 2d 281, 488 
P.2d 738 (1971), and English v. Southern 
Pacific Co., 13 Utah 407, 45 P. 47 (1896). 
These words were never intended to impose 
a standard of care higher than ordinary 
care, the degree of care exercised by a 
reasonable person under the circumstanc-
es.6 Thus, the railroad is required to take 
precautions to prevent injury to crossing 
motorists if a reasonable person in the rail-
road's position would take such precau-
tions.7 
[5,6] In determining what is reasonable 
under the circumstances of a railroad 
crossing, it is obvious that every railroad 
crossing is hazardous, but, since it is not 
practicable to eliminate all railroad cross-
ings, the simple existence of a railroad 
crossing is not in itself a breach of a duty 
of care. Much of everyday life presents 
hazards; driving or walking along a street 
are hazardous, and so are stairs, electricity, 
and many other things, but we tolerate 
those hazards because of the impracticabili-
ty of eliminating them. In determining 
6. English, 45 P. at 50. 
7. See Meese v. Brigham Young Univ., 639 P.2d 
720 (Utah 1981); Whitman v. W.T. Grant Co., 16 
Utah 2d 81, 395 P~2d 918 (1964); Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 283 (1965). 
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whether a mishap involving one of those 
hazards is tortious, the question is not 
whether a hazard existed, but rather 
whether, under prevailing community stan-
dards, the defendant should bear the re-
sponsibility to discover and ameliorate a 
hazard, in light of the practicability of do-
ing so and the costs and benefits to society 
of requiring the defendant so to act.8 In 
the case of railroad crossings, the cost of 
eliminating the hazard, such as by install-
ing overpasses at all railroad crossings, 
including rural ones, does not warrant a 
duty of care so rigorous that simply having 
a railroad cross a street is tortious. Rath-
er, for a railroad to be liable for a crossmg 
mishap, there must be something about the 
railroad's right of way that creates a haz-
ard to motorists greater than the hazard 
presented by the simple fact that the rail-
road and the street intersect. 
[7] In determining what is reasonable 
to require of a railroad in its tort liability 
for crossings, it would thus be error to hold 
that the railroad right of way cannot cross 
a street. However, for such a crossing, the 
railroad is required to take every reason-
able action to assure the safety of motor-
ists who can reasonably be expected to 
cross the right of way. In determining 
what is reasonable under the circumstances 
of a specitic case, the trier of fact must 
ultimately weigh the burden on the rail-
road, and indirectly on the public, of requir-
ing added precautions, against the benefits 
that would be derived by the public at large 
from such precautions. For example, in 
the Gleave case,9 wild vegetation on the 
right of way obscured oncoming trains 
from motorists at the crossing. The cost 
of removing or maintaining the vegetation 
was minimal compared to the enormous 
benefit to the public of being able to see an 
approaching train at a frequent crossing. 
ft. See Erickson v. Walgreen Drug Co., 120 Utah 
31, 232 P.2d 210, 31 AXJUd 177 (1951); Wag-
oner v. Waterslide, Inc., 744 P.2d 1012, 1013 
(Utah App.1987). 
9. Gleave v. Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. Co., 
749 ?2d 660, 662-64 (Utah 1988). 
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The imposition of a tort duty on the rail-
road to remove or maintain the vegetation 
was therefore clearly correct. 
[8] In this case, there is nothing to indi-
cate what could have made Union Pacific's 
right of way safer to motorists crossing on 
Droubay Road. The path of the train is 
clearly visible to oncoming motorists. 
Plaintiffs suggest that Union Pacific 
should have placed warning signs and de-
vices on Droubay Road, including automat-
ic gates blocking traffic on the Road from 
crossing the tracks when a train was ap-
proaching. It is not, however, the respon-
sibility of the railroad to place signs and 
devices on the public road. The railroad 
must maintain its owr right of way, but it 
is not under any dutv to place signs or 
devices on the public roaa. 
The design and maintenance of state 
roads and the control of traffic on state 
roads are UDOT's responsibilities and pre-
rogatives.10 At common law, this responsi-
bility at railroad crossings was shared with 
the railroad.11 Thus, in English, the rail-
road was found liable for failing to flag 
motorists on an intersecting city street. 
Since English, however, UDOT has been 
established, and the Legislature invested 
UDOT with "power to determine and pre-
scribe the manner . . . of . . . protection of 
each crossing."12 Although that responsi-
bility in no way reduces the railroad's re-
sponsibility to maintain its right of way,13 it 
would nevertheless, under ordinary circum-
stances, place the railroad in the role of 
meddler, trespasser, or usurper if the rail-
road were to put signs on the public road 
or forbid traffic on the public road from 
crossing its right of way. Union Pacific 
therefore had no duty to place signs or 
roadblocking devices on Droubay Road, 
11. Although we hold that the railroad does not 
have authority or responsibility to place signs or 
roadblocks on the public road, we note that the 
cost of protecting users of the public road con-
tinues to be shared with the railroad pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-153 (1990). 
12. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15(2) (1990).
 v 
10. Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 (1990). 13. Gleave, 749 P.2d at 664. 
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and it is not liable in tort for its failure to 
do so. 
CLAIMS AGAINST UDOT 
[9,10] Governmental immunity is 
UDOTs principal defense w against plain-
tiffs. Governmental immunity shields sov-
ereign policy-making and discretion from 
state-law damage claims by generally pre 
eluding damage liability for performance of 
a governmental function, subject to certain 
statutorily enumerated waivers.15 
Resolution of the governmental immuni-
ty question in this case is controlled by 
Gleave, which held that UDOT was govern-
mentally immune in determining the pre-
cise method to be used in warning persons 
on a public road approaching a railroad 
crossing. We follow Gleave, and hold that 
UDOT is immune in this case. We add, 
however, a few comments to address the 
particular arguments of counsel in this 
case. 
[11] Plaintiffs cite Bowen v. Riverton 
City, 656 P.2d 434 (Utah 1982) in an at-
tempt to avoid governmental immunity. In 
Bowen, the Utah Supreme Court reversed 
a summary judgment in favor of Riverton 
in a tort action. Bowen asserted that a 
stop sign at a busy Riverton intersection 
was lying on the ground as Bowen and 
another vehicle collided in the intersection. 
14. We logically do not reach the affirmative 
defense of governmental immunity without first 
determining or presuming that a plaintiff has 
established a pnma facie case. See Ferree v. 
State of Utah, 784 P.2d 149 (Utah 1989). How-
ever, while UDOTs pnma facie liability was 
perhaps implicitly presumed in the distnet 
court's reasoning, the district court did not ex-
pressly review plaintiffs' pnma facie claim 
against UDOT. We are reluctant to delve into 
an issue on which the trial court has not ex-
pressly ruled, for the reasons explained in Zions 
First Natl Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co., 
749 ?2d 651, 654 (Utah 1988). Therefore, we 
choose to rest our decision on governmental 
immunity and presume for purposes of argu-
ment (but do not hold) that the plaintiffs have 
stated a pnma facie case of negligence by 
UDOT. See Kirk v. State of Utah, 784 P.2d 1255 
(Utah App.1989). 
15. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10 (1989). 
The scope of the governmental immunity issue 
in this case is limited. Plaintiffs have not sued 
any governmental personnel, and therefore, the 
 Bowen came after the pathbreaking Stan-
diford v. Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 
1230 (Utah 1980), but did not cite Standi-
ford or refer to its test for "governmental 
function," the threshold of governmental 
- immunity analysis. Standiford held that 
'- the test for determining governmental im-
i munity is "whether the activity under con-
- sideration is of such a unique nature that it 
f can only be performed by a governmental 
i agency or that it is essential to the core of 
governmental activity." Standiford, 605 
. P.2d at 1236-37. Under this test, we exam-
r ine the nature of the activity itself, not the 
. identity of the person performing the activ-
ity. In this case, for example, the activity 
i in question consists of designing and main-
[ taining a road. It would make the analysis 
: tautological to define the activity as design-
ing and maintaining a public or govern-
\ mental road.16 
As Judge Jackson points out in his sepa-
rate concurring opinion, the absence in 
Bowen of a reference to Standiford could 
simply be a result of the procedural pos-
ture of the Bowen case. Possibly the only 
issues before the court in Bowen were the 
elements of Bowen's prima facie case, and 
the court did not reach the issue of govern-
mental immunity because it is a defense, 
rather than an element of the prima facie 
case. However, Bowen's emphasis on Riv-
lmmumty of officials is not m issue, nor have 
plaintiffs raised constitutional arguments such 
as those considered in Condemann v. University 
Hospital 775 P.2d 348 (Utah 1989). 
16. In adopting its test for governmental func-
tion, Standiford renounced the earlier govern-
mental/proprietary distinction because of in-
consistencies that had developed over the course 
of its application. 
Like the Standiford test, the governmen-
tal/proprietary distinction was originally meant 
to restnet the application of governmental im-
munity. However, m time, the governmen-
tal/proprietary analysis degenerated from real 
thought of its meaning to simple categorization 
of the activity in question as involving a golf 
course, a park, a hospital, etc To some extent, 
the same consequences can result from a facile 
categorization approach under the Standiford 
test. We therefore decline to make an entry in 
a laundry list of governmental functions per se, 
eliminating all thought in future cases of the 
basic test established in Standiford. 
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niton's duty to maintain streets becomes 
rather disingenuous lip service if Riverton 
had a viable defense of governmental im-
munity against all liability based on that 
'duty. While procedurally it is important to 
observe the distinction between plaintiffs 
prima facie case and defendant's defenses, 
in a more basic sense, what is ultimately 
important is the scope of governmental re-
sponsibility, which, in a well-pleaded case, 
is a function both of prima facie liability 
and available defenses. It would also seem 
to be a waste of resources to reverse and 
remand Bowen for a trial on the negligence 
question if there was no way for Bowen to 
recover due to governmental immunity. 
[12,13] Bowen's emphasis on the 
government's duty in tort to assure safe 
streets is entirely consistent with Standi-
ford, if we accept the premise that the 
decision whether to exert any control at all 
over intersecting traffic is not a govern-
mental function giving rise to immunity 
from tort liability. In other words, the 
government may be held liable in tort to 
provide some effective warning or control 
for traffic at a city intersection. However, 
the duty to provide some effective warning 
or controi must be distinguished from more 
than minimal maintenance and from en-
hancement of the means of providing warn-
ing and control. The case of Richards v. 
LeawtU 716 P.2d 276 (Utah 1985) (per cu-
riam) required compliance with the notice 
requirements of governmental immunity 
for a claim based on allegedly inadequate 
maintenance of a stop sign. From a com-
parison of Bowen and Richards and in 
light of Gleave, we conclude that as long as 
warning or control signage of a clear haz-
ard is in existence and maintained enough 
to give it minimal effectiveness, the 
17. Not every governmental activity that affects 
the public fisc is a governmental function. 
Clearly nongovernmental functions, such as 
providing utility services or recreation, or serv-
ing process, may be financed in part by funds 
obtained through governmental revenue exac-
tions, and liability incurred in performing those 
functions will be satisfied out of the public 
treasurv. See Schultz v. Conger, 755 P.2d 165 
(Utah 1988); Dalton v. Salt Lake Suburban Sani-
tary Dtst., 676 P.2d 399 (Utah 1984); Thomas v. 
Clearfield City, 642 P.2d 737 (Utah 1982); John-
son v. Salt Lake city Corp., 629 P.2d 432 (Utah 
government is not liable in tort for its 
failure to better maintain or to enhance the 
signage. If the signage has some cogniza-
ble effect in warning or controlling traffic 
at a clear hazard, its maintenance and im-
provement are governmental functions for 
which the government is immune from suit 
in Utah courts. 
Highway maintenance and improvement 
are predominately " fiscal matters. Every 
highway could probably be made safer by 
further expenditures, but we will not hold 
UDOT (and implicitly, the legislature) neg-
ligent for having to strike a difficult bal-
ance between the need for greater safety 
and the burden of funding improvements. 
As we pointed out in Gleave, and as UDOT 
emphasizes here, there are hundreds of 
unelectrified railroad crossings in Utah, 
and it is not fiscally feasible to equip them 
all with the best possible means of assur-
ing traffic safety. Rather, UDOT priori-
tizes the crossings in allocating the limited 
funds available for crossing improvements. 
The role of the judiciary in that prioritiza-
tion and allocation process is strictly limit-
ed. In a case seeking judicial review of 
that administrative process, we would exer-
cise our reviewing function with deference 
to the administrative agency under the "ar-
bitrary and capricious" standard. How-
ever, in a tort action such as this, the 
deference to a governmental function is 
absolute unless waived, and we do not re-
view it at all under tort principles. 
In this case, we are not presented with a 
lack of any effective control of traffic, 
since there are three signs on Droubay 
Road where it approaches the railroad. 
The basis asserted here for recovery 
against UDOT is its failure to better warn 
1981). However, the sources of funds to con-
duct the activity or to pay an eventual judgment 
do not determine whether the activity in ques-
tion is a governmental function. In this case, 
disregarding the fact that the funds for railroad 
crossings may denve in part from public 
sources, we are nevertheless left with an over-
ndingly fiscal question: How much to spend on 
each railroad crossing that could be improved. 
We believe that the governmental budgeting and 
spending involved in deciding how to improve 
the safety of railroad crossings suffice to make 
that decision a governmental function. 
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and control traffic at the crossing. Since 
we have concluded that UDOT is immune 
for its failure to do more than minimal 
warning and control, we hold that plaintiffs 
cannot recover against UDOT or the State. 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore hold in this case that, even 
considering the Crommelin affidavit and 
considering the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the plaintiffs, they failed to 
show any negligence by Union Pacific in 
the design and maintenance of its right of 
way. Union Pacific is not responsible for 
controlling traffic on state roads, and the 
state, having given at least some warning 
or control at this railroad crossing, is gov-
ernmentally immune in deciding whether to 
improve the means of warning or control at 
the crossing because of the fiscal effects of 
such a decision. 
Thus, these plaintiffs have not shown 
negligence by the railroad in the accident 
at this crossing, where the oncoming train 
was clearly visible from a lengthy distance 
on the road toward the crossing, and the 
train was not shown to have been negli-
gently operated. Signs notified approach-
ing drivers of the crossing, but UDOT is 
not liable for not having expended more 
funds in making more extensive safety im-
provements that might have prevented the 
accident. The net effect of this holding is 
that if the railroad's right of way does not 
negligently obscure an oncoming train, the 
train is properly operated, and if some visi-
ble warning sign age is present on the 
public road, then the plaintiff is not entitled 
to relief in tort for an injury at the cross-
ing. We do not consider this outcome to be 
harsh or unjust, although any tragedy in 
which life is lost or impaired is regrettable, 
whatever the cause. 
The dismissal of the plaintiffs' case is 
affirmed. 
BENCH, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (concurring): 
Although I concur in the result reached 
by the majority and in most of its analysis, 
I write separately to disassociate myself 
from the faulty analysis of the governmen-
tal immunity issue. Contrary to the major-
ity's characterization, supra at 6, UDOTs 
general activity in this case does not con-
sist of "designing and maintaining a road." 
It consists of the installation and improve-
ment of traffic safety devices and signs at 
railroad crossings. As for the specific, 
purportedly negligent act by UDOT, plain-
tiffs in this case alleged that UDOT negli-
gently failed to install a different, presum-
ably safer, kind of traffic warning device at 
a railroad crossing. The same claims were 
raised by the plaintiff in Gleave v. Denver 
& Rio Grande W.R., 749 P.2d 660 (Utah 
CtApp.), cert denied, 765 P.2d 1278 (1988). 
As the majority recognizes, the outcome in 
this case is controlled by Gleave, in which 
we held that (1) UDOTs general activity in 
evaluating, installing, maintaining, and im-
proving safety signals or devices at rail-
road crossings is a governmental function 
within Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-3 (1986) 
under the test set forth in Standiford v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., 605 P.2d 1230 (Utah 
1980); and (2) the specific act of UDOT 
which the plaintiff claimed was negligent, 
i.e., the failure to upgrade safety devices at 
a particular railroad crossing, arose out of 
the exercise of a discretionary function, 
under the test in Little v. Utah State Div. 
of Family Servs., 667 P.2d 49, 51 (Utah 
1983), for which immunity had not been 
waived by Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-10(l)(a) 
(1986). 
The majority appears unaware of the 
two-step analysis—used, for example, in 
Gleave and Rocky ML Thrift Stores v. Salt 
Lake City Corp., 784 P.2d 459 (Utah 1989) 
—that is necessary to resolve a governmen-
tal immunity claim in which the parties 
contest whether, even if the general activi-
ty is a governmental function, the allegedly 
negligent act arose out of the exercise of a 
"discretionary function" under section 63-
30-10(1). If the general activity under con-
sideration is not a governmental function 
within the meaning of section 63-30-3, then 
there is no immunity. If the general activi-
ty is a governmental function, then the 
Little test must be applied to determine if 
the specific, allegedly negligent act or 
omission is purely discretionary under sec-
tion 63-30-10<lXa) 
tionary, then immunity has not been 
waived by section 63-30-10(l)(a). If it is 
not purely discretionary, then immunity 
has been waived by section 63-30-10(1). 
The failure to appreciate the difference 
between these two distinct inquiries appar-
ently underlies the majority's confusing at-
tempt to harmonize the results in Bowen v. 
Riverton City, 656 R2d 434 (Utah 1982) 
and Richards v. Leavitt, 716 P.2d 276 
(Utah 1985) (per curiam) with Standiford 
and Gleave. Governmental immunity was 
not even an issue in Bowen, a case involv-
ing the allegedly negligent failure of the 
city to maintain a stop sign that had been 
knocked down, so it is not really surprising 
that no mention was made of Standiford. 
It is the substance of the issues actually 
raised and of the tacit assumptions made m 
Bowen, not the case's procedural posture, 
that is important The summary judgment 
in favor of the city, which the supreme 
court reversed in Bowen, had been granted 
on the basis that the city was not negligent 
as a matter of law on the undisputed facts; 
the summary judgment was not granted on 
the basis of any immunity. The first un-
spoken assumption m Bowen, which was 
subsequently the express holding in Leav-
itt, 716 P.2d at 279, is that the maintenance 
and repair of traffic signs is a governmen-
tal function. Leavitt, which also involved a 
municipality's failure to maintain a traffic 
control device at a highway intersection, 
addressed another issue not raised in Bow-
en, i.e., whether immunity for the exercise 
of that governmental function had been 
statutorily waived. The court in Bowen 
tacitly assumed that it had, or the summa-
ry judgment in favor of the municipality 
could have been affirmed on the alternate 
ground of immunity. The Leavitt court 
concluded that the immunity provided to 
the city by section 63-30-3 for its activities 
in maintaining traffic control devices had 
been expressly waived by section 63-30-8 
"for any injury caused by a defective, un-
safe, or dangerous condition of any high-
way, road, street, alley, crosswalk, side-
walk, culvert, tunnel, bridge, viaduct, or 
other structure located thereon.'' Relying 
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If it is purely discre- on its prior decision in Bigelow v. Ingersoll, 
618 P.2d 50 (Utah 1980), decided two years 
before Bowen, the Leavitt court re-
affirmed that the express waiver of immu-
nity in section 63-30-8 is not subject to the 
section 63-30-10(l)(a) discretionary func-
tion exception to the waiver of immunity. 
The court thus read section 63-30-8 as 
expressing the legislature's view that an 
act or omission in the exercise of a govern-
mental function that created a "defective, 
unsafe, or dangerous condition" on a public 
way could never involve activity at the 
basic policy-making level for which immuni-
ty is preserved by section 63-3(M0(l)(a). 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Leavitt and Bige-
low, however, but exactly like the injured 
plaintiff and appellant railroad in Gleave, 
749 P.2d at 667 L n 6, the plaintiffs in this 
case have never pleaded or contended that 
the discretionary function analysis under 
section 63-30-10(l)(a) is unnecessary and 
irrelevant because the decedents' injuries 
resulted from an unsafe or dangerous con-
dition on a road within the purview of 
section 63-30-8. Instead, they asked the 
trial court and us to overrule one of the 
two aforementioned holdings m Gleave and 
conclude either that (1) UDOT's evaluation, 
installation, maintenance, and improvement 
of safety signals or devices at railroad 
crossings is not a governmental function 
withm section 63-30-3; or (2) UDOT's fail-
ure to install upgraded safety devices at 
the subject railroad crossing did not arise 
out of a section 63-30-10(l)(a) discretionary 
function. 
Since my colleagues and I have unani-
mously declined the invitation to abandon 
Gleave, it is unfortunate that the majority 
adds confusion to an already difficult area 
of law m its flawed analysis of Leavitt and 
Bowen, which should be disregarded as 
dicta. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR TOOELE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
LEWIS DUNCAN, individually and : MEMORANDUM DECISION 
as personal representative of 
the Estate of PATRICK DUNCAN, : CIVIL NO. 84-146 
deceased, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY, 
a corporation, et al., : 
Defendants. : 
The above-referenced matter came before the Court for oral 
argument on November 12, 1987. Counsel for the various parties 
appeared and argued their respective positions. Prior to the 
oral argument, the parties had submitted Memoranda of Points and 
Authorities, as well as Affidavits and other documentary evidence 
addressing the issues raised in the various Motions. Following 
oral argument, the Court ruled from the bench on portions of the 
defendant Union Pacific Railroad's (hereinafter "Railroad") 
Motion for Summary Judgment. The remainder of the Motions were 
taken under advisement for further consideration of the issues 
raised. The Court has since argument, again reviewed the 
Memoranda of Points and Authorities, and other materials 
submitted, and being fully advised, enters the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
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MOTIONS PREVIOUSLY GRANTED 
As indicated above, the Court granted a portion of the 
Railroad's Motion for Summary Judgment. From the bench, at the 
conclusion of oral argument, the Court determined that there was 
no evidence to support the plaintiffs1 claim that the Railroad 
operated the train in a negligent manner. To the contrary, the 
only evidence presented went to the proposition that the train 
was operated in a reasonable, safe and prudent manner. In 
addition, there was no evidence offered by the plaintiffs that 
suggested that their claim that the engineer, co-defendant 
Kleinman, was incompetent. The only evidence before the Court is 
again to the contrary, and establishes that the defendant 
Kleinman was a competent and qualified engineer. Therefore, the 
Railroad and Kleinmanfs Motions for Summary Judgment on those 
issues were granted. There was also a Motion to Strike a portion 
of the plaintiffs1 Brief that contained inappropriate comments. 
The plaintiff did not object, and the Motion was granted, and the 
word "murdered" in plaintiffs1 Brief was stricken pursuant to 
Rule 12(f) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case arises out of an automobile/train collision that 
occurred on April 9, 1983, at approximately 8:50 p.m. The 
collision took place at the crossing of the defendants railroad 
tracks, and Droubay Road in a rural portion of Tooele County. 
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The train was operated by defendant Kleinman; a deceased, Patrick 
Duncan, operated the automobile and, in addition to the operator, 
the automobile contained three passengers. All four occupants of 
the automobile were killed as a result of the collision. It was 
dark at the time of the collision, and the weather was not a 
factor. The automobile's and the train's lights were lit. The 
train had in operation a dual headlight, and a strobe light, both 
exceeding federally mandated standards. Droubay Road crosses the 
railroad tracks at an oblique angle of approximately 13 6* in the 
direction that the automobile was planning on crossing the 
tracks. Considering the direction of the automobile and the 
train, the train was therefore approaching the crossing to the 
right front of the automobile. The defendant engineer, Kleinman, 
observed the automobile approaching the crossing for some 
substantial distance before the crossing, and assumed that the 
automobile would stop prior to reaching the crossing. By the 
time the defendant Kleinman was able to observe that the 
automobile was not going to stop, it was not possible to stop the 
train, or take other evasive action before the impact occurred. 
The required whistle and bells on the train were operating for 
the prescribed distance prior to the crossing. Other than 
railroad personnel on the train, there were no eyewitnesses to 
the collision that survived. Based upon the material submitted, 
there is no obstruction to the observation of an approaching 
DUNCAN V. UNION PACIFIC PAGE FOUR MEMORANDUM DECISION 
train for an automobile driver approaching, as was the Duncan 
automobile in this case for some substantial distance before the 
crossing (investigating officers tests). 
Plaintiffs1 counsel orally argued that the terrain 
approaching the crossing was not flat as suggested by the 
defendants, but offered no support for that conclusion. The 
photos, submitted to show the terrain, suggests the contrary, and 
there is no genuine issue of material fact that is disputed on 
that point. The signing on the road preceding the crossing 
consisted of a traditional railroad crossing sign at 
approximately 305 feet in advance of the crossing. Unrefuted 
tests offered by the defendants show that the sign was visible at 
night, using automobile low beams for a distance of three-
quarters of a mile. The white crossing sign at the crossing 
itself was also visible at that distance. An automobile 
traveling with high beams would be able to observe the signs in 
question a mile distant from the crossing. The automobile and 
the train collided front-to-front at the crossing. There is a 
disputed issue of fact regarding the effect of marijuana use by 
the deceased driver Duncan. For the purposes of this Motion, the 
Court accepts the proposition that the plaintiffs assert, to wit: 
that marijuana ingestion by the plaintiff driver had no effect on 
his ability to operate the vehicle in any fashion, and that his 
judgment was not impaired. At the time of the accident there 
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were no flashing signals at the crossing, nor crossing arms 
prohibiting the passage of vehicle traffic onto the crossing. 
RAILROAD'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad was negligent in not 
installing additional warning lights or other devices at the 
crossing. Plaintiffs claim that the Railroad has a duty to 
install such devices concurrently with the State of Utah, and 
more particularly the Utah Department of Transportation 
(hereinafter referred to as "State" or "UDOT"). The Railroad 
denies this duty, and claims that the determination of need and 
the decision to install signing and other warnings is the sole 
and exclusive responsibility of the State. With that proposition 
the Court agrees. Utah statutes place the responsibility clearly 
upon the State for making the determination of what type of 
signing and when it should be installed on railroad crossings. 
This conclusion is true, even in the face of the 1975 amendment 
to Section 54-4-15, Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. The courts 
that have interpreted Section 54-4-15, as amended, have held and 
this Court finds those holdings persuasive, that no duty exists 
in law for the Railroad to independently, or concurrently with 
the State, install or maintain crossing signs, lights, and other 
traffic control devices at railroad crossings. There being no 
duty to sign or place signals at railroad crossings on the part 
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of the Railroad, the remainder of the Railroadfs Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be and is hereby granted. 
STATE OF UTAH'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
In considering the State1s Motion for Summary Judgment, it 
must be considered in two phases. First, it must be determined 
if the State is entitled to immunity in this case, because of the 
State1 s claim that crossing, signing and signals are 
discretionary, and therefore governmental immunity is not waived 
and applies, and secondly, even if such activity is a 
discretionary function, is the State still liable because of the 
plaintiffs' claim that the crossing is extra hazardous. 
The process used by UDOT personnel in making their 
inspection of railroad crossings in this state to determine what 
type of signs and signals should be used is a process requiring 
both the use of objective and subjective factors and 
considerations. It must first be determined whether or not a 
particular crossing requires more than just advance signing. If 
it is so determined, then it must be determined to apply for 
whatever federal funding is available. The crossing must also be 
rated by UDOT personnel and given a position on a priority 
listing for crossings for which federal funding has been 
requested throughout the state. In reaching a priority 
evaluation, the inspection team evaluates the potential hazards 
of the crossing compared to all others in the state. This 
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procedure is fully described in the State's Brief and supporting 
documents. The process is far beyond the perfunctory decisions 
that government officials may make on a day-in and day-out basis, 
which are not entitled to protection as discretionary decisions. 
The process of evaluation involved here embodies the classic 
elements of a discretionary function, to wit: balancing various 
needs of differing railroad crossings throughout the state, 
weighing competing interests for available funding, balancing 
potential risk versus dollar and manpower available. The Court 
finds that the decision to add additional signs or signals to 
this crossing, and when to do it was a discretionary function for 
which the State has not waived immunity under Section 63-3 0-
10(1)(a), Utah Code Ann., 1953 as amended. Having determined 
that the State is entitled to immunity under the exception of a 
discretionary function, the Court declines to address the other 
two grounds for immunity asserted by the State. 
The plaintiff also claims that even if a decision to install 
signs and signals is discretionary, the exemption does not apply, 
because the crossing is extra hazardous. While the Court is not 
necessarily convinced that the plaintiffs' proposition is a 
correct statement of the law, the Court is satisfied as a matter 
of law that the crossing in question does not fall into the 
category of extra hazardous. This conclusion is reached for two 
reasons. First, the plaintiffs' expert Affidavit upon which the 
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plaintiffs rely to establish their claim of an extra hazardous 
crossing is based upon inadmissible evidence and a flawed 
foundation. Secondly, and more importantf the evidence presented 
clearly shows that this crossing does not fall into the type of 
crossing contemplated by the Supreme Court in defining extra 
hazardous crossings. 
Plaintiffs have filed the Affidavit of Robert Crommelin in 
which Mr. Crommelin opines that based, at least in substantial 
part, on the inspection and surveillance reports of the State 
officials at UDOT, that the crossing is extra hazardous. That 
opinion is without foundation or basis when the report relied 
upon is removed from consideration, as it must be in this case. 
23 U.S.C. 409 prohibits any court, state or federal, from 
receiving into evidence reports and other information such as 
UDOT surveillance reports. The policy reasons behind Congress's 
action is clear. It is to encourage the full and free exchange 
of information, and to encourage candid reports, conclusions and 
evaluations by governmental officials conducting inspections at 
railroad crossings and the like. Were the reports and other 
information admissible, inspection teams would be chilled in 
making accurate reports so as to insure that they were not 
hindsighted at a later time in liability actions by statements 
and evaluations contained in those reports. Plaintiffs1 expert's 
conclusions are also based upon misinformation. Mr. Crommelin 
relies upon a "projected" traffic density of 1,500 vehicles per 
DUNCAN V. UNION PACIFIC PAGE NINE MEMORANDUM DECISION 
day, when in actuality the density was at most 580 vehicles per 
day. The statement that the placement of the advance warning 
sign violated federal standards for distance is also misplaced. 
The federal statute does not mandate a specific distance, it 
provides a suggested distance. In any event, the placement of 
the sign could have no proximate effect upon the accident in any 
event. The driver either failed to see the sign, or ignored the 
sign, and it makes little difference if an operator does not see, 
or ignores a sign 305 feet from a railroad crossing, as opposed 
to not seeing or ignoring a sign that is 750 feet from a railroad 
crossing. A careful review of the Crommelin claim of "similar 
accidents" at the crossing further shows that his use of that 
basis for determining that this crossing is ultra hazardous is in 
error. The three prior accidents upon which he relies are not 
similar to the action in question at all. One involved a 
collision with a train where visibility was poor in a snowstorm. 
The others involved automobiles coming from the opposite 
direction, which substantially changes the angle at which the 
train approaches the intersection, as compared to the oncoming 
approaching car, and are otherwise substantially dissimilar. 
These differences were pointed out in defendant Railroad's 
Memoranda, dated May 26, 1987, and the Court has received no 
addition to Mr. Crommelin's Affidavit to suggest that his 
conclusions are or can be based upon proper foundations. 
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Considered as a whole, the opinion of Mr. Crommelin, because of 
the loss of its underpinnings, cannot be considered as raising a 
substantial or genuine material issue of fact on the issue of the 
crossing being extra hazardous or not. 
More important than the lack of plaintiff raising a genuine 
issue of fact on the nature of the crossing by way of Mr. 
Crommelin's Affidavit, is the Court's evaluation through the 
photos and other documents submitted of the crossing itself. 
This crossing as a matter of law does not meet the Supreme Court 
test as outlined in Bridges v. Union Pacific Railroad Co. , 488 
P. 2d 378 (Utah 1971). As noted by the Supreme Court in the 
Bridges case, there must be something unusual about the crossing. 
The photos and investigating officer's tests and observations all 
show that the surrounding land in the area of the automobile's 
approach is reasonably flat. It is flat, at least to the extent 
that the approaching train can be readily seen and observed by 
the driver of an approaching automobile. There are no buildings 
or other structures in the area to divert a driver's attention, 
or to otherwise confuse. There are no other lights or unusual 
noises to confuse or deceive an otherwise unsuspecting driver. 
In sum, there is nothing about this crossing that could provide 
notice to UDOT personnel that the warnings which were there at 
the time of the accident were not adequate to warn the public. 
While any railroad crossing can be hazardous, it is hard to 
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imagine a crossing that presents a smaller hazard than the one in 
question before the Court. The Court therefore determines that 
reasonably minds could not differ on whether or not this crossing 
is extra hazardous, and concludes as a matter of law that the 
crossing is not extra hazardous. 
Based upon the foregoing, the State1s Motion for Summary 
Judgment is equally well-taken as that of the Railroad, and 
should therefore be, and the same is hereby granted. 
Counsel for the Railroad and Kleinman are requested to 
prepare an appropriate Order in accordance with this Memorandum 
Decision granting their Motion for Summary Judgment, and counsel 
for the State is likewise requested to prepare an Order granting 
the State's Motion for Summary Judgment in accordance with this 
Memorandum Decision, and submit the same to the Court for review 
and signature in accordance with the Local Rules of Practice. 
Dated this / 7 day of November, 1987. 
IS/ ^W^ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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This matter is before the Court on: 
1. Defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, 
2. Plaintiff's Motion in Limine Regarding Seat Belt Defense, 
and 
3. Defendant's Motion to Exclude Conclusory Testimony of 
Plaintiff's Expert that Crossing was Extrahazardous. 
The Court, having read the memoranda submitted by the parties, 
having examined the exhibits attached thereto and being apprised 
of the applicable law, reaches the following decisions for the 
reasons set forth below. 
This is an action for wrongful death. On October 23, 1987, 
the Defendant operated a railroad train on its railway line through 
the North Gabaldon crossing in Belen, New Mexico, where a collision 
occurred between the train and a motor vehicle driven by Luz 
Araijo, the Plaintiff's Decedent. Plaintiff claims the death of 
Luz Armijo was the proximate result of the Defendants negligent 
failure to provide adequate warnings at the crossing and 
Defendant's negligent operation of its train. Defendant claims 
that Araljo's death was the proximate result of his own negligence 
and that it was not negligent in any manner in operating the train 
on the night of the accident. Defendant further claims that any 
state common law theory of negligence based on Defendant's duty to 
install warning devices at railroad crossings has been preempted 
by federal laws and regulations. This last contention is the 
subject of Defendants motion for partial summary judgment which 
the Court will address first. 
I. Defendant• • Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Defendant moves the Court for an order granting it partial 
summary judgment with respect to the Plaintifffs claims that 
Defendant had a duty to install additional warning devices at the 
railroad crossing at issue in this case. As grounds therefore, 
Defendant states that any state common law theory of negligence on 
the part of Defendant with regard to the installation of warning 
devices at railroad crossings has been preempted by federal laws 
and regulations. Plaintiff makes numerous arguments against 
preemption. 
The following facts were submitted by Defendant in its Motion 
for Partial Summary Judgment as undisputed material facts. 
According to 56.1b. of the Rules of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Mexico, all material facts set forth 
in the statement of the movant shall be deemed admitted unless 
specifically controverted. Plaintiff in her Response Brief did 
not dispute any of Defendants undisputed material facts. 
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Therefore, the Court will consider admitted the following material 
facts. 
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted the Federal Rail 
Safety Act (FRSA) which expressly preempted state law as to the 
subject matter of any order, standard, or regulation relating to 
railroad safety issued by the Secretary of Transportation. 45 
U.S.C. §§ 421-444. A specific section of the FRSA was devoted to 
railroad-highway grade crossing safety and required the Secretary 
of Transportation to report to Congress on procedures to be 
employed to develop safer grade crossings. 45 U.S.C. 1433(a). In 
1973, after the Secretary of Transportation filed his report with 
Congress, Congress amended the Federal Highway Safety Act to 
require the states to "conduct and systematically maintain" a list 
of railroad crossings requiring improved protective or warning 
devices. 23 U.S.C. §130(d). In addition, the states were required 
to "implement a schedule" for the construction and installation of 
improved railroad crossing protective devices. Ide 
In 1983, pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Secretary 
of Transportation, the Federal Highway Administration adopted and 
approved the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices (MUTCD) as 
the national standard for all traffic control devices. 23 C.F.R. 
S 655.603 (1990). Consistent with federal regulations, New Mexico 
adopted the MUTCD as the standard for traffic control devices in 
New Mexico. N.M.Stat.Ann. §66-7-101 (Repl. 1987). The MUTCD 
provides that "the determination of need and selection of devices 
at a grade crossing is made by the public agency with 
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jurisdictional authority." HUTCD, Part VIII at 8A-1. Furthermore, 
in 1975, the Secretary promulgated regulations mandating that 
"state laws requiring railroads to share in the cost of work for 
the elimination of hazards at railroad-highway crossings shall not 
apply to Federal-aid projects." 23 C.F.R. 1646.210(a) (1990). 
The Secretary of Transportation determined that "projects for grade 
crossing improvements are deemed to be of no ascertainable net 
benefit to the railroads and there shall be no required share of 
the costs." 23 C.F.R. §646.210(b)(1) (1990). 
Pursuant to the provisions of the Highway Safety Act, in 1984 
the State of New Mexico obtained a list of all railroad-highway 
grade crossings in the State, prepared by the federal Department 
of Transportation with input from the American Association of 
Railroads (hereinafter the DOT-AAR inventory), which listed all 
public railroad crossings in New Mexico based on the likelihood of 
an accident occurring at a particular crossing during a given year. 
Cisneros Deposition, p. 10.1 In 1984, the North Gabaldon Road 
crossing was number 197 on the DOT-AAR inventory containing a total 
number of 900 public railroad-highway crossings located in New 
Mexico. Cisneros Deposition, Ex. 1. Having obtained the DOT-AAR 
inventory, the New Mexico State Highway Department (through the 
Railroad & Utilities Section), with federal assistance, prioritized 
and ranked the railroad crossings for warning device upgrading 
based on a number of factors calculated by the State. Cisneros 
1
 Lester Cisneros is the section head of the Railroad & 
Utilities Section of the New Mexico State Highway and 
Transportation Department. 
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Deposition, pp. 9, 10, 30. In July, 1984, the Railroads & 
Utilities Section completed its statewide study of the 900 railroad 
crossings listed in the DOT-AAR inventory. Cisneros Deposition, 
Ex. 2, p. 25. Also, in July, 1984, the Railroad & Utilities 
Section narrowed the DOT-AAR Inventory to a list of 22 (later 
amended to 27) projects that the Section concluded should be 
considered for Federal-Aid Safety Funding. Id* at 26-30. On July 
27, 1984, the Railroad & Utilities Section diagnostic team 
submitted its list of the 22 projects to be submitted for approval 
by the Federal Highway Administration for federal railroad safety 
project funding. Id. at 25. The July, 1984 evaluation prepared 
by the Railroad & Utilities Section ranked the North Gabaldon Road 
crossing with a priority number of 14 and included the crossing in 
its 5 year plan. Id. at 27-30. This report included the specific 
evaluation that the type of warning device to be installed at the 
North Gabaldon Road railroad crossing was "flashers and gates." 
Id. at 29. 
When the Railroad & Utilities Section determines that a 
particular railroad crossing is, by virtue of its ranking, the next 
to have its warning devices upgraded, it first informs the Federal 
Highway Administration and then informs the railroad (through a 
railroad representative on the diagnostic team) of that 
determination and requests a preliminary engineering report and 
construction cost estimate for installing the additional warning 
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signals. Cisneros Deposition, p. 30; San Miguel Affidavit, 16.2 
Requests for an engineering report are made by the Railroad & 
Utilities Section to the railroad-employee member of the diagnostic 
team to provide engineering advice in terms of railroad operations 
as to the installation of additional warning devices at particular 
railroad crossings. Cisneros Deposition, p. 30; San Miguel 
Affidavit, J15, 6? 23 CP.R. 5646.204(g) (1990); 23 C.F.R. 
§646.216(b)(i) (1990). As of October 23, 1987 (the date of the 
accident) the State of New Mexico had not requested a preliminary 
engineering report concerning upgrading the warning devices at the 
North Gabaldon Road crossing. San Miguel Affidavit, J6. 
The State of New Mexico receives federal funding to upgrade 
warning devices at railroad crossings and presently upgrades about 
ten railroad crossings per year. Cisneros Deposition, p. 10. As 
of September 30, 1987, the Railroad & Utilities Section had 
completed seven of the 22 projects listed on the July, 1984 
evaluation. Cisneros Deposition, Ex. 2, p. 20. One factor 
considered by the Railroad & Utilities Section in ranking and 
prioritizing railroad crossings for the upgrading of warning 
devices is whether previous collisions have occurred at a 
particular crossing. Cisneros Deposition, p. 13. Prior to 
October, 1987, there were no accidents at the North Gabaldon Road 
crossing. Cisneros Deposition, Ex. 1. In November 1987, following 
the accident, Mr. San Miguel was contacted by the State Railroad 
Rudy San Miguel is an ATSSF employee and was a member of 
the State diagnostic team in 1987. 
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& Utilities Section. San Miguel Affidavit, J6. The Section 
requested that Defendant perform the preliminary engineering and 
prepare a construction cost estimate for upgrading the warning 
devices at the North Gabaldon Road crossing. Id. 
A motion for summary judgment properly may be granted only 
when there is no genuine issue of material fact and the movant is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). 
The movant bears the burden of demonstrating the absence of a 
genuine issue of material fact. Celotax Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 
317 (1986); Houston v. National General Insurance Co., 317 F.2d 83 
(10th Cir. 1987). Here, there appear to be no disputed facts. The 
issue before the Court is strictly a legal question. The issue is 
whether Plaintiff's claims that Defendant was negligent in failing 
to install additional warning devices at the North Gabaldon Road 
crossing are preempted by federal law. 
State law is preempted under the Supremacy Clause of the 
United States Constitution, Art. VI, cl. 2, in three circumstances. 
English v. General Electric Company, U.S. , 110 S.Ct. 2270, 
110 L.Ed.2d 65 (1990). "First, Congress can define explicitly the 
extent to which its enactments pre-empt state law." Id. This is 
the situation presently before the Court.3 Congress included in 
the FRSA a broad preemption provision excluding the states from 
legislating in any area of railroad safety already covered by 
The other two circumstances where state law is preempted 
are: 1) where state law is in a field that Congress intended the 
federal government occupy exclusively and 2) where a state law 
actually conflicts with a federal law. English, supra. 
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regulations adopted by the Secretary. C8Z Transportation, Inc. v. 
Public Utilities Commission of Ohio, 701 F.Supp. 608, 609 (S.D. 
Ohio 1988), aff'd, 901 P.2d 497 (6th Cir. 1990), Section 434 
reads: 
The Congress declares that laws, rules, regulations, 
orders, and standards relating to railroad safety shall 
be nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State 
may adopt or continue in force any lav, rule, regulation, 
order, or standard relating to railroad safety until such 
time as the Secretary has adopted a rule, regulation, 
order or standard covering the subject matter of such 
State requirement. A state may adopt or continue in 
force an additional or more stringent lav, rule, 
regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad 
safety when necessary to eliminate or reduce an 
essentially local safety hazard, and when not 
incompatible vith any Federal lav, rule, regulation, 
order, or standard, and vhen not creating an undue burden 
on interstate commerce (emphasis added)• 
The scope of preemption under the FRSA has been broadly 
construed by the courts. C8Z Transportation at 612-613 citing 
numerous cases. Section 434 expressly declares that a primary 
objective of the Act is the establishment of a nationally uniform 
system of regulation in the rail safety field. Thus, state adopted 
regulations, vith the exception of those designated to eliminate 
an essentially local safety hazard, are permitted to continue in 
force only until such time as a federal regulation covering the 
same subject matter is promulgated. national Association of 
Regulatory Utility Commissioners • . Coleman, 542 F.2d 11, 13 (3rd 
Cir. 1976) • The FRSA does not merely preempt those state lavs 
vhich impair or are inconsistent vith federal regulations. 
Burlington Northern Railroad Company v. State of Montana, 880 F.2d 
1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1989). It preempts all state regulations 
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aimed at the same safety concerns addressed by federal regulations. 
Id. 
Therefore, if the Secretary acts with regard to the same 
subject matter as a state law, rule, regulation, order, or 
standard, unless the state law addresses an essentially local 
safety hazard, the state law is preempted. Several courts have 
dealt with the issue of whether federal regulations promulgated by 
the Secretary (as set forth in the undisputed material facts) have 
preempted state laws in the area of improvements at railroad-
highway crossings* For example, the Federal District Court for the 
District of Kansas stated: 
[I]n the 1970's, Congress, recognizing a need for uniform 
safety standards, enacted the Railroad Safety Act which 
imposed nationwide standards, reserving authority to the 
states for further regulation only under special 
circumstances. In conjunction with the national 
regulation of railroad safety, Congress determined that 
grade crossing improvements were a governmental 
responsibility rather than the responsibility of the 
railroads and increased funding to the federal aid 
program. 
Sisk v. national Railroad Passenger Corp., 647 F.Supp. 861, 863 
(D.Kan. 1986). 
This Court is in agreement with those courts that have found 
that the federal regulations in this area have preempted state law. 
It is this Court's conclusion, that the Secretary has acted with 
regard to the installation of warning devices at railroad-highway 
crossings. The Secretary acted in this area with the promulgation 
of the procedures outlined in 23 C.F.R. §646.200 et mmq. and with 
the adoption of the MUTCD as the national standard. The MUTCD 
specifically states that "the determination of need and selection 
9 
of devices at a grade crossing is Bade by the public agency with 
jurisdictional authority.11 MUTCD, Part VIII at 8A-1. "Subject to 
such detenlnation and selection, the design, installation and 
operation shall be in accordance with the national standards 
contained herein." Id. By adopting this standard, the Secretary 
has effectively preempted any state lav covering the same subject 
matter. The New Mexico law cited to this Court by Plaintiff 
predates the Secretary's action and addresses precisely the subject 
matter addressed by the MUTCD, that is, what entity is responsible 
for determining the need and selection of devices at railroad-
highway crossings. As stated previously, the FRSA preempts all 
state regulations aimed at the same safety concerns addressed by 
the Secretary's regulations. Burlington Northern Railroad Company 
• . State of Montana, 880 F.2d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 1989). 
Therefore, the Court finds that any New Mexico state common law or 
statutory law placing the duty of determining the need for and the 
selection of appropriate warning devices at railroad-highway 
crossings on the railroad is preempted by federal law. Federal law 
delegates to the public agency having jurisdictional authority, and 
not to the railroad, the responsibility and the authority for 
determining the need for and the selection of appropriate railroad-
highway grade crossing signals. 
While this Court believes that state law was preempted when 
the Secretary passed regulations dealing with the subject matter 
of warning devices at railroad-highway grade crossings as discussed 
above, the Court alternatively finds, that at the very least, under 
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the rationale of Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 
1149 (9th Cir. 1983) the present negligence claim was entirely 
preempted as of July, 1984. Only two federal appellate courts have 
considered the question of whether federal grade crossing 
regulations preempt state law claims against railroads predicated 
upon negligence in selecting or providing additional warning 
devices. The Ninth Circuit in Marshall held that preemption occurs 
when the state authorities approve the level of protection at a 
crossing, whereas the Eighth Circuit in Karl •. Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co., 880 F.2d 68, 76 (8th Cir. 1989) ruled there was no 
preemption. The Ninth Circuit in Marshall stated: 
The Secretary, through the Federal Highway 
Administration, prescribed procedures to obtain 
uniformity in highway traffic control devices and adopted 
the Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices on Streets 
and Highways, see 23 C.F.R. §655.601 (1981), which also 
was adopted by Montana, see Mont.Code Ann. §61-8-202 
(1981). The manual prescribes that the selection of 
devices at grade crossings and the approval for federal 
funds is to be made by local agencies with jurisdiction 
over the crossing. Thus, the Secretary has delegated 
federal authority to regulate grade crossings to local 
agencies. 
Marshall at 1154. 
The Marshall Court found that the FRSA preempts a state 
negligence claim when the responsible state agency has made a 
determination regarding the type of warning device to be installed 
at a crossing* Id. Therefore, the Marshall Court held that until 
a federal decision is reached through the local agency on the 
adequacy of the warning device at a particular crossing, the 
railroad1s duty under applicable state lav is not preempted. Id. 
If this Court follows the reasoning of the Ninth Circuit, the 
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federal decision in this case was made in 1984 when the State of 
New Mexico Railroad & Utilities Section made the determination, 
under the KUTCD, as to the type of warning devices to be installed 
at the North Gabaldon Road crossing. So, at the very least, under 
the Marshall rationale, the present negligence claim was entirely 
preempted as of July, 1984.4 
Thus, the Court finds that the Secretary has acted in this 
case and state law is preempted. However, §434 of the FRSA has a 
savings clause under which states are permitted to adopt 
regulations to eliminate essentially local safety hazards, even if 
the Secretary has acted in a particular area of railroad safety. 
This section reads: 
A state may adopt or continue in force an additional or 
more stringent law, rule, regulation, order, or standard 
relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate 
The Court does not find the Eight Circuits decision in 
Karl to be persuasive. The Karl Court did not discuss the express 
preemption provision in 45 U.S.C. §434. Rather, it focused on 
generally how state laws may be preempted if they actually conflict 
with an express or implied federal declaration, or if the state law 
is in a field that is so pervasively controlled by federal law that 
no room is left for state rulemaking. Karl at 76. The Karl Court 
found that neither circumstance was present in that case. Id. 
However, the Karl decision ignores the first circumstance (as 
discussed by the Supreme Court in English, supra) where state law 
is preempted, namely, when Congress defines explicitly the extent 
to which its enactment preempts state law. As explained in the 
body of this opinion, Congress explicitly defined the extent to 
which its enactment would preempt state law in §434 of the FRSA. 
In light of the express provision in 5434, there is no need to 
determine whether state law in this case actually conflicts with 
the federal law or whether state lav is preempted because it is in 
a field that Congress intended the federal government to occupy 
exclusively. The Court notes, however, that state lav placing the 
duty to determine the need for and selection of warning devices at 
railroad-highway crossings on the railroad is in direct conflict 
with the MUTCD which places this duty on the public agency with 
jurisdictional authority. 
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or reduce an essentially local safety hazard, and when 
not incompatible with any Federal law, rule, regulation, 
order, or standard, and when not creating an undue burden 
on interstate commerce. 
45 U.S.C. §434. 
Plaintiff argues that the North Gabaldon Road crossing in 
question is an "essentially local safety hazard." The Court does 
not agree. This savings clause was designed to enable states to 
respond to local situations which are not statewide in character 
and not capable of being adequately encompassed within uniform 
national standards. National Association of Regulatory Utilities 
Commissioners v. Coleman, 542 F.2d 11, 14-15 (3d Cir. 1976). The 
exception in §434 was not intended "to permit a State to establish 
Statewide standards superimposed on national standards covering the 
same subject matter." H.R. Rep. No. 91-1194, reprinted in 1970 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News, 4104, 4116-4117. Plaintiff is 
asking this Court to find that the statewide common law duty of 
railroads to maintain a good and sufficient crossing falls within 
the local safety hazard exception of §434. However, based on the 
legislative history of §434, it is clear to the Court that 
statewide laws, such as the tort duty advanced by Plaintiff in this 
case, would not constitute a law relating to a "local safety 
hazard." Plaintiff is attempting to do exactly what the House 
Report specifically states that there is no intent to permit, 
namely, establishing a statewide standard (a statewide common law 
duty) "superimposed on national standards covering the same subject 
matter." The Court finds that the statewide system of tort law 
imposing a duty on a railroad to determine the need for, select and 
13 
Install warning devices at railroad-highway crossings does not 
constitute a law relating to a "local safety hazard." 
The Plaintiff next argues that if the Court finds that the 
Defendants common law duty has been preempted, the preemptive 
effect of the federal acts is unconstitutional. Plaintiff argues 
the federal acts provide no right of redress to persons, such as 
Plaintiff, who are the victims of the negligence of railroads. 
She states this blanket eradication of the right of redress is 
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses of the 
Constitutions of the United States and New Mexico. Plaintiff 
states that if it is the sole responsibility of the New Mexico 
State Highway Department to erect appropriate warning devices at 
railroad crossings, then the sole remedy against the State falls 
under the New Mexico Tort Claims Act. The Plaintiff further argues 
that it is unlikely that there is any remedy to be had against the 
State because there is no waiver of sovereign immunity in this 
situation. Finally, the Plaintiff argues the application of the 
preemption doctrine in this case would effectively deprive this 
Plaintiff of any remedy because of the expiration of the statute 
of limitations against both the federal and state governments for 
negligent acts. 
The Court agrees with Defendant's response to Plaintiff's 
arguments. Plaintiff has not been denied access to the courts or 
a right of recovery. First, the issue of whether Defendant 
negligently operated the train remains in this case regardless of 
the Court's finding on the preemption issue. Second, the New 
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Mexico Tort Claims Act does not explicitly retain sovereign 
immunity for claims in the nature of those being made in the 
present case. The Act does not specifically address a claim for 
liability based on the state1s negligence in failing to properly 
prioritize the installation of additional warning devices at 
railroad-highway crossings. From the Court's cursory loo)c at this 
issue, it appears that the State of New Mexico would probably not 
enjoy sovereign immunity for these claims.5 Finally, the fact that 
the statute of limitations for a claim against the state or the 
responsible agency may have passed is not sufficient reason to hold 
preemption unconstitutional. 
Finally, the Plaintiff argues that since this is a matter of 
first impression in the Tenth Circuit, judicial economy dictates 
denial of the motion. The Court does not agree with Plaintiff1s 
contention. Judicial economy dictates that if the motion is 
proper, that is, if it meets the requirements of Rule 56, that it 
be granted. As the Defendant states, Rule 56 contemplates motions 
such as the present one as a means of streamlining trials. 
Therefore, for the above reasons, Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment with respect to the Plaintiff's claims 
5
 Two cases are cited in the New Mexico Statutes Annotated 
that would sees to support a waiver of sovereign immunity in this 
particular situation. First, in Blackburn v. stmts, 98 N.M. 34, 
644 P.2d 548 (Ct. App. 1982) the Court held where the Plaintiff's 
allegations, in large part, concern the placement of signals and 
signs, the State of New Mexico does not enjoy immunity for such 
decisions. Second, in Qrano v. Roadrunner Trucking, Inc., 99 N.M. 
227, 656 P.2d 890 (Ct. App. 1982), cert, denied, 99 N.M. 358, 658 
P.2d 433 (1983) the Court held that the absence of traffic controls 
is a condition of a highway and is, therefore, the subject of 
maintenance, and the state is not immune from liability. 
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that Defendant had a duty to install additional warning devices at 
the railroad-highway crossing at issue in this case will be 
granted• 
II. Plaintiff9! Motion in Limine Regarding Seat Belt Defense 
The Plaintiff requests that the Court exclude any evidence, 
argument, or inference to be adduced by the Defendant as to the 
alleged failure by the Plaintiff's Decedent to use a seat belt, and 
the consequences flowing therefrom. Defendant argues that 
N.M.Stat.Ann. S66-7-373B. (Supp. 1990) does not prohibit the jury 
from apportioning fault and damages as a consequence of Armijo's 
failure to use a seat belt and if it does, then the statute is 
unconstitutional as a violation of the separation of powers 
doctrine and the equal protection requirements of the United States 
and New Mexico Constitutions. 
New Mexico law is clear on this issue. Section 66-7-373B. 
(Supp. 1990) states: 
Failure to be secured by a child passenger restraint 
device or by a safety belt as required by the Safety Belt 
Use Act [66-7-370 to 66-7-373 NMSA 1978] shall not in anv 
instance constitute fault or negligence and shall not 
limit or apportion damages (emphasis added)• 
The words of the statute clearly and unambiguously prohibit 
consideration of the violation of the Act as constituting 
negligence or negligence per sef as well as using evidence of the 
failure to wear a seat belt to limit or apportion damages. 
The Legislature was fully aware of the "seat belt defense19 
when it enacted this statute. The New Mexico Supreme Court had 
just recently overruled the "seat belt defense19 created by the 
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Court of Appeals in Thomas • • Hanson, 102 N.M. 417f 696 P.2d 1010 
(Ct. App. 1984), aff'd in part and revfd in part, 102 N.M. 326, 
327, 695 P,2d 476 (1985), saying, "ve believe that the creation of 
a 'seat belt defense1 is a matter for the Legislature, not for the 
judiciary." This decision was handed down during the 37th 
Legislature which is the legislature that passed the "Safety Belt 
Use Act." Furthermore, an earlier draft of §66-7-373B. provided 
for admissibility of this type of evidence,6 however, the bill 
which was enacted did not. Therefore, it is clear that the 
legislature made a conscious choice to precaca evidence of the 
failure to wear a seat belt to limit or apportion damages. The 
legislature undoubtedly concluded that seat belt use was desirable, 
and that although the enactment of a law providing for small fines 
would encourage people to wear seat belts, an injured plaintiff 
should nevertheless not be denied recovery when involved in a 
collision with a negligent tortfeasor. 
In addition, the Court finds that Defendant's constitutional 
challenges to this statute are without merit. First, the Court 
6
 The earlier draft of §66-7-373B. which was rejected for 
the present provision states: 
B. Evidence of a violation of Subsection A of Section 
3 of the Safety Belt Use Act shall be admissible 
concerning mitigation of damages, apportionment of 
damages or comparative fault, with respect to any person 
who is involved in an accident while violating Subsection 
A of Section 3 of the Safety Belt Use Act and who seeks 
in any subsequent litigation to recover damages for 
injuries resulting from the accident. Such evidence may 
also be admissible on other issues as determined by the 
court. 
Senate Bill 111, 37th Legislature, 1st Session (1985), p. 2. 
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notes that legislative acts are presumptively valid and will not 
be declared invalid unless the court is clearly satisfied that the 
legislature went outside the constitution in enacting them. 
Richardson • . Carnegie Library Restaurant, Inc., 107 N.M. 688, 693, 
763 P.2d 1153 (1988). 
With regard to Defendant's separation of powers argument, the 
Court finds that S66-7-373B. is not, as the Defendant contends, a 
legislative enactment of a rule of evidence, but rather is the 
enactment of a substantive state policy. It is true as Defendant 
states that the New Mexico Constitution reposes the inherent power 
to regulate all pleading, practice and procedure affecting the 
judicial branch exclusively in the Supreme Court. Miller & 
Associates, Ltd. v. Rainwater, 102 N.M. 170, 171-172, 692 P.2d 1319 
(1985) . However, it is also true that the Courts should not 
invalidate substantive policy choices made by the legislature under 
the constitutional exercise of its police powers. Southwest 
Community Health Services v. Smith, 107 N.M. 196, 199, 755 P.2d 40 
(1988). The Court finds it is clearly within the power of the 
legislature to determine whether or not to impose as a matter of 
State policy an obligation on its citizens to wear a seat belt and 
to establish the sanctions for non-conformity with that obligation. 
The Court also finds that this statute does not violate the 
equal protection provisions of the United States and New Mexico 
Constitutions. Defendant argues that this statute creates a class 
of defendants who have the random misfortune of allegedly injuring 
a plaintiff who fails to exercise ordinary care by not wearing a 
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seat belt where in virtually any other instance of a plaintiff's 
failure to use ordinary care which leads to or contributes to the 
plaintiff's injury, evidence of the plaintiff's breach of duty 
would be considered by ±hm jury in apportioning fault and damages. 
Defendant argues this classification works an injustice against 
included defendants by making them pay for damages caused entirely 
by the plaintiff's failure to exercise due care for his safety by 
failing to use an available seat belt. The problem with this 
argument is that a common law duty to wear a seat belt did not 
exist prior to the enactment of this statute and with the enactment 
of this statute the legislature specifically declined to make 
failure to wear a seat belt the basis for negligence or fault. 
Therefore, the statute does not affect the substantive rights of 
defendants or plaintiffs. In New Mexico, there never was a "seat 
belt defense19 and there still is not a "seat belt defense." 
Alternatively, even if this statute can be construed as 
creating statutory classifications, the Court finds that the equal 
protection test to be applied in this situation is the rational 
basis test because this legislation concerns social and economic 
issues and does not infringe on substantial or important rights nor 
involve sensitive classes.7 Richardson at 697-698. Applying the 
rational basis test to this legislation, the Court finds that 
Thus far, the only classifications afforded heightened 
scrutiny under the federal constitution are those based on gender 
or illegitimacy. The New Mexico Courts have also subjected 
legislatively created "damage caps19 to intermediate scrutiny. 
Trujillo •. city of Albuquerque, N.M.Bar.Bull, Vol. 29, No. 43, p. 
917 (1990). 
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§66-7-373B. is rationally related to a valid legislative purpose, 
namely, encouragement of seat belt use through a fine system, while 
preserving the right to compensation for injuries caused by 
negligent tortfeasors. 
Therefore, for the above reasons, the Court will grant 
Plaintifffs Motion in Limine regarding the seat belt defense. Any 
evidence regarding Plaintiff's Decedent's failure to use a seat 
belt and the consequences thereof, will be excluded. 
III. Defendant1* Motion to Exclude Conclusory Testimony of 
Plaintiff9* Expert that crossing was Extrahasardous 
Defendant requests that Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Baerwald not 
be allowed to offer any testimony which reflects his conclusion 
that the characteristics of the crossing were such that the 
railroad was required, as a matter of law, to install additional 
signals. Because this Court granted Defendant's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment, Defendant's above request is moot. This Court 
has found, as a matter of law, that any prior state basis for 
Plaintiff's claims that Defendant was negligent in failing to 
provide additional warning devices at the North Gabaldon Road 
crossing have been preempted by federal law. Thus, the motion will 
be denied as moot, however, due to the disposition of the partial 
summary judgment motion, Dr. Baerwald will not be allowed to 
testify that the railroad, as a matter of law, was required to 
install additional signals. 
Therefore, 
XT 18 THE ORDER OF THE COURT that Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment should be, and hereby is, GRANTED. 
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IT 18 FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion in Limine 
Regarding Seat Belt Defense should be, and hereby is, GRANTED. 
IT IE FURTHER ORDERED that Defendant's Motion to Exclude 
Conclusory Testimony of Plaintiff's Expert that Crossing was 
Extrahazardous should be, and hereby is, DENIED as moot. 
UNITED STA1 
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IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS 
MAHONING COUNTY, OHIO 
GERALD CARPENTER, et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
CCNRAIL, 
Defendant. 
Case No. 88-CV-1797 
Judge Jenkins 
JUDGMENT ENTRY 
This matter came on for hearing to the court upon a motion 
for summary judgment filed by defendant, Conrail, pursuant to 
Civ. R, 56, and upon the pleadings, the affidavits filed by the 
parties in support of and opposing the motion, and the briefs of 
the parties. 
Upon due consideration of all the material submitted, the 
court finds as a matter of law that under the Federal Railroad 
Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 421, et seq.) and the Federal 
Highway Safety Act of 1970 (23 U.S.C. 401, et seq.) and the 
federal laws, rules, regulations, orders and standards enacted 
pursuant thereto, that federal law delegates to the public 
agency having jurisdictional authority, and not to the railroad, 
the responsibility and the authority for determining the need 
for and the selection of appropriate railroad-highway grade 
U L - 1 3 — ^ 0 F=-RI 1 -4- : 1 l V «-» «»a & u- ^ 
IS x ^  
reference to determination of the need for and the selection o; 
traffic control devices that are installed at railroad-highwa: 
crossings. 
Since plaintiffs' claims are premised upon the railroad' 
alleged duty "to provide crossing gates and flashing signals t-
warn drivers11 approaching the crossing, which the court finds i 
a duty delegated by federal law to the public agency havin 
jurisdictional authority, the court finds that there is n 
genuine issue as to any material fact and defendant is entitle 
to judgment. 
It is therefore ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED thfi 
defendant shall be and hereby is granted judgment as a matter c 
law. 
i^c^L as:• •& bsto 
ANTHONY VtvO, C'cr-ic -jr1 
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IN THE CDUHT OF CQMON PIZAS OF SXIEUSKY CCCOTY, OHIO 
Mildred G. Case, ?j±nir.istraror, 
e t a l - r 
vs. 
Norfolk and Western Saiiway Co., 
et al., 
Defendants. 
Case Nos. 86 CV 459 
86 CV 920 
JUDGE 2C5E3T V. FrSSKLIN 
CCUHT'S ORDER 3E: PrZEZIPTICN 
) 1 ^ /L^ 
Defendant Sailwav's Motion m _inme re rreezstior. is crtntec. 
mc acaittaa rec No dansges ai^ to be awarded and no evidenc 
additional grade crossing warning devices. 
With respect to the Defendants Morion re : Preemption, th i s 
Court specif ical ly finds as a matter of law that under the Federal 
Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. 421 e t sec J and the Federal 
Highway Safety Act of 1970 (23 D.S.C. 401 e t sec.) and the federal laws, 
ru les , regulations f orders and standards enacted pursuant thereto, tha t 
federal lav; delegates to the public agency having jurisdict ional 
authority/ and not to the ra i l road, the responsibil i ty and the authority 
for determining the need for and the select ion of appropriate 
railroad-highway grade crossing s igna l s , and federal law has presetted 
s t a t e law with reference to determination of the need for and the 
selection of t ra f f ic control devices t h a t are installed a t 
railroad-rJLghway crossings. Cartenter v . Conrail (June 25, IS90), 
Mahoning County C.P. No. 88-07-1797, unreported * / 0 
•JtSLU G'J 
IN THE COMMON PLEAS COURT OF MIAMI COUNTY, OHIO 
TAMARA TILEY, as Executrix 
of the Estate of Charles 
Blodgett, Deceased, et al., CASE NO. 86-110 
Plaintiffs, JUDGE: JOSEPH B. GRIGSBY -
BY ASSIGNMENT 
v. 
BALTIMORE & OHIO RAILROAD, 
COMPANY, et al. , ORDER 
Defendants. 
The several motions 111 limine are, in consideration of the 
tentative and interlocutory nature of such rulings (see State v. Grubbs 
(1986), 28 Ohio St. 3d 199 and State v. Spahr (1976), 47 Ohio App. 2d 
221), considered as follows: 
1. Evidence of subsequent accidents at the intersection 
of the B & 0 Railroad and county road 25-A are considered not relevant 
to this case. 
2. The testimony of Dr. Welty, a treating physician, will 
be admitted to the extent it is competent and relevant. Evidently this 
is testimony intended to substantiate the claimed emotional injuries of 
Mrs. Blodgett. Such testimony is admissible under Binns v. Fredendall 
(1987), 32 Ohio St. 3d 244. Of course his testimony cannot be used as 
a conduit for inadmissible hearsay and must be judged according to Arti-
cles VII and VIII of the Evidence Rules. 
3. The motion to limit testimony concerning train speed 
appears to be well taken for it seems there is no issue as to a speed 
violation by the train and no duty in that regard violated by Defendant 
B & 0 Railroad. 
4. The motion concerning warning devices appears to be 
directed at questions other than malfunctioning. The maintenance of the 
lights is a duty of the railroad. Any violation of a duty imposed upon 
:he railroad by lawful authority would be relevant. The preemption of 
:he Federal Railroad Safety Act of 1970 (FRSA) seems settled as a legal 
.ssue in light of CSX Transporation, Inc., et al. v. The Public Utilitie^ 
lommission of Ohio, et al. (CA6f 1990), 901 F. 2d 497. 
5. The motion concerning the obstruction of view goes to 
he question of the railroad's duty concerning further warning devices, 
hich matter was discussed above. Assuming the view is obstructed by 
raffic going westerly, (extent?) what, if any, resulting duty is impo-
*d upon any of the defendants? This motion (as in fact all these in 
Lmine motions) can best be answered when the court is more aware of the 
roposed evidence concerning its relevance to Mrs. Blodgett and the 
;sues of duty and causation. 
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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N 
C O U R T O F A P P E A L S 
MICHAEL J . BAUGHMAN, as Persona l 
R e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e E s t a t e of . „ 
Santa Ramirez, deceased , ArK 2 5 B90 
P l a i n t i f f - A p p e l l a n t , 
v No. 113816 
CONSOLIDATED RAIL CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Third-
Party Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v 
JOSE V. RAMIREZ, 
Third-Party Defendant. 
Before: Michael J. Kelly, P.J., and Wahls and Sawyer, JJ. 
PER CURIAM. 
Plaintiff appeals from evidentiary rulings by the 
circuit court excluding the contents of files compiled by the 
Michigan Department of Transportation (MDOT). 
Plaintiff's decedent was killed when the car in which 
she was a passenger was struck by a train coming through a 
railway crossing maintained and controlled by defendant 
Consolidated Rail Corporation. Plaintiff sued defendant for 
negligence, basing his claims upon the company's failure to 
maintain adequate warning devices or gates at the crossing to 
prevent accidents. In support of these claims, plaintiff 
attempted to present into evidence MDOT files regarding the 
crossing in order to establish a need for gates. Defendant moved 
to exclude the MDOT file from evidence, which the trial court 
granted, stating: 
Well my impression is that the law and apparently 
ertministrative law has pretty much taken over this area 
1
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couid be done with respect to ranroavl cio-.oir..-j. :i.d 
if the government and the railroad complies v-uii Uute 
recommendations or the orders with respect to that that 
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there is very little room for common law negligence. 
So unless there is something else that comes out during 
the course of the trial about those reports and so on 
those would not be admitted. 
Prior to trial, plaintiff stipulated to an order of 
dismissal on the grounds that, given the court's evidentiary 
rulings, plaintiff had no viable case against defendant Conrail. 
The court entered an order dismissing plaintiff's claims with 
prejudice. 
On appeal, plaintiff argues that the circuit court 
erred in ruling that the contents of the MDOT files were not 
admissible. We disagree. 
Plaintiff attempted to present the contents of the MDOT 
files to prove that defendants' railroad crossing required 
warning signals and gates, and that defendant was negligent in 
falling to install these devices. MCL 257.668(2); MSA 23.68(2) 
provides in relevant part: 
* 
The erection of or failure to erect, replace, or 
maintain a stop or yield sign or other railroad warning 
device, unless such devices or signs were ordered by 
public authority, shall not be a basis for an action of 
negligence against the state transportation department, 
county road commissions, the railroads, or local 
authorities. 
The terms of this statute are clear and unambiguous, and preclude 
liability for failure to install warning devices unless so 
ordered by a public authority. Edington v Grand Trunk Western RR 
Co., 165 Mich App 163, 168-169; 418 NW2d 415 (1987), lv den 430 
Mich 890 (1988). There was no order to install gates at the 
crossing in question prior to the accident, thus defendant cannot 
be held liable for negligence in falling to install gates or 
other warning devices. Plaintiff may not use the MDOT files to 
prove a theory of liability which is barred by the statute. The 
court properly excluded the files from evidence. 
Plaintiff also argues that the court erred in holding 
that the blood alcohol content of the car's driver, third party 
dcfon.if.ni: Jose Ramirez, was aJ...i£.i-Llo ct trial. We agree. The 
test results in question were obtained pursuant to the implied 
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consent statute, and therefore cannot be used in civil 
litigation. McNitt v Citco Drilling Co., 397 Mich 384, 388; 245 
NW2d 18 (1976). Nevertheless, this error does not require 
reversal as it has no effect on plaintiff's inability to prove 
his claim against defendant Consolidated Rail Corp. 
Affirmed. 
/s/ Michael J. Kelly 
/s/ Myron H. Wahls 
/s/ David H. Sawyer 
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
ROME DIVISION 
FILED IN CLEF'S OFFICE 
ROBERT MAHONY, a s f a t h e r and U.S 2.C. - R;me 
personal r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of Eve 
Mahony, in h i s own b e h a l f and , ^ 
as next of kin and for the use A^* I ^ 1990 
and b e n e f i t of Eve Mahonyfs mother, 
Barbara Mahony, LUThKD.THCJJAS.Clerk . f 
By;!/. V ^ / ^ - ^ ^ ^ ^ 
Deputy Clerk 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v. CIVIL ACTION 
4:88-cv-13-HLM 
CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC. 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Both sides have moved the Court to reconsider portions 
of the summary judgment order decided February 6, 1990. CSX 
challenges this Court's determination that the evidence does 
not show a "federal decision" with regard to warning devices 
such that state law claims would be preempted by federal law, 
and Plaintiff challenges this Court's determination that a 
jury issue does not exist with regard to the proper speed of 
the train. 
Speed 
In the summary judgment order, the Court found that 
the regulations permitted its train to be travelling 
through the intersection at 60 miles per hour, and that 
the undisputed evidence is that the train was travelling 
at 35 miles per hour. 
In his motion to reconsider, Plaintiff contends that CSX 
is obligated to travel at a "reasonable" speed regardless of 
the speed limit, and that there is a question of fact 
concerning the applicable speed limit. 
As the Court made clear in its prior order, the 
"reasonableness" of the train's speed under Georgia law is 
preempted by the speed set by federal regulation. Federal lav 
alone determines the "reasonable" rate of speed, even if a 
factual dispute exists concerning the proper speed limit. 
The sole issue is whether the speed was within the limits 
set by those regulations. The parties do not dispute that the 
train was traveling at a speed of 35 miles per hour when 
Plaintiff's decedent was killed. What is disputed is the 
applicable speed limit for this particular grade crossing. 
Plaintiff contends that his only burden on the speed 
limit issue is "to show some question of fact, or that the 
movant is incorrect as to the law alleged." Plaintiff 
interprets his burden too lightly. The Supreme Court has made 
clear that the nonmovant "must do more than simply show that 
there is some metaphysical doubt about material facts . . . 
[T]he nonmoving party must come forward with 'specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.1" 
Matsushita Elec. Ind. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 
586 (1986) (footnote, citations, and emphasis omitted). In 
the instant case, therefore, Plaintiff must point to evidence 
showing that the train was exceeding the speed limit allowed 
by federal law. 
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Defendant claims that the track is "Class 4," which 
permits speeds up to 60 miles per hour. 49 C.F.R. § 213.9; 
see DeLong Aff. J 4. Plaintiff has shown evidence that the 
track is "Class 3" due to curvature, which permits speeds up 
to 40 miles per hour. § 213.9; see Abercrombie Dep. at 37. 
Plaintiff shows further that the curve has been measured at 
6 degrees. See Purvis Dep., Exh. A. The evidence of 
curvature, standing alone, is insufficient to show that the 
speed limit is below 35 miles per hour because Plaintiff has 
not pointed to evidence of the elevation of the outer rail. 
See 49 C.F.R. § 213, Appendix A (train speed limit is measured 
by the combination of degree of the curve and the elevation 
of the outer rail). 
Plaintiff cites further to 1 11 of Hester's affidavit, 
submitted with Plaintiff's opposition to CSX's motion for 
summary judgment, which reads as follows: 
Our report listed a speed limit for trains of 20mph. 
This information was obtained from the U.S. Department 
of Transportation Crossing Inventory, which is maintained 
as a part of my file. The information is provided to the 
U.S. Department of Transportation by the Railroad which 
sets its own timetable speeds. 
The report, attached to CSX's motion to reconsider, does not 
state that 2.0 miles per hour is the speed limit; rather, it 
states that 30 trains crossed the intersection at a rate of 
20 miles per hour. In a deposition of Plaintiff's expert 
Massie, however, Massie reviewed the inconsistency in the 
3 
report and stated that "from his research in the area," he 
understands that "the maximum allowable train speed over a 
crossing is given by that train speed.11 
The Court finds the evidence conflicting such that 
summary judgment cannot be entered as to the train's 
compliance with the federal speed limit. Although the 
Plaintiff has the burden of proof, there is some evidence from 
which a jury could find that the speed limit is 20 miles per 
hour and therefore that the train was speeding when it crossed 
the intersection at 35 miles per hour. CSX is, however, 
still entitled to judgment on the preemption issue: no 
evidence or argument based on Georgia law concerning the 
train's speed will be admissible at trial. 
Warning Devices 
CSX moves the Court to reconsider that portion of its 
summary judgment order that found the evidence inconclusive 
on preemption of the warning devices issue. Specifically, the 
Court found that 
the inconsistencies in Hester's affidavits as to whether 
the DOT made a recommendation or a decision is critica. 
to the preemption issue. On one hand, a "recommendation" 
concerning warning devices would not be tantamount to a 
"rule, regulation, order or standard," within the meaning 
of § 434, which would then be adopted by the Secretary, 
under 23 C.F.R. § 655.603(a), which would thereby preempt 
Plaintiffs1 claim for common law negligence based on the 
lack of additional warning devices. On the other hand, 
a "decision" by the DOT would be such a "rule, 
regulation, order or standard," and would bar Plaintiffs1 
state law claim based on the need for warning devices. 
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The Court continued: 
on the record as it is presently constituted, there is 
no clear indication that the State of Georgia has made 
a conclusive determination of the need for warning 
devices at the crossing in question. The Court therefore 
finds insufficient evidence that the subject matter has 
been preempted as a matter of law. 
Pursuant to footnote 1 of the Court's prior order finding the 
DOT report itself to be admissible for the limited purpose of 
determining preemption, CSX has submitted a copy of the 
report. In pertinent part, the report reads as follows: 
RECOMMENDATIONS, SUBJECT TO STATE-WIDE PRIORITY RANKING 
AND AVAILABILITY OF FUNDS, ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
It is recommended that the crossing not be signalized at 
this time due to low ADT. 
NE & SW Quadrants: Install automatic gates with flashing 
lights. Locate 15 ft. from track centerline 
(perpendicular) and 8 ft. from the pavement edge. 
Required: Centerline, Symbolized pavement markers, and 
advance warning signs. 
The report then recites that it is recommended by Wendell 
Hester and approved by Archie C. Burnham, Jr. 
Although the report lists apparent inconsistent 
recommendations such that it is not clear which recommendation 
was approved, the preemption issue is not whether or not the 
federal government, through the state, has determined that 
warning devices are needed — the issue is whether a decision 
was made. The record does not explain what position Burnham 
holds or what his "approval" meant. For example, if he is 
Hester's supervisor, his approval could be of Hester's 
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decision concerning the proper recommendation. Alternatively, 
his "approval" could be an acceptance by the state of the 
recommendation. 
However, Hester's affidavit, submitted by Defendant in 
its reply brief, recites that after the recommendations were 
made, "the Railroad Highway-Grade Crossing Section [of the 
DOT] made a decision not to install automatic warning 
devices." This statement, read along with the actual report, 
reveals that a decision was made. 
Plaintiff asks this Court for leave to depose Hester and 
Burnham should this Court find that reconsideration of the 
warning devices preemption issue is appropriate. The Court 
does not find that such further discovery is needed — 
regardless of the basis for their decisions, the only 
significant fact for purposes of the preemption issue is that 
a decision was made.1 
In sum, the undisputed evidence shows that a decision was 
made by the State which, under the law, is a "federal 
decision" that preempts Georgia law on the adequacy of the 
warning devices. CSX is therefore entitled to summary 
judgment on that issue such that no evidence or argument on 
1 
If Plaintiff believes that the testimonies of Hester and 
Burnham may be relevant for another purpose, they may depose 
those individuals by agreement with counsel for CSX or by 
leave of Court upon proper motion. 
6 
the adequacy of the warning 
be admissible at trial. 
ACCORDINGLY, Plaintiff 
GRANTED IN PART and DENIED 
reconsideration is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED, this 
devices based on Georgia law will 
•s motion for reconsideration is 
IN PART; Defendant's motion for 
the $4 day of April, 1990. 
7 
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sentative of the Estate of Benno 
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Third Party Defendant. 
Joseph Kalthoff, 
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v. 
Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company, 
Defendant. 
John Kalthoff , Trustee for the 
Estate of J e f f r e y Kalthoff, 
deceased, 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v . 
Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company, 
Defendant and 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
v. 
Bud Morrow, as Personal Repre-
sentative of the Estate of 
Benno Kalthoff, Deceased, 
Civil File No. 3-88-0353 
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Civil File No. 3-88-0354 
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FILED, i<n •: m?r 
FRANCIS E. DOSAL. CLERK 
Darrell Wolff, Trustee for the Civil File No. 3-88-0556 
Heirs of Benno Kalthoff, 
deceased, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company, 
Defendant. 
John Kalthoff, Trustee for the Civil File No. 3-88-0557 
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Plaintiff, 
v. 
Burlington Northern Railroad 
Company, 
Defendant. 
David J. Moskal, Esq., Schwebel, Goetz & Sieben, P.A., 
5120 IDS Center, Minneapolis, MN 55402, Maclay R. 
Hyde, Esq., and Erik T. Salveson, Esq., Gray, Plant, 
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for Burlington Northern Railroad. 
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 
This matter is before the court upon defendants motion for 
summary judgment challenging plaintiffs' negligence claims. For 
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the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted in 
part and denied in part. 
I. FACTS 
These five cases arise out of an accident in which 
defendant's train collided with the Kalthoffs1 van, killing four 
of the five occupants and seriously injuring the fifth. 
Plaintiffs seek recovery for defendant's alleged negligence under 
a number of different theories. Specifically, plaintiffs claim 
that defendant was negligent in its operation of its train, 
negligent in failing to make the railroad crossing safe for 
motorists and negligent per se in failing to satisfy its 
statutory obligations in connection with the intersection. 
Defendant's summary judgment motion challenges plaintiffs' 
claims on three grounds. First, defendant claims that federal 
regulation of railroads under the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45 
U.S.C. § 421 et sea., preempts any state statutory or common law 
duty to ensure that railroad crossings are safe. Second, 
defendant contends that plaintiffs' negligence per se claims must 
fail either because defendant complied fully with its duty, or 
because the statutory provisions cited by the plaintiffs impose 
no affirmative duty on the railroad. Finally, defendant argues 
that there is no authority under statute or common law that 
imposes on a railroad the duty to realign either railroad tracks 
or roadways that intersect at a sharp angle. 
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II. Analysis 
In deciding defendant's motion for summary judgment the 
court must apply the standards set forth in Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c). The defendant bears the initial burden of informing the 
court of the basis for its motion, and of identifying those 
portions of the pleadings, depositions, and affidavits which it 
believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material 
fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). In 
order to defeat the motion, plaintiffs must set forth specific 
facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 56(e). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the 
outcome of the suit under governing law will properly preclude 
the entry of summary judgment." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 
477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The judge*s function at the summary 
judgment stage is not to weigh the evidence, but to determine 
whether there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at 249. 
The Supreme Court has stated that summary judgment "is 
properly regarded not as a disfavored procedural shortcut, but 
rather as an integral part of the Federal Rules as a whole, which 
are designed 'to secure the just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action.'" Celotex, 477 U.S. at 327 
(quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1) . The court must consider not only 
"the rights of persons asserting claims" but also "the rights of 
persons opposing such claims...to demonstrate, in the manner 
provided by the Rule, prior to trial, that the claims have no 
factual basis." Id. In this regard, the court must grant 
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summary judgment ifr on the record before the court, no 
reasonable jury could find in favor of the nonmoving party. 
Anderson. 477 U.S. at 250. 
A. Preemption 
Defendants preemption argument is undermined by the 
recent Eighth Circuit case of Karl v. Burlington Northern 
Railroad Co., 880 F.2d 68 (8th Cir. 1989) . Karl is a railroad 
crossing case in which defendant argued, among other things, that 
federal law preempted common law negligence claims. In rejecting 
defendants position, the court stated: 
In general, state laws may be preempted if 
they actually conflict with an express or 
implied federal declaration, or if the state 
law is in a field that is so pervasively 
controlled by the federal law that no room is 
left for state rule making...• Neither 
circumstance is present in this case. First, 
nothing suggests that Karl was forced to 
choose whether to follow federal or state 
law, a traditional test of whether state and 
federal laws are in actual conflict.... 
Additionally, Burlington Northern can point 
to no case law or legislative history to 
support the theory that Congress intended to 
completely occupy the field of railroad 
safety governance.... We conclude that 
Karlfs negligence claim is not preempted by 
federal law.Id, at 76 (citations omitted). 
Defendant attempts to distinguish Karl on the grounds that 
the Iowa transportation authority made no decision with respect 
to the safety devices at the intersection. Defendant contrasts 
the actions of the Minnesota Department of Transportation, which 
approved the safety devices in place at the site of the Kalthoff 
accident. This distinction is unfounded because the Eighth 
Circuit in Karl specifically stated that "the local agency in 
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this case approved the warning devices....11 Id. Whether the 
court1 s statement was actually true is not important. The court 
clearly assumed that a decision had been made when it rejected 
the preemption argument. This court is bound to apply the 
precedent of the Eighth Circuit, and therefore defendant's 
summary judgment motion for preemption is denied. 
B. Negligence per se 
Defendant next challenges plaintiffs1 claims that 
defendant is per se negligent in failing to comply with Minn. 
Stat. §§ 219.06, 219.19, 219.20, and 219.567. Negligence per se 
results from the breach of a statutorily defined standard of 
conduct. This statutory standard replaces the ordinary 
negligence standard of the reasonable, prudent person*s conduct 
in a similar situation. Seim v. Garavalia, 306 N.W.2d 806, 810 
(Minn. 1981). 
The only difference between a statutorily 
imposed duty of care and a duty of care under 
common law is that the duty imposed by 
statute is fixed, so its breach ordinarily 
constitutes conclusive evidence of 
negligence, or negligence per se. while the 
measure of legal duty in the absence of a 
statute is determined under common law 
principles. 
Zerbv v. Warren, 297 Minn. 134. 139, 210 N.W.2d 58, 62 (1973). 
See also Dart v. Pure Oil Co., 223 Minn. 526, 27 N.W.2d 555 
(1947) . 
Violation of a statute is negligence per se if the 
plaintiffs are members of the class of persons the statute was 
intended to protect, plaintiffs1 injuries are those the statute 
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was intended to prevent, and violation of the statute is the 
proximate cause of the injury. Wildwood Mink Ranch v. United 
States, 218 F. Supp. 67, 71 (D. Minn. 1963); Johnson v. Farmers 
and Merchants State Bank, 320 N.W. 2d 892, 897 (Minn. 1982). 
Applying this test to plaintiffs1 claims, the court concludes 
that plaintiffs have failed to establish defendant's per se 
negligence for violation of Minn. Stat. §§ 219.06, 219.17, 
219.19, and 219.20, and defendant's motion for summary judgment 
on these claims is granted. 
Minn. Stat. § 219.06 states that "[a] railroad company shall 
maintain*, wherever its lines cross a public road, a proper and 
conspicuous sign indicating the crossing." It is clear from the 
record that the Clear Lake crossing was protected by standard 
cross buck signs. Plaintiffs admit this. Since defendant has 
complied with the statute, there can be no negligence per se 
because there has been no statutory violation. 
Minn. Stat. § 219.17 provides that lf[t]he commissioner by 
rule shall require that uniform warning signs be placed at grade 
crossings." As defendant correctly points out, under this 
statute, an affirmative duty is imposed upon the commissioner, 
not the railroad. Defendant cannot violate a statute which does 
not impose an obligation upon it. Thus defendant has not 
violated the statute and, absent such a violation, cannot be 
found negligent per se. 
Minn. Stat. § 219.19 requires the commissioner to designate 
those crossings which require additional warning signs. Once 
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this designation has been made, the statute provides that "the 
road authority shall furnish and maintain uniform signs in the 
appropriate places on the highway....fl Here again, no 
affirmative duty is placed upon the railroad, but rather upon the 
commissioner and the road authority. Defendant cannot be found 
per se negligent where there is no statutorily imposed duty and 
thus no violation of the statute. 
Minn. Stat. § 219.20 sets forth the procedure to be followed 
to have stop signs placed at a crossing: 
On determining, after an investigation 
following a petition from a governmental 
agency...or on the commissioner's own motion, 
that stop signs should be install ^a at: a 
crossing, the commissioner shall designate 
the crossing a stop crossing and shall notify 
the railway company.... The railway shall 
erect the uniform stop crossing signs.... 
The commissioner made no such designation for the Clear Lake 
crossing. As a result, no obligations were imposed upon the 
defendant. As stated above, defendant cannot be found per se 
negligent for failure to comply with a statute which imposes no 
duty upon it. 
Defendant has also moved for summary judgment on plaintiffs1 
claim that defendant was negligent per se in failing to ring the 
bell or sound the whistle on the locomotive at least 80 rods in 
front of the crossing, as required by Minn. Stat. § 219.567. 
This statute imposes an affirmative duty upon defendant, and 
noncompliance, if proved, may establish a finding of negligence 
per se. Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. Hauaan, 184 F.2d 472, 
476 (8th Cir. 1950); Roth v. Swanson, 145 F.2d 262, 265 (8th Cir. 
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1944). Defendant supports its motion for summary judgment with 
the depositions of witnesses who were in a position to observe 
the train as it approached the crossing. Plaintiffs counters 
with similar evidence. This conflicting testimony creates a 
genuine issue of material fact. Therefore, defendant's motion 
for summary judgment on plaintiffs1 claim that defendant was 
negligent per se in failing to comply with Minn. Stat. § 219.567 
is denied. 
Finally, defendant contends that it has no duty, either 
statutory or at common lawf to realign a railroad crossing that 
forms an acute angle with the roadway. The question of whether 
the Clear Lake crossing was unsafe or hazardous is one of fact 
for the jury to determine. The angle of the crossing is one 
factor for the jury to consider in reaching its conclusion. 
C. Other Motions 
Also before this court is plaintiffs1 motion for 
partial summary judgment seeking to strike the defense of 
contributory negligence. Defendant has withdrawn this defense 
with respect to the passengers in the Kalthoff's van. With 
respect to the driver, plaintiffs1 motion is denied. 
Defendant seeks bifurcation of the trial into damages 
and liability phases. Defendant claims that evidence relating to 
damages will have a prejudicial effect on liability issues. 
Bifurcation would not solve this problem because both the damages 
issue and the liability issue are supported by similar evidence. 
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Nor will bifurcation in this case contribute 
significantly to judicial economy. Bifurcation can result in 
more efficient litigation where a lengthy damage determination 
can potentially be avoided by litigating liability first. Here, 
the potential efficiency gains from bifurcation are minimal 
because neither the liability phase nor the damages phase of the 
litigation should be particularly complex or protracted. For 
these reasons, defendant's motion for bifurcation is denied. 
D. Motion in Limine. 
Defendant has filed a motion in limine to prevent 
introduction of evidence relating to the erection of a stop sign 
at the accident site following the accident. Evidence of 
subsequent remedial measures is inadmissable under Fed. R. Evid. 
407. The purpose of this rule is to prevent the threat of 
admission of such evidence from discouraging and delaying the 
taking of necessary remedial measures. Therefore, defendant's 
motion in limine is granted. 
Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Defendant's summary judgment motion challenging 
plaintiffs1 claims on the basis of federal preemption 
is DENIED. 
2. Defendant's summary judgment motion challenging 
plaintiffs' claims that defendant was negligent per se 
in violating Minn. Stat. §§ 219.06, 219.17, 219.19, and 
219.20 is GRANTED. 
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3. Defendant's summary judgment motion challenging 
plaintiffs1 claims that defendant was negligent per se 
in violating Minn. Stat. § 219.567 is DENIED. 
4. Plaintiffs1 motion for partial summary judgment motion 
seeking to strike the defense of contributory 
negligence is DENIED with respect to the driver of the 
van and DENIED as moot as to the passengers. 
5. Defendant's motion for bifurcation of the trial is 
DENIED. 
6. Defendant's motion in limine to exclude evidence of a 
stop sign erected after the accident is GRANTED. 
Dated: dt^i 2L , 1990. 
"H-
PauiAf Hagnusoi 
United States d i s t r i c t Court Judge 
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FICED 
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA 
BILLINGS DIVISION 
' 9* m\t O 1 C 5 H 
MAXINE NIXON, DONALD NIXON, 
DELANE NIXON, and DALLAS-
NIXON, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
BURLINGTON NORTHERN RAILROAD, 
a corporation, 
Defendant. 
CV 85-384-BLG-JFB 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER 
Present ly pending before the Court i s defendant's 
Motion for Part ia l Summary Judgment. For the reasons stated 
below, defendant's motion i s granted. 
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Darrell Nixon was killed when his automobile collided 
with a Burlington Northern train at a rai lroad crossing in 
Plevna, Montana. Maxine Nixon, the mother and only surviving 
parent of the deceased, f i led this action al leging, among ozher 
th ings , that the defendant railroad f a i l e d to furnish proper 
warning signals or safeguards, or to otherwise adequately notify 
the decedent of the train's approach. 
Defendant moves for p a r t i a l summary judgment on 
p l a i n t i f f ' s claim as i t relates to a fai lure to furnish proper 
warning signals or devices at the railroad crossing. Defendant 
contends that federal s t a t u t e s and regulat ions pertaining to the 
i n s t a l l a t i o n of c r o s s i n g warning d e v i c e s preempt any s t a t e 
s ta tu tory or common law dut i e s i t may have had with respect to 
the warning devices in use a t the Plevna c r o s s i n g a t the time of 
the a c c i d e n t . S p e c i f i c a l l y f d e f e n d a n t a rgues t h a t any s t a t e 
d u t i e s are preempted under the Rai l road Safe ty Act , 45 U.S.C. 
5433 , and the Highway Safety Act , 23 D.S.C. §401 £ i ^ s e c , , and 
r e g u l a t i o n s t h e r e u n d e r . 
DISCUSSION 
The Rai l road Safety Act p rov ides t h a t " . . . [ a ] s t a t e may 
adopt or cont inue and force any law f r u l e , r e g u l a t i o n , order or 
s t a n d a r d r e l a t i n g t o r a i l r o a d s a f e t y u n t i l such t ime as the 
S e c r e t a r y has adopted a r u l e , r e g u l a t i o n , o r d e r , or s t andard 
governing the sub j ec t mat te r of such S t a t e r e q u i r e m e n t . . . " . 45 
U . S . C . §434 ( 1 9 7 6 ) . The Nin th C i r c u i t has c o n s t r u e d t h a t 
l a n g u a g e t o mean t h a t t h e " R a i l r o a d S a f e t y Act preempts only 
t h o s e s t a t e laws where t h e f e d e r a l government has acted wi th 
r e s p e c t t o t h e same ' s u b j e c t m a t t e r . 1 Marshal l v . S u r l i n c t o n 
N o r t h e r n , T n e , . 7 2 o F.2d 1149 , 1153 (9 th C i r . 1 9 8 3 ) . The 
p e r t i n e n t q u e s t i o n h e r e i s whether s t a t e law i s t r y i n g t o 
r e g u l a t e t h e same " s u b j e c t m a t t e r " which i s r egu l a t ed by .the 
S e c r e t a r y . I d . a t 1154. 
This C o u r t ' s de t e rmina t ion of t h a t i s sue i s guided by 
the Ninth C i r c u i t ' s d e c i s i o n in Marsha l l , which a rose out of t he 
D i s t r i c t of Montana. In M a r s h a l l , the Court no t ed : 
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"The Railroad Safety Act requires the Secretary 
to study and deve lop s o l u t i o n s to problems 
associated with rai lroad grade c r o s s i n g s . 45 
U.S.C. S433 (1976). The Highway Safety Act of 
1966, Pub.L. No. 89-564, 80 S t a t . 731 (1966) (as 
amended, codified a t 23 U.S.C. S5401-404 (1982)), 
d i r e c t s t h e S e c r e t a r y to d e v e l o p un i form 
s tandards and to approve state-designed highway 
safety programs tha t comply with them, which are 
then e l i g i b l e t o r e c e i v e f e d e r a l f i n a n c i a l 
a s s i s t a n c e . 23 U . S . C . $402 ( 1 9 8 2 ) . The 
S e c r e t a r y , t h r o u g h t h e F e d e r a l Highway 
Admin is t ra t ion , prescribed procedures to obtain 
uniformity in highway t r a f f i c control devices and 
adopted the Manual on Uniform Tra f f i c Control 
Devices on S t r e e t s and Highways, see 23 C.F.R. 
S655.601 ( 1 9 8 1 ) , which a l s o was adopted by 
Montana, see Mont.Code Ann. $61-8-202 (1981). 
The manual p r e s c r i b e s t h a t t s e s e l e c t i o n of 
devices a t grade crossings and the approval for 
f e d e r a l funds i s to be made by local agencies 
with j u r i sd i c t i on over the cross ing. Thus, the 
S e c r e t a r y has de lega ted f ede ra l a u t h o r i t y to 
regulate grade crossings to local agencies. 
Marshal l . 720 F.2d at 1154. In tha t case, a federal decis ion, 
through the loca l i t y in charge of the crossing in question, had 
no t been made r e g a r d i n g t h e type of warning device to be 
i n s t a l l e d a t the cross ing. The Court therefore concluded tha t 
the r a i l r o a d ' s duty under the a p p l i c a b l e s t a t e law was not 
preempted. The same cannot be said in t h i s case . 
Defendant has shown, and p l a i n t i f f has not disputed, 
t h a t on Apr i l 12 , 1984, p r i o r to the decedent 's accident, an 
agreement was made between the State of Montana, act ing through 
i t s Depar tment of Highways , F a l l o n County, and defendant 
B u r l i n g t o n Nor thern , wherein the p a r t i e s agreed to i n s t a l l 
f l a s h i n g l i g h t s i g n a l s with automatic ga t e s a t the Plevna 
c r o s s i n g . (See, Exh ib i t C to d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion for P a r t i a l 
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Summary Judgment)* This agreement was the r e s u l t of an 
evaluation and determination by the State Department of Highways 
as to the type of c r o s s i n g pro tec t ion warranted, and was 
subsequently approved by the Federal Eighway Administrat ion. 
The determination by the S ta te Eighway Department const i tu ted a 
f e d e r a l d e c i s i o n , reached through the s t a t e agency, on the 
adequacy of the warning dev ices at the c r o s s i n g . Once tha t 
d e t e r m i n a t i o n was made, any app l i c ab l e s t a t e common law or 
s t a t u t o r y duty upon d e f e n d a n t became v o i d , a s f e d e r a l l y 
preempted. 
P l a in t i f f argues against preemption on the ground tha t 
t he Manual on Uniform T r a f f i c Contro l Devices, adopted a t 23 
C.F.R. §655.601, p rov ides tha t "the determination of need and 
s e l e c t i o n of devices a t a grade crossing i s made by the public 
agency with j u r i s d i c t i o n a l au thor i ty . " P l a in t i f f contends tha t 
the Ci ty of Plevna i s the l o c a l agency with j u r i s d i c t i o n a l 
au thor i ty over i t s own s t r e e t s and cross ings , and tha t since i t 
had not made an independent de te rmina t ion as to the type of 
s ignal needed, the s t a t e law is not preempted. This argument i s 
not persuas ive , as a review of the regula t ions promulgated under 
the Eighway Safety Act c lea r ly indicates tha t the s t a t e agency, 
in t h i s case the Montana Highways Department , i s the " local 
agency" contemplated in the Marshall dec is ion . See, 23 C.F.R. 
§646.200, e t . s e c , , and §924.100 §£.*. seg- As cor rec t ly noted by 
de fendan t , i t i s s t a t e agencies to which the federal authori ty 
has been delegated, and n[w]here appropr ia te , the processes sha l l 
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be developed cooperatively with o f f i c ia l s of the various un i t s of 
l o c a l governments." 23 C.F.R. S924.70Q. The use of the term 
"local agency" in the Marshall d e c i s i o n , i n s t e a d of "publ ic 
agency", does not serve to transfer the author i ty so delegated 
from the state to the town or municipal l eve l
 # as p l a i n t i f f would 
have t h i s Court r u l e . 
Furthermore, the undisputed record indica tes that the 
members of the Plevna town counci l , acting for and on behalf of 
the town of Plevna, pet i t ioned the Sta te of Montana, Department 
of Highways, to i n s t a l l ' a flashing l i g h t s ignal with gates a t the 
crossing in quest ion. The record further shows t ha t the town of 
Plevna agreed to share in the cost of repai r ing or replacing the 
s igna ls ins ta l l ed pursuant to that reques t . Given the- fact t ha t 
the c i t y of Plevna s p e c i f i c a l l y requested the type of device 
which was eventually i n s t a l l ed , and i n i t i a t e d the process which 
culminated in a de te rmina t ion by the s t a t e agency that a new 
signal was needed, i t i s c lear tha t federal preemption applies in 
t h i s c a se r e g a r d l e s s of how one c o n s t r u e s the term " l o c a l 
agency". As such, defendant cannot be found negligent under the 
a p p l i c a b l e s t a t e law for f a i l i n g to provide a more adequate 
warning device a t the crossing in quest ion. 
Accordingly, 
IT IS ORDERED t h a t d e f e n d a n t ' s Motion for P a r t i a l 
Summary Judgment be and i s hereby granted with r e spec t t o 
p l a i n t i f f ' s claim tha t defendant fai led to provide an adequate 
warn ing device- a t the c ros s ing in q u e s t i o n . The Clerk i s 
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directed not to enter judgment until all claims against all 
parties have been resolvedf pursuant to Rule 54(b) , F.R.Civ.P. 
The Clerk i s fu r t he r d i r e c t e d f o r t h w i t h to no t i fy 
counsel for the respec t ive pa r t i e s of the making of t h i s order. 
Done and dated t h i s ^ day of Apr i l , 1988. 
K^J Chief Judge 
6 
